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Consumers become more health-conscious and have higher and more diverse expectations for food 
quality, ranging from food taste and nutrition features to the characteristics of food production, 
processing, and marketing. In response, large numbers of new products are introduced and a wide 
range of changes have occurred in food and agricultural markets. Accordingly, this dissertation 
comprises three essays investigating questions relevant to these changes and providing implications 
for food policy and retailing. 
The first essay focuses on the increasing popularity of the “New Super Grain”—Ethiopian 
teff. Specifically, we examine Ethiopian consumers’ welfare losses due to increasing teff prices 
and evaluate the effectiveness of alternative food aid policies in alleviating these losses. Using data 
from two waves of Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey 2013-2014 and 2015-2016, we estimate a two-
stage demand system and document the consumption patterns of cereals in Ethiopia. We find that 
teff is the most own-price inelastic grain in the cereal market and a one percent increase in teff 
prices leads to a decrease of 0.38 percent in total consumer welfare. Subsequently, our results 
suggest wheat aid is an effective policy in reducing the impacts of increasing teff prices, which 
lends support to the ongoing Ethiopian policy that distributes subsidized wheat on a large scale. 
The second essay focuses on the introduction of new demand-enhancing agricultural 
products. Specifically, we evaluate the welfare impacts of the introduction of Honeycrisp apples. 
We estimate structural models of consumer demand and retailer competition using store scanner 
data covering 61 cities across the United States during the period from March 2009 to February 
2015. The results show that, on average, the introduction of Honeycrisp apples increases consumer 
welfare by 3.14 cents per pound, of which 2.98 cents is explained by the increased number of total 
apple varieties and 0.16 cents by the decline in prices of competing apple varieties. The results also 
show that the introduction of Honeycrisp apples has increased the total sales quantity by 8.03 
percent and the total sales revenue by 21.25 percent over the study period. 
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The third essay examines the food retail competition in local markets by addressing the 
heterogeneity in households’ choice sets of stores, shopping baskets, and travel distances. A revised 
mixed logit model is developed to model the household choice of shopping stores that enable us to 
calculate stores’ price elasticities and recover their gross profit margins under alternative pricing 
strategies. We construct a dataset for estimation by matching the information in 2016 IRI household 
and retail scanner datasets. The results show that without considering household travel distance for 
shopping, we might overestimate stores’ price elasticities and underestimate their gross profit 
margins. The results also suggest that households prefer to visiting closer stores at expense of 
paying higher prices for their shopping baskets. Finally, we find that one increase in the number of 
nearby rivals within 5 kilometers from a store is associated with a decrease of 1.6 to 2.4 percent in 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
The effective functioning and organization of food and agricultural markets are vital to improve 
people’s lives and, consequently have been central to research and policy goals throughout history. 
Over the past century, a tremendous effort has been put to the development of agricultural 
technologies and processes that enable us to increase production and alleviate the risk of hunger 
and malnutrition to a large extent. Although such problems still exist, our attention has shifted away 
from the challenges in food and agricultural production and moved towards issues pertinent to 
consumption (Lusk, Roosen, and Shogren 2011). As consumers have increasingly high and diverse 
expectations for food quality, food and agricultural markets are becoming more consumer-oriented 
(Unnevehr et al. 2010). 
In the last decades, a wide range of changes has taken place. Food and agricultural products 
have been gradually more differentiated to serve consumers’ heterogeneous tastes and expectations. 
Consumers demand for quality ranges from taste, appearance, and healthfulness of food to how 
food is produced, packaged and marketed. In response, an abundance of new food products is 
introduced, providing consumers more options than ever. These changes have reshaped the 
landscape of food and agricultural markets and accordingly raised public interests in timely 
empirical research on consumer demand for foods and implications for food policy and retailing.  
This dissertation consists of three essays focusing on research questions in consumer 
demand for foods and consumer choices of stores. Overall, each essay builds an analytical 
framework centered on consumer demand with a strong connection to economic theory. The first 
essay investigates the increasing popularity of teff consumption in developed countries on 
consumer welfare in Ethiopia. Headlined by the popular press, there is an increasing demand for 
ancient grains in Europe and North America. Teff is one of such grains and is primarily grown in 
Ethiopia. With two to three times as much iron and calcium as quinoa—“Super Grain”—contains, 
teff is entitled the “New Super Grain.” Having concerns about a dramatic increase in domestic teff 
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prices driven by the global demand, the Ethiopian government imposed an export ban on teff grain 
and flour in 2006. This trade restriction was expected to stabilize teff prices and enhance food 
security in Ethiopia. After about a decade, in 2015, the government partially lifted the export ban 
and, consequently, teff prices increased. The average teff price in 2016 and 2017 was 10 percent 
higher than the price in 2014 and 2015. In the meantime, the government had been implementing 
a wheat import program since 2008, which has enabled consumers to substitute teff with wheat. 
The first essay measures the loss of consumer welfare due to the increasing teff prices and the 
impacts of food aid policies in mitigating this loss. The results provide new evidence on the welfare 
impacts of price increases and improve our understanding of the cereal market and food policy in 
Ethiopia. 
The second essay focuses on the introduction of new demand-enhancing agricultural 
products. The agriculture sector in the United States (U.S.) has introduced to the market more than 
3,500 new varieties of fruit and vegetables since 2011. This large-scale introduction is primarily 
driven by research programs toward consumer-oriented products that are financially supported by 
agricultural research and development (R&D) investments. At the same time, the development of 
patent protection laws gave universities the permission to attain the ownership of inventions made 
with federal funding and, thereby, enabled them to finance agricultural research by transferring a 
part of their patent rights to the private sector. Therefore, it is of interest to know the economic 
benefits of new demand-enhancing agricultural products. The second essay examines welfare 
impacts from the introduction of a new agricultural product, with a focus on the case of Honeycrisp 
apples. Honeycrisp apples are one example of the most successful products developed by the public 
university system. The results quantify the economic benefit of Honeycrisp apples for both 
consumers and retailers and provide some implications for agricultural R&D initiatives in the 
public university system. 
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The third essay looks into store competition in local food markets and the determinants in 
the household choice of stores. According to the 2009 National Household Travel Survey, the 
annual average of a personal trip for shopping was 6.5 miles, suggesting that consumers might be 
reluctant to travel a long distance for their shopping. Ideally, they would like to shop in a store, 
both close to their residential communities and selling the products at lower prices. As a result, 
stores probably compete against nearby rivals by providing differentiated products in local markets. 
Through efforts such as developing and equipping stores, the U.S. Healthy Food Financing 
Initiatives expect to increase food access in underserved communities. However, an increasing 
number of stores do not necessarily imply an improvement of food access, since household 
decisions on food consumptions are jointly determined by the accessibility and affordability of 
stores. On one hand, opening a new store will directly increase the accessibility of food and raise 
competition in the local market and in turn reduce food prices in the local market. On the other 
hand, stores in the local market might cooperate with their nearby rivals and thereafter exercise 
market power and maintain considerable profit margins. Therefore, the third essay examines the 
store competition in local markets by addressing the heterogeneity in household choice sets of 
stores, travel distances, and shopping baskets. The results help us understand household valuations 
of store proximity and the extent to which retailer concentration drives up local food prices. The 
results also contribute to the discussion on community economic development policy and anti-trust 
regulation in local markets.
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Chapter 2. The Welfare Impacts of Increased Demand for The 
“New Super Grain” 
2.1. Introduction 
In the last decade, there is an increasing trend in demand for ancient grains such as quinoa and teff 
in Europe and North America. These grains have been preserved in the natural states for thousands 
of years but recently became popular due to their nutritional and environmental value. 1  The 
recognition from international organizations also fuels this growing popularity of ancient grains. 
For example, the United Nations launched the “International Year of Quinoa” in 2013 to raise the 
awareness of the grain, as well as its value in culture, economics, and health. With two to three 
times as much iron and calcium as quinoa contains, teff is entitled the “New Super Grain” (Jeffrey 
2015; Secorun 2016). 
Teff, one of the main staples in Ethiopia, provides more than 15 percent of all calories 
consumed in the country (O’Connor 2016). The increasing global demand for teff raised the public 
concerns about the affordability of teff and food security in Ethiopia as well. In response, the 
Ethiopian government imposed an export ban on teff grain and flour in 2006 to stabilize the 
domestic teff price (Provost and Jobson 2014; Jeffrey 2015; Nurse 2015; O’Connor 2016; Secorun 
2016).2 However, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) challenged 
the purpose of this restriction, arguing that the poor agrarian households in rural Ethiopia primarily 
grow teff as a cash crop and, thus, would benefit from higher teff prices. The FAO reports suggest 
that wheat, maize, and sorghum are more critical than teff to enhance food security (Demeke and 
Di Marcantonio 2013a; Assefa 2015). 
                                                     
1 The terms “grain” and “cereal” will be used interchangeably through this chapter. 
2 A wide array of policies designed to control food prices are frequently employed in developing countries, 
since food expenditure in these countries accounts for a large share of household consumption (Porteous 
2017). In the poorest countries, household diets heavily depend on staple grains rather than meat or processed 
foods (Abbott 2012). 
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Due to improvements of technology and government policies, the teff production in 
Ethiopia doubled between 2006 and 2015. The growth of production helped to alleviate concerns 
about maintaining a sufficient teff supply in the domestic market. As a result, the government began 
to lift the teff ban partially by granting export licenses to 48 commercial farmers (O’Connor 2016; 
Secorun 2016).3 The export permission was put into effect in July 2015, the beginning of the fiscal 
in Ethiopia. After the withdrawal of the ban, teff prices in Ethiopia increased considerably. The 
average price of teff in 2016 and 2017, on average, was 10 percent higher than its level in 2014 and 
2015 (Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise 2017). Since teff is a primary staple in Ethiopia, the 
increase in its prices would inevitably hurt consumer welfare and have adverse impacts on food 
security. Meanwhile, the Ethiopian government maintained a large quantity of wheat import since 
2008 and distributed the imported wheat at subsidized prices in the market (Demeke and Di 
Marcantonio 2013b). Consumers are hence able to substitute teff with wheat. However, the overall 
change in consumer welfare is unclear.  
To improve our understanding of the cereal market in Ethiopia, this chapter investigates 
the following questions. How large is the adverse impact of the increasing teff prices on the 
consumer welfare of an average Ethiopian household? How effective is the ongoing food aid of 
wheat in reducing this adverse impact? Would it be more effective if less expensive cereals, such 
as maize, barley, and sorghum, are provided as alternative food aids? To answer these questions, 
we particularly examine the food expenditure in Ethiopia and the associated cereal consumption 
patterns. A two-stage food demand system is estimated using the aggregated consumption data 
from the two waves of Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey 2013-2014 and 2015-2016. With the 
estimated demand system, we are able to calculate price and expenditure elasticities of grains, 
                                                     
3  According to the Ethiopian Agricultural Transformation Agency, the government would expand the 




evaluate the change in consumer welfare due to the increasing teff prices, and explore the role of 
alternative food aid policies in reducing the impact of “teff fever.” 
The cereal production is an essential component of Ethiopian agriculture and has been 
continuously subject to public policies over the past fifty years (Rashid 2010). The cereal sub-
sector employs 60 percent of rural labor and provides more than 60 percent of household calorie 
consumption with an equivalent value at more than 40 percent of household food expenditure 
(Rashid 2010). Teff is the most valuable staple grain in Ethiopia. It is grown on 23 percent of the 
overall cultivated land by 43 percent of agrarian households who raise grain crops (Central 
Statistical Agency 2016). It is the only grain in which Ethiopia has a comparative advantage in the 
international cereal market (Demeke and Di Marcantonio 2013a).  
Most of the literature on the impacts of price change in the cereal market examines the 
adverse impact of food price spikes on the well-being of households in poor countries. Ivanic and 
Martin (2008) investigate the short-run effects of higher staple food prices on poverty in low-
income countries. According to household food consumption and production data from nine low-
income countries as well as international market prices, they find the increasing food prices 
generally raises the overall poverty, although the impacts might differ by commodity and by 
country. On the contrary, using data from the household survey and the information of domestic 
prices in Vietnam, Vu and Glewwe (2011) find average welfare gain for net sellers outweighs 
average welfare loss for net buyers and hence conclude that on average higher food prices 
contribute to the increase of household welfare in Vietnam.  
The only two economic studies on the effects of rising prices of “super grains” are Stevens 
(2015) and Bellemare et al. (2016). Both of them investigate the problems triggered by the “quinoa 
fever” since 2009. By modeling household demand for foods, Stevens (2015) finds the rising 
quinoa prices do not affect household nutrition outcomes through the pathway of regional 
preferences for quinoa. The author attributes this insignificance to the small share of quinoa in local 
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household diets. Bellemare et al. (2016) examine the welfare impacts of rising quinoa prices in 
Peru, using pseudo-panel and the difference-in-difference method. They find a positive association 
between the price of quinoa and household welfare within the areas where quinoa is consumed, and 
a robust positive relationship between household welfare and household quinoa production as well. 
In contrast to the small share of quinoa in household diets in South America, teff is a local staple 
food in Ethiopia, accounting for a large proportion of household food consumption, especially for 
urban residents. 
This chapter is closely related to the literature on cereal supply and demand in Ethiopia. 
Mottaleb and Rahut (2018) investigate the determinants of household production and consumption 
of teff using the first two waves of the Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey. Their results imply a strong 
value chain of teff between farmers and consumers, suggesting to link producers with international 
markets. Their study, however, does not evaluate the welfare impact of the increasing teff prices 
on consumer welfare. In another relevant study, Tefera et al. (2012) examine the food demand and 
consumer welfare in Ethiopia. They estimate a household demand system for foods using six waves 
of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey from 1994 to 2009. They find the rising food prices benefit 
both net-cereal sellers and autarkic and net-cereal buyers. There are two distinctive features in this 
study. First, we use updated survey data that are nationally representative for both rural and urban 
areas. Second, we model the decision process of food consumption in a two-stage approach and 
focus our discussion on the consumption patterns within the segment of cereals. 
 This chapter also enriches the literature on the trade restriction in agricultural markets. 
Most of the existing studies have found the adverse impact of trade restrictions. Martin and 
Anderson (2012) estimates the impacts of domestic market-insulating policy on international price 
spikes and find that this policy intervention makes the problem worse (i.e., not only fail to stabilize 
prices in the domestic market but also contribute price volatility in the international market). A 
sizeable literature is in line with this point of view after investigating the impacts of export 
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restrictions (i.e., extra export tax, export quota, and export ban) imposed by grain exporting 
countries during the world food price crisis in 2007 and 2008. For example, Götz et al. (2013) focus 
on export restrictions in Russia and Ukraine during the crisis and argue the wheat producers 
experienced a loss of welfare and the government interventions destabilized the wheat market. 
Using a 10-year period data from 5 countries in Eastern and Southern Africa, Porteous (2017) 
investigates the effect of 13 short-term export bans on maize. His results show that the export bans 
do not have a significant effect on cross-border gaps in maize prices and even destabilize markets 
by signaling price increases rather than preventing them. In contrast to these studies, we discuss 
the impact of the withdrawal rather than the imposition of a trade restriction. Moreover, we evaluate 
the effectiveness of alternative food aid policies in mitigating the consumer welfare loss due to the 
increasing teff prices and measure the distance of these policies to the ideal one that offers 
households an equivalent cash transfer. 
 The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2.2, we introduce some 
background information about teff and the Ethiopian cereal market. Section 2.3 displays the data. 
Section 2.4 presents the analytical framework and the estimation approach. In Section 2.5, we 
discuss the results of our model and welfare analysis and then conclude in Section 2.6. 
 
2.2. Teff in Ethiopia 
Teff is a gift from Ethiopia to the world, which is gluten-free and high in protein, iron, and calcium. 
It has been grown and consumed by Ethiopians for millennia and recently become an upper-class 
staple grain for health-conscious consumers in Europe and North America. Resistant to many biotic 
and abiotic stresses, teff is highly adaptable to various terrains from basin to highland (Assefa 2015). 
According to the Central Statistical Agency (CSA) annual reports on the Agricultural Sample 
Survey in Ethiopia from 2005/2006 to 2015/2016, teff is the second most widely grown crop, 
accounting for the largest share of farmland over the past decade. Figure 2.1 shows the number of 
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households who grew teff increased from 5.2 million in 2005 to 6.6 million in 2015, and the 
farmland used for teff rose from 2.2 million hectares in 2005 to 2.8 million hectares in 2015. On 
average, the farmland used for teff was 30 percent more than that for maize, while the production 
quantity of teff was 50 percent less than that of maize. Among the primary cereals, teff was the 
least productive one, though the average yield of teff had been increasing over the last 10 years up 
to 15.6 quintals per hectare. In 2015, the average yield of teff was less than half as much as that of 
maize and was about sixty percent of the average yield of wheat and sorghum. The yield of teff is 
doomed to be lower since teff has been sheltered in Ethiopia for thousands of years and seldom 
exposed to agricultural research and investment (Jeffrey 2015). For the harvesting purpose, the tiny 
teff seeds, as small as poppy seeds, are not applicable to modern agricultural machinery designed 
for other staple crops. 
 The Agricultural Marketing Corporation (AMC), a government parastatal, controlled the 
grain trade in Ethiopia until the 1990s. In 1991, because of the policy reform, the AMC was 
replaced by the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise (EGTE). The EGTE was expected to compete 
with the private sector in the open market as a representative of the government. However, it does 
not intervene in the teff market since teff is not a cereal included in food aid in Ethiopia (Assefa 
2015). Figure 2.2 shows the wholesale prices for primary cereals from 2014 to 2017 reported by 
the EGTE. Accordingly, before the export restriction was partially withdrawn in mid-2015, the 
price of teff was fluctuating between 9 and 10 Birrs per kilogram, more than twice the price of 
maize and 20 to 50 percent higher than the prices of wheat, barley, and sorghum. After 2015, the 
price of teff rose up and reached as high as 11.5 Birrs per kilogram in October 2016. By contrast, 
the price of wheat declined from 7 Birrs in 2014 to about 5 Birrs per kilogram in 2017. Meanwhile, 
the price of barley varied slightly around 6 Birrs per kilogram, the price of sorghum experienced a 
big variation ranging from 3.9 Birrs and 6.7 Birrs per kilogram, and the price of maize stayed 
between 3 Birrs and 4 Birrs per kilogram. It is worth noting the nominal cereal prices are 
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substantially affected by the food price inflation rate and all the wholesale prices in Figure 2.2 are 
deflated by the CSA consumer price index (CPI) for food and non-alcoholic beverages. Figure 2.3 
displays the CPI data and shows that Ethiopia has been undergoing a food price inflation, especially 
in 2012 at an increasing rate of 15 percent and in 2015 at 12 percent.  
 
2.3. Data 
The data are obtained from the Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey (ESS), a collaborative project 
conducted by the Central Statistical Agency of Ethiopia (CSA) and the World Bank Living 
Standards Measurement Study (LSMS) team. The first wave was implemented in 2011-2012, 
including 3,969 households from 333 enumeration areas (EAs), of which 290 are rural EAs and 43 
are small town EAs.4 An EA is a geographic area delineated for census data collection in Ethiopia, 
usually including 150 to 200 households. In order to represent the full population in Ethiopia, the 
second wave in 2013-2014 and the third wave in 2015-2016 added additional 100 middle- and 
large-sized town EAs and consequently expanded the sample size to 5,469 households. A two-stage 
sampling method is applied, wherein EAs and households are selected successively in turn. The 
data include the information of household sampling weights for aggregation. In the end, there were 
5,262 and 4,954 households from 433 and 432 EAs in the second and the third wave of ESS, 
respectively, with an average of 11 to 12 households per EA. These EAs are sampled from 75 
geographic zones across 11 regions in Ethiopia except the southeastern part of the country, where 
there is semi-desert or desert (see Figure A1). To maintain a cohesive and nationally representative 
sample, we only use the two waves of ESS in 2013-2014 and 2015-2016.  
                                                     
4 The first wave of ESS can be regarded as an “upgraded” version of the Ethiopia Rural Household Survey 




 The fieldwork of ESS begins every September. The household- and community-part of 
ESS are distributed and collected between February and April in the next year. Households report 
their food consumption quantity and expenditure by item (e.g., teff, wheat, barley, maize, sorghum, 
horse beans, potato, and etc.) in the past week prior to the survey interview. Food prices are 
consequently obtained by dividing the associated quantity of purchase into the item-specific 
expenditure. However, food prices could be missing, if there is no any record of household 
expenditure on associated items in the past week. To address this challenge, we also use the 
community-part of ESS, which includes local retail prices by food item that are directly observed 
from up to two nearby markets.5  
In this chapter, we aggregate the data at the EA level. In particular, an item-specific price 
in an EA is an average over associated prices reported by local retailers. 6  An item-specific 
expenditure is the item-specific price multiplied by the aggregated quantity, which is obtained by 
adding up household consumption quantities with sampling weights. 7 In turn, the expenditure 
shares by item are able to be calculated. All prices are deflated by the CSA CPI.  
Table 2.1 presents the sample statistics of expenditures, prices, quantities, and expenditure 
shares for five primary cereals (i.e., teff, wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum) and four food 
segments (i.e., cereals, pulses and root crops, fruit and vegetables, and animal products). 8 The 
detailed definitions of four food segments are presented in Table A1. A common problem in the 
                                                     
5 The community questionnaires are administered by the field supervisors, rather than the enumerators. The 
price information are collected with the help of sellers in the markets. 
6 For the items that are missing in the community price data, the local prices are defined as the average of 
item-specific prices from the household expenditure data. For the items that are missing in both the 
community price data and the household expenditure data, the local prices are defined as the average prices 
from the three closest areas where such items are available. 
7 In the ESS, household consumption quantities comprise the quantities from the household purchases in last 
week, the stocks of self-production, and the gifts and other sources. The majority of household consumption 
comes from the first two sources. 
8 It worth noting that, due to the presence of zero observations, the average of expenditure conditional on 
non-zero observations is not equal to the product of the overall averages of price and quantity. 
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disaggregated data on food expenditure is that most expenditure variables are censored. In our 
context, there are large numbers of zeros in the data on cereal expenditures, since not every cereal 
is consumed in all EAs. The most consumed cereal is maize, consumed by 80 percent of EAs in 
2013 and 85 percent of EAs in 2015. It is followed by teff, consumed by 80 percent of EAs in both 
2013 and 2015. The problem of censored expenditures, however, is less of a concern for food 
segments since it is very likely that a few items, at least one, included in a food segment are 
purchased by some households in an EA. 
During the survey period in 2013 and 2015, the prices of teff, wheat, and barley had a small 
variation, while the prices of maize and sorghum experienced a significant decrease. A food 
segment price is an average price weighted by sub-segment expenditure shares. Table 2.1 shows 
the prices of cereals and fruit and vegetables went down by 19 percent, while the prices of animal 
products increased slightly and the prices of pulses and root crops rose up by 53 percent. The 
changes in consumption quantities complied with the law of demand. In other words, the 
consumption quantities of cereals and fruit and vegetables increased, while the consumption 
quantities of pulses and root crops and animal products decreased. Lastly, the expenditure shares 
experienced minor changes between 2013 and 2015. Specifically, the expenditure shares of maize 
and sorghum decreased by 1.2 percent and 1.6 percent, whereas the expenditure shares of teff and 
wheat increased by 0.7 percent and 2.2 percent. On average, teff accounted for 40 percent of the 
food expenditure on cereals and the food segment of cereals accounted for a half of the total food 
expenditure. These suggest that any changes in cereal markets, especially in teff and wheat, can 
have important implications for Ethiopians’ budgets and food security. 
Table 2.2 displays the demographic statistics of sampled EAs from two waves of ESS in 
2013 and 2015. There are 67 percent of EAs (i.e., 290 EAs) from the rural area, 10 percent from 
the small town area, and 23 percent from the urban area. The information on cereal production 
shows that maize is widely reported as a major crop grown in an EA, followed by teff and sorghum. 
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Particularly, there are 40 percent of EAs producing maize and 28 percent of EAs growing teff and 
sorghum as one of their major (or top three) crops in their communities. This is consistent with the 
information of the size of planting areas by cereal variety in Figure 2.1. There are 9 geographic 
regions included in the sample, in which chartered cities are defined as a separate group because 
they are significantly different from others in terms of the socioeconomic status. The geographic 
locations of EAs are presented in Figure A1. 
 
2.4. Analytical Framework and Estimation Approach 
To assess the impacts of alternative food policies on consumer welfare, we develop a two-level, 
structural demand system by following Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006). According to the 
theory of demand, a change in cereal prices will lead to changes in both the total cereal expenditure 
(i.e., the income effect) and the allocation of cereal consumption (i.e., the substitution effect). 
Therefore, the two-level demand system allows us to examine both the income and the substitution 




The food demand system is constructed in the approach of two-stage budgeting, according to the 
weak separability of household decisions on food expenditures.9 In particular, households allocate 
their fixed total expenditures in two stages. At the upper stage, households divide the budget into 
several food segments (e.g., cereals, pulses and root crops, fruit and vegetables, and animal 
products), while at the lower stage, households decide the consumption of food items within each 
                                                     
9 The weak separability implies that the food items can be partitioned into groups so that preferences within 
groups can be described independently of the quantities in other groups. For example, in our context, 
consumers can rank different bundles of cereals in a well-defined ordering regardless of their consumptions 
of items in other food segments. 
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segment. Food items included in the same segment, defined by the ESS (see Table A1), are assumed 
to be close substitutes.  
First, consider the lower-level demand system, in which households allocate segment 
expenditures on food items within the segment. Specifically, let the relevant segment of cereals be 
indexed by 𝐺𝐺 and the primary grains within the cereal segment be indexed by 𝑖𝑖 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁. Denote 
𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 and 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖, respectively, as the price and the quantity of grain 𝑖𝑖. The share of expenditure on grain 𝑖𝑖 








where 𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖  is the expenditure on grain 𝑖𝑖  and 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺  is the expenditure on the cereal segment 𝐺𝐺 . 
Following the specification of the Almost Ideal Demand System (AIDS) developed by Deaton and 
Muellbauer (1980), the expenditure share equation is written as 
 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 +�𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗
+ 𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 ln �
𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺
𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖, (2) 
where 𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺 is the price index given by 





��𝛾𝛾 �𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 ln𝑝𝑝𝑖𝑖 ln𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗
𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖
, (3) 
and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖 represents the additive error term for grain 𝑖𝑖. The properties of demand functions, derived 







= 0 ∀𝑗𝑗;  
Homogeneity: �𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘
𝑘𝑘
= 0 ∀𝑗𝑗;  
Symmetry: 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 𝛾𝛾𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 =
1
2 �
𝛾𝛾�𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 + 𝛾𝛾�𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�.  
The lower-level demand system is analyzed conditional on the segment expenditure (e.g., 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺). To 
address censoring in food expenditures on cereals, we adapt the form of the parsimonious censored 
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system proposed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999) for the lower-level demand system. Denote all 
parameters in the lower-level demand system, defined by (2), as 𝜃𝜃 and the explanatory part of the 
share equation for gain 𝑖𝑖 as 𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃). Then the revised model with the observed expenditure share 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 
is given by 
 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 = 1(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 + 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 > 0)[𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃) + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖], (4) 
where 1(⋅)  is a binary indicator function, 𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖  is a vector of non-price and -income variables 
determining the likelihood of the demand for grain 𝑖𝑖 with a conformable vector 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 of parameters, 
and 𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 is the random error. 
The upper-level demand system accounts for the changes in the segment expenditures due 
to the price changes in the cereal market. It is assumed that total food expenditures are spent on 
four segments, that is, cereals, pulses and root crops, fruit and vegetables, and animal products. Let 
the total expenditure 𝑋𝑋 be given as a constant and the composite price index 𝑃𝑃 be defined as a 
translog price index, analog to (3). The share of expenditure on segment 𝐺𝐺 is 𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺, such that 
 𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺 = 𝛼𝛼𝐺𝐺 +�𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺 ln𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺
𝐺𝐺
+ 𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺 ln �
𝑋𝑋
𝑃𝑃
� + 𝜖𝜖𝐺𝐺 , (5) 
where all variables denoted by capital letters are defined as before but refer to segments rather than 
food items and the subscript 𝐻𝐻 is a segment notation. The parameter restrictions are also imposed 
on the upper-level demand system. 
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− 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 , (7) 
the Kronecker delta 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 = 1  for 𝑖𝑖 = 𝑗𝑗  and 0  for 𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗  and the partial derivatives of ln𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜  with 
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By Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006), 𝜕𝜕 ln𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺 /𝜕𝜕 ln𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺  is well approximated by 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺/𝜔𝜔𝐺𝐺. Hence, 
we are able to calculate the unconditional and conditional price elasticities, defined in (6) and (7) 
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2.4.2. Estimation Approach 
Ideally, we would like to have the aggregated data with the consumption information (i.e., 
expenditures and prices) of every food item for all EAs, so that we could follow the estimation 
approach of the two-level demand system proposed by Chaudhuri, Goldberg, and Jia (2006). 
However, we are not able to completely adopt their approach due to censoring in food expenditures 
on cereals and have to accommodate this issue in the estimation at the lower stage. 
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 There are two data generating processes that can result in censored cereal expenditures. 
First, the data on cereal consumption are not well measured. By construction, the cereal 
consumption in an EA is the aggregated consumption overall households. Since the survey is 
nationally representative and households are well sampled, there is little chance that people in an 
EA do consume one cereal while all sampled households do not. So, this concern is less of a 
problem. Second, the data are well measured and people in an EA do not consume a certain cereal. 
In other words, there is no measurement error in the data. The zero cereal consumptions in an EA 
is attributed to the fact that there are no households consuming such cereals in this EA. The 
censored data in this study result from the second data generating process. In order to explain the 
zero cereal consumptions in an EA, we add in the lower-level demand a selection mechanism that 
determines the consumption of every cereal in the EA. 
 The selection mechanism is represented by as a binary choice model. Specifically, we use 
a probit model with a collection of variables capturing the fixed effects of regional lifestyles and 
socioeconomic circumstances and the supply shifters. The binary variables characterizing the fixed 
effects of regional lifestyles and socioeconomic circumstances are included in both the selection 
mechanism and the share equations of demand, whereas the supply shifters are only included in the 
selection model to address censoring in food expenditures on cereals. The supply shifters represent 
basic situations of the cereal production. In particular, the shifter variables indicate if primary 
cereals (i.e., teff, wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum) are grown as major crops (i.e., top three most 
grown crops) in an EA. These variables are predetermined and imply the market propensity for 
some cereals rather than the consumption quantity. As a result, households in an EA where teff is 
grown as a major crop are more likely to consume teff than households in another EA where teff is 
not grown as a major crop. With the information relevant to the cereal production, we cannot infer 
the cereal expenditure in an EA. Therefore, these binary variables delineating the production of 
major crops can be used to explain the selection mechanism in an EA. 
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 To estimate the lower-level demand with censoring in food expenditures on cereals, we 
follow the two-step procedure developed by Shonkwiler and Yen (1999). Based on the assumption 
of the bivariate normality of (𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖) , the observed expenditure share 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜  is thought of as the 
unconditional mean of the expenditure share, which is written as 
𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 = Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖) �𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖
𝜙𝜙(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖)
Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖)
� + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = Φ(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖)𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃) + 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖𝜙𝜙(𝑍𝑍𝑖𝑖𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖) + 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 , (10) 
where 𝜉𝜉𝑖𝑖 = 𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖𝑜𝑜 − E[𝜔𝜔𝑖𝑖]  is the disturbance term reflecting the error between the observed 
expenditure share and the unconditional, expected expenditure share, Φ(⋅)  and 𝜙𝜙(⋅)  are the 
cumulative distribution function (cdf) and the probability density function (pdf) of the univariate 
normal distribution, and 𝜙𝜙(⋅)/Φ(⋅) is the inverse mills ratio addressing the selection bias due to 
censoring. The scalar parameter 𝜆𝜆𝑖𝑖 represents the covariance of error terms (𝜈𝜈𝑖𝑖, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖) of each pair of 
the selection mechanism and the expenditure share of demand for cereal 𝑖𝑖. The estimation at the 
lower stage is conducted as follows: first, obtain ML estimates 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 of 𝛿𝛿𝑖𝑖 using the probit model for 
each cereal 𝑖𝑖; second, estimate the censored demand system for the cereal segment, defined by the 
(𝑛𝑛 − 1)-equation system in (10) evaluated at �?̂?𝛿𝑖𝑖�∀𝑖𝑖. In Deaton and Muellbauer’s AIDS model, the 
homogeneity and symmetry restrictions are imposed in the estimation, while the adding-up 
restriction is implicitly built-in by dropping one of the share equations from this 𝑛𝑛-equation system. 
However, the adding-up restriction does not hold in the presence of censoring. Hence, in the 
second-step, we alternatively exclude one of 𝑛𝑛 equations in each round of the estimation and the 
parameter estimates are the means of (𝑛𝑛 − 1)  associated estimates from all 𝑛𝑛  alternative 
estimations. Subsequently, the price and income elasticities in (6) and (9) are respectively obtained. 
All of the standard errors of parameter and elasticity estimates are calculated by using a bootstrap 
technique (also see in Bilgic and Yen 2013).10  
                                                     
10 We use a nonparametric bootstrap technique (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation), in which our data are treated 





2.5.1. Parameter Estimates and Elasticities 
Tables A2 and A3 in the Appendix display the estimates of parameters in the selection equation 
and the lower-level demand system. In Table A2, the indicators of major crops characterizing basic 
situations of the cereal production are positively related to the decision on the cereal consumption. 
In Table A3, the coefficients of inverse mills ratios are significant, suggesting the correlations 
between the consumption decisions on cereals and the associated level demand. In other words, it 
justifies the inclusion of the selection mechanism at the lower stage. Table A4 shows the results of 
the demand estimation at the upper stage. The coefficient of year dummy is either small in the 
segment share equation of animal products or insignificant in other segment share equations. This 
finding implies that the consumption pattern was similar between the two waves. For ease of 
interpretation, we show the impacts of explanatory variables in the selection equation on cereal 
consumption decisions in Table 2.3 and present the unconditional price and income elasticities at 
the upper and the lower stage in Table 2.4 and 2.5, respectively. 
 In Table 2.3, the marginal effects of regional dummies suggest the cereal consumption 
patterns vary across regions. Also, the consumption patterns are significantly different between 
rural and urban (or small town) areas. The likelihoods of consuming teff in a small town EA and 
an urban EA are 35.2 percent and 43.8 percent higher than that in a rural area, respectively. 
Moreover, we find the indicators of major crops play important roles in the selection mechanism. 
Compared to an EA where teff is not a major crop, an EA where teff is a major crop is 18 percent 
higher in the propensity for consuming teff. This difference is even greater in terms of sorghum. 
                                                     
One set of the second-step estimates (i.e., 𝜃𝜃 and 𝜆𝜆) can be obtained from the estimation using a bootstrap 
sample, so can be the elasticity estimates (i.e., 𝜀𝜀 and 𝜂𝜂). All the standard errors are the standard deviations 
over the associated estimates obtained from 500 bootstrap samples. 
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Specifically, sorghum is 55.2 percent more likely to be consumed in an EA where it is a major crop 
than another EA where it is not. 
Table 2.4 and 2.5 present price and income elasticities at the upper and lower stage, 
respectively. The diagonals of Marshallian and Hicksian elasticity matrices include the estimates 
of the own-price elasticities, all of which are negative and significant. As expected, the estimates 
of Hicksian own-price elasticities are all smaller than the estimates of Marshallian ones, since foods 
are normal goods in Ethiopia. Table 2.4 shows the consumption pattern across food segments. The 
estimates of Marshallian own-price elasticities are less than one in magnitude, implying cereals, 
pulses and root crops, fruit and vegetables, as well as animal products are staple foods for Ethiopian 
households. The estimates of Marshallian cross-price elasticities show that these foods are 
generally complementary goods. The magnitude of these estimates implies there are little 
complementary effects among these foods from different segments, consistent with the weak 
separability assumption. The estimates of Hicksian price elasticities reflect the substitution pattern 
across food segments with a given utility level. For example, to remain at the same utility level, a 
1 percent decrease in the price of cereals will lead to an increase of 0.73 percent in the consumption 
of animal products. The estimates of income elasticities suggest, among these food segments, 
animal products are the upper-class foods for Ethiopian households. An increase of 10 percent in 
household expenditure on foods will result in an increase of 14 percent in the consumption of 
animal products. 
Table 2.5 displays the detail substitution and income effects within the cereal segment, 
which provides insights for the subsequent analysis of consumer welfare. The income effects of 
cereals are all positive and significant, suggesting all cereals are normal goods. In particular, every 
10 percent increase in food expenditure on cereals will raise the consumption of teff—the most 
favorable cereal—by 6.33 percent, wheat by 6.29 percent, and maize—the least one—by 1.07 
percent. The income elasticity of barley and sorghum are in between. As the utility level is fixed in 
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the subsequent analysis of consumer welfare, we focus our discussion thereafter on Hicksian 
elasticities in this section and the term “Hicksian” is suppressed. The own-elasticities are negative 
ranging from –0.39 to –0.87, which strongly suggest all the cereals are inelastic with respect to 
price and considered as staple foods for Ethiopian households. 
Among all of these primary cereals, teff is the most inelastic, implying its essential role in 
Ethiopian daily diets. The cross-price elasticities of teff with respect to other cereal prices are 
positive and highly significant, which means that other cereals are close substitutes for teff. In other 
words, the consumption of teff will decline as the prices of wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum fall 
down. For example, the consumption of teff will drop by 1.57 percent if the price of wheat decreases 
by 10 percent and 2.47 percent if the price of maize decrease by 10 percent. These significant cross-
price elasticities of teff to competing cereals inform the potential policies on food aid. In particular, 
consumer welfare can be improved if we think of facilitating a consumption switch from teff to 
other less expensive cereals in response to the increasing teff prices. 
The cross-price elasticities of wheat indicate that barley is a complement, while teff, maize, 
and sorghum are substitutes. Similarly, maize and sorghum are complements, but both of them are 
substitutes for teff, wheat, and barley. The magnitude of the cross-price elasticities of wheat 
suggests wheat is more reactive to changes in the prices of other cereals than teff. For example, the 
consumption of wheat will increase by 3.69 percent as the price of maize increases by 10 percent 
and 4.22 percent as the price of sorghum increases by 10 percent. In addition, comparing the 
significance and magnitude of cross-price elasticities across columns in Table 2.5, we find the 
cereal market is more responsive to the changes in the prices of wheat and sorghum than barley and 
maize. This suggests that wheat and sorghum can be better instruments used to influence the 




2.5.2. Welfare Analysis 
In this section, we introduce how to measure the difference in consumer welfare as the prices 
change and conduct simulations under alternative food aid policies in response to the increasing 
teff prices. The simulation results provide insights into how the Ethiopian government and non-
profit organizations ought to react to the increasing teff prices. To compare with the effectiveness 
of alternative policies on food aid, we compute the distance of every alternative policy to the ideal 
one using a measurement of dissimilarity.  
 We measure the change in consumer welfare by the compensating variation (CV)—the 
additional expenditure that consumers have to pay for living with a constant utility as teff prices 
hike up to a new level. Specifically, let 𝒑𝒑0 and 𝒑𝒑1 be the prices before and after the increase in teff 
prices, 𝑢𝑢0 be the level of initial utility attained by consumers, and 𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑,𝑢𝑢0) be the expenditure 
function. Then, the CV is given by 
 CV = 𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑1,𝑢𝑢0)− 𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑0,𝑢𝑢0). (11) 
Note that there are two ways to calculate the value of CV. One is to directly compute the value of 
CV using 𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑,𝑢𝑢0). The other is to attain the second order approximation of CV using the Taylor 
series expansion of 𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑1,𝑢𝑢0) around 𝒑𝒑1 = 𝒑𝒑0; that is, 
 






⋅ (𝒑𝒑1 − 𝒑𝒑0)𝑇𝑇 ⋅
𝜕𝜕2𝐸𝐸(𝒑𝒑0,𝑢𝑢0)
(𝜕𝜕𝒑𝒑0)2
⋅ (𝒑𝒑1 − 𝒑𝒑0). (12) 
Suppose all other cereal prices remain constant as the price of teff increases. The second order 
approximation of CV in (12) is then reduced to 











�𝜔𝜔teff0  𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺0, (13) 
where 𝜀𝜀teffℎ  is the Hicksian own-price elasticity of teff, 𝜔𝜔teff0  the expenditure share of teff within the 
cereal segment before the increase in teff prices, and 𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺0 is the original food expenditure on cereals. 
23 
 
 We examine the changes in the weekly cereal consumption for an average household as 
teff prices increase under alternative policies. Figure 2.2 shows that there was about a 10 percent 
increase in teff prices from 2015 to 2016. Therefore, in Table 2.6, we present simulation results 
from the scenario in which teff prices increase by 10 percent. For more information, Table 5A in 
the Appendix displays the simulation results as teff prices increase by 5 percent and 15 percent. 
There are five alternative policy measures reacting to the increasing teff prices. The ideal food aid 
policy is to offer households cash voucher, as the same amount of CV, allowing them to achieve 
the same utility with the new, increased teff prices. In particular, using the expenditure function 
derived from the estimated demand system, we calculate the CV in (11) given a 10 percent increase 
in teff prices. The associated CV is 7.82 Birrs a week, that is, 3.85 percent of the weekly expenditure 
on foods for an average household.11 In Table 2.5, the simulation results from the estimated demand 
system shows that a cash voucher of 7.82 Birrs enables an average household to maintain a constant 
utility by increasing their consumptions of wheat from 2.97 to 3.14 kilograms, barley from 1.02 to 
1.26, maize from 3.76 to 6.09, and sorghum from 2.51 to 3.32, while decreasing their consumptions 
of teff from 4.21 to 4.06 kilograms. Now, suppose instead of cash vouchers the government 
launched a food aid policy to provide households with wheat. Then, an average household will 
receive 1.09 (= 4.07 – 2.98) kilogram of wheat, worth 7.82 Birrs, as food aids. Similarly, for a food 
aid providing barley, maize, and sorghum, an average household will receive 1.10 (= 2.31 – 1.21) 
kilogram of barley, 1.88 (= 7.81 – 5.93) kilograms of maize, and 1.44 (= 4.63 – 3.19) kilograms of 
sorghum. 
As a robustness check, we also examine the changes in the cereal consumption using 
Hicksian and Marshallian price elasticities. The estimate of CV given by (13) is 4.55 Birrs. The 
cereal consumption associated with the food aid of offering cash voucher is calculated using 
                                                     
11 According to data, the weekly expenditure on foods for an average household is 203 Birrs. 
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Hicksian price elasticities and the cereal consumption from the data. Table 2.6 reveals that, given 
a cash voucher of 4.55 Birrs, an average household will decrease teff and maize consumption to 
4.04 and 3.71 kilograms, whereas increase wheat, barley, and sorghum consumption to 3.06, 1.05, 
and 2.53 kilograms. Then we compute changes in the cereal consumption for an average household 
with a fixed total expenditure on food using Marshallian price elasticities and obtain the policy 
outcomes of cereal consumption by adding the associated cereal at the same amount of cash 
voucher worth 4.55 Birrs. The additional consumption of wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum 
associated with the corresponding food aids are 0.64, 0.64, 1.09, and 0.84 kilogram(s), respectively. 
Compared to the cereal consumption simulated by the estimated demand system, the results based 
on the elasticities are smaller, suggesting the non-linearity of the food expenditure function.12 
Next, we evaluate the distances between the ideal food aid policy of offering cash voucher 
and the alternative food aid policies of providing real cereals. To measure the relative dissimilarity 
in terms of quantity between two consumption bundles, we adopt the weighted log quadratic 
formula given by (Diewert 2009), that is, 










where 𝒒𝒒0 and 𝒒𝒒1 are the vectors of consumption quantities before and after the increase in teff 
prices. The scalar 𝑄𝑄01 denotes the Törnqvist index, given by 









The last columns of Table 2.6 and Table A5 present the measure of dissimilarity toward the ideal 
food aid policy of offering cash voucher. The results from both simulations using the estimated 
demand system and elasticities in Table 2.6 indicate that the policy offering wheat as food aid is 
                                                     
12 The simulation results of CV using the estimated demand system and elasticities are closer to each other 
as the increase in teff prices is smaller (see Table 5A). 
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the option closest to the ideal alternative—offering cash voucher. This finding is robust across 
scenarios where teff prices increase by 5 and 15 percent (see Table A5). 
 
2.6. Conclusion 
Teff is an ancient grain primarily grown in Ethiopia and has been a staple food for Ethiopians for 
millennia. As a popular ingredient in contemporary healthy diets in developed countries, teff has 
experienced an increase in both prices and demand in the international market. This “teff fever” 
inevitably affects consumer welfare in Ethiopia especially after the Ethiopian government withdrew 
the export restriction on teff in mid-2015. 
This chapter examines the changes in consumer welfare due to the increasing teff prices 
and the roles of multiple food aid policies in reducing the adverse impacts of the increasing teff 
prices by estimating a two-stage food demand system with a focus on cereals. In the estimation, we 
accommodate censoring in food expenditures on cereals by adapting a censored demand system at 
the lower stage. A selection mechanism is introduced to determine the propensity of cereal 
consumption in an EA. We find that the indicators of major crops that characterize the situation of 
cereal production are positively associated with the propensity of cereal consumption.  
Using the full estimated demand system, we calculate the price and income elasticities of 
cereals. Although the total expenditures on food staples might change as the Ethiopian economy 
grows, the consumption patterns featured by elasticities would remain fairly stable. The cereal price 
and income elasticities inform policymakers about how consumers respond to the changes in prices 
and their incomes. We find that own-price elasticities of all primary cereals are negative and 
significant, and teff is the most inelastic one among all primary cereals. This implies that cereals, 
especially teff, are staple foods for Ethiopian households. Therefore, changes in teff prices might 
have profound impacts on consumer welfare. Moreover, the cereal market is more responsive to 
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the changes in the prices of wheat and sorghum than barley and maize. This implies that wheat and 
sorghum have better potential to be used as instruments for food aid policies. 
Finally, we evaluate the changes in consumer welfare as teff prices increase and simulate 
the weekly consumption of all cereals under alternative food aid policies for an average household. 
Specifically, given a 10 percent increase in teff prices, the monetary compensation for living in a 
constant level of utility—the value of CV—is 7.82 Birrs a household a week evaluated by the 
estimated demand system and 4.55 Birrs by the second order approximation using elasticities, 
accounting for 3.85 percent and 2.24 percent of the weekly expenditure on foods for an average 
household, respectively. This discrepancy implies the non-linearity of the food expenditure 
function. The smaller a change in teff prices is, the smaller this discrepancy will be. In addition to 
the ideal food aid policy that offers households cash voucher, we discuss alternative policies that 
provide households real cereals at the same value of the cash voucher. This discussion is 
informative and practical since a poor developing country usually receives real cereals rather than 
cash vouchers as food aid from non-profit organizations and other countries. The simulation results 
show that the policy providing wheat as food aid is the most effective alternative close to the cash 
voucher solution. In other words, compared to maize, sorghum, and barley, the outcomes of the 
policy offering wheat as food aid are closer to the outcomes of the policy offering cash voucher. 
This finding lends support to the ongoing Ethiopian food policy that distributes subsidized wheat 
on a large scale. 
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Table 2.1. Sample Statistics of Expenditures, Prices, Quantities, and Expenditure Shares 
  2013 (N = 433)  2015 (N = 432) 
 % Consuming Mean SD  % Consuming Mean SD 
Expenditures (million Birrs)        
Cereals 100.00 4.37 6.79  100.00 4.78 6.58 
Teff 79.68 1.59 3.14  79.63 2.12 3.87 
Wheat 78.98 0.75 1.81  78.01 0.98 2.39 
Barley 62.36 0.46 2.37  60.19 0.33 1.20 
Maize 79.91 0.90 3.04  84.95 0.72 1.31 
Sorghum 62.12 0.67 2.27  62.27 0.63 1.82 
Pulses and Root Crops 96.77 1.59 3.72  97.69 2.09 6.20 
Fruit and Vegetables 98.15 0.41 0.54  97.92 0.47 0.57 
Animal Products 96.77 1.83 3.41  97.22 2.01 4.86 
Prices (Birrs per kilogram)        
Cereals  9.01 8.46   8.09 4.34 
Teff  11.00 5.26   11.45 3.70 
Wheat  7.44 3.81   7.45 2.63 
Barley  7.46 6.26   7.53 4.38 
Maize  5.52 6.78   4.46 2.39 
Sorghum  6.42 6.39   5.47 3.31 
Pulses and Root Crops  9.96 5.05   15.21 10.67 
Fruit and Vegetables  9.24 4.49   7.50 3.27 
Animal Products  43.64 26.21   44.26 26.23 
Quantities (thousand kilograms)        
Cereals  629.05 903.07   771.15 1150.87 
Teff  153.38 311.95   200.66 380.75 
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Wheat  116.75 278.99   163.74 521.90 
Barley  65.40 244.97   65.51 257.69 
Maize  173.06 371.42   210.39 403.09 
Sorghum  120.46 329.98   130.85 357.18 
Pulses and Root Crops  256.86 663.08   214.91 438.58 
Fruit and Vegetables  51.33 72.14   70.74 83.82 
Animal Products  77.10 121.65   77.00 137.01 
Expenditure shares (percent)        
Cereals  52.68 20.16   51.60 20.36 
Teff  38.28 32.55   39.02 31.55 
Wheat  16.32 18.83   18.59 21.51 
Barley  6.45 13.88   6.22 12.72 
Maize  21.48 25.68   20.26 23.20 
Sorghum  17.47 25.35   15.92 22.91 
Pulses and Root Crops  16.88 14.16   19.68 14.23 
Fruit and Vegetables  6.73 5.16   6.38 5.18 
Animal Products  23.71 18.05   22.34 17.59 
Note: All statistics are calculated at the EA level. The column labeled “% Consuming” presents the percentage 
of non-zero observations in the sample. The column labeled “Mean” (“SD”) presents the conditional average 
(standard deviation) of expenditure over non-zero observations, and the unconditional average (standard 
deviation) of price, quantity, and expenditure share. The food segment of cereals is made of teff, wheat, barley, 
maize, and sorghum. The expenditure shares of teff, wheat, barley, maize, and sorghum sum to 1, and the 
expenditures of cereals, pulses and root crops, fruit and vegetables, and animal products sum to 1. All prices and 




Table 2.2. Definitions and Sample Statistics of Demographic Variables (N = 865) 
Variable Definition Mean SD 
Year 2015 Survey in 2015 0.50 0.50 
Rural Rural area (reference) 0.67 0.47 
Town Small town area 0.10 0.30 
Urban Urban area 0.23 0.42 
Major crop - teff Teff is one of the major (top 3) crops grown in this enumeration area 0.28 0.45 
Major crop - wheat Wheat is one of the major (top 3) crops grown in this enumeration area 0.20 0.40 
Major crop - barley Barley is one of the major (top 3) crops grown in this enumeration area 0.14 0.34 
Major crop - maize Maize is one of the major (top 3) crops grown in this enumeration area 0.40 0.49 
Major crop - sorghum Sorghum is one of the major (top 3) crops grown in this enumeration area 0.28 0.45 
Region - Tigray Enumeration area is in Tigray (reference) 0.11 0.32 
Region - Afar Enumeration area is in Afar 0.03 0.17 
Region - Amhara 
 
Enumeration area is in Amhara 0.20 0.40 
Region - Oromiya Enumeration area is in Oromiya 0.20 0.40 
Region - Somali Enumeration area is in Somali 0.06 0.24 
Region – Bens. Gumuz Enumeration area is in Benshangul Gumuz 0.03 0.16 
Region - SNNP Enumeration area is in SNNP 0.23 0.42 
Region - Gambella Enumeration area is in Gambella 0.03 0.16 




Table 2.3. Marginal Effects of Explanatory Variables in the Selection Equation 
 Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum 
Year 2015 0.012 0.008 0.005 0.065*** 0.028 
 (0.021) (0.025) (0.029) (0.023) (0.029) 
Region - Afar –0.114* 0.209** –0.214** 0.132 –0.453*** 
 (0.062) (0.082) (0.094) (0.084) (0.100) 
Region - Amhara –0.050 0.020 0.023 –0.033 –0.123** 
 (0.047) (0.046) (0.054) (0.035) (0.054) 
Region - Oromiya –0.071 0.095** 0.171*** 0.085** –0.079 
 (0.046) (0.047) (0.055) (0.039) (0.054) 
Region - Somali –0.528*** 0.141** –0.292*** 0.010 –0.227*** 
 (0.065) (0.061) (0.076) (0.059) (0.075) 
Region - Bens. Gumuz 0.026 –0.095 –0.188* 0.031 0.097 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.102) (0.104) (0.147) 
Region - SNNP –0.068 0.020 0.127** 0.236*** –0.076 
 (0.044) (0.044) (0.053) (0.047) (0.053) 
Region - Gambella –0.120* –0.220*** –0.043 0.093 –0.409*** 
 (0.062) (0.072) (0.093) (0.114) (0.101) 
Region - Chartered Cities –0.218*** 0.210*** –0.104* –0.049 –0.032 
 (0.050) (0.060) (0.061) (0.040) (0.065) 
Town 0.352*** 0.146*** 0.129*** 0.054 0.074 
 (0.077) (0.042) (0.050) (0.041) (0.048) 
Urban 0.438*** 0.250*** 0.299*** 0.009 –0.125*** 
 (0.055) (0.036) (0.035) (0.028) (0.036) 
Major crop – teff 0.180***     
 (0.027)     
Major crop – wheat  0.381***    
  (0.049)    
Major crop – barley   0.446***   
   (0.055)   
Major crop – maize    0.271***  
    (0.034)  
Major crop – sorghum     0.552*** 
     (0.047) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of 




Table 2.4. Demand Pattern across Food Segments: Price and Income Elasticities 
 Cereals Pulses and Fruit and Animal 
  Root Crops Vegetables Products 
Marshallian price elasticities 
Cereals –0.9234*** –0.0128** –0.0133*** –0.0290*** 
 (0.0077) (0.0057) (0.0027) (0.0047) 
Pulses and Root Crops –0.0056** –0.9899*** –0.0008 –0.0022 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0007) (0.0014) 
Fruit and Vegetables –0.0005* 0.0001 –0.9980*** 0.0003*** 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0001) 
Animal Products –0.0211*** –0.0054*** –0.0014*** –0.9881*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0014) (0.0005) (0.0016) 
Hicksian price elasticities 
Cereals –0.426*** 0.178*** 0.040*** 0.156*** 
 (0.019) (0.011) (0.003) (0.008) 
Pulses and Root Crops 0.513*** –0.791*** 0.054*** 0.190*** 
 (0.028) (0.015) (0.003) (0.012) 
Fruit and Vegetables 0.230*** 0.088*** –0.974*** 0.086*** 
 (0.030) (0.012) (0.003) (0.011) 
Animal Products 0.732*** 0.283*** 0.079*** –0.709*** 
 (0.041) (0.018) (0.005) (0.018) 
Income elasticities 
 0.926*** 0.964*** 0.428*** 1.401*** 
 (0.028) (0.053) (0.054) (0.075) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of 




Table 2.5. Demand Pattern within the Cereal Segment: Price and Income Elasticities 
 Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum 
Marshallian price elasticities 
Teff –0.632*** 0.031 0.144*** 0.090* 0.085 
 (0.065) (0.051) (0.055) (0.051) (0.052) 
Wheat 0.038 –0.651*** –0.181*** 0.213** 0.311*** 
 (0.082) (0.109) (0.064) (0.088) (0.080) 
Barley 0.218 –0.529*** –0.642** 0.116 0.037 
 (0.191) (0.140) (0.278) (0.170) (0.156) 
Maize –0.130* 0.034 0.008 –0.895*** –0.316*** 
 (0.069) (0.070) (0.069) (0.126) (0.085) 
Sorghum –0.029 0.195*** 0.034 –0.247*** –0.716*** 
 (0.072) (0.068) (0.063) (0.083) (0.127) 
Hicksian price elasticities 
Teff –0.390*** 0.157*** 0.195*** 0.247*** 0.197*** 
 (0.061) (0.054) (0.055) (0.059) (0.055) 
Wheat 0.278*** –0.525*** –0.131** 0.369*** 0.422*** 
 (0.085) (0.111) (0.065) (0.099) (0.087) 
Barley 0.366* –0.451*** –0.611** 0.212 0.105 
 (0.190) (0.156) (0.288) (0.191) (0.179) 
Maize –0.091 0.055 0.017 –0.867*** –0.296*** 
 (0.072) (0.072) (0.071) (0.130) (0.090) 
Sorghum 0.114 0.270*** 0.064 –0.153 –0.649*** 
 (0.078) (0.070) (0.066) (0.094) (0.136) 
Income elasticities 
 0.633*** 0.629*** 0.387** 0.107* 0.375*** 
 (0.042) (0.056) (0.169) (0.057) (0.072) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of 




Table 2.6. Policy Outcomes of Weekly Cereal Consumption as Teff Prices Increase by 10 Percent (Kilogram) 
      Dissimilarity from 
Policy Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum Cash Voucher 
Cereal consumptions for an average household a week from the ESS 2015/2016 
 4.21 2.97 1.02 3.76 2.51  
Cereal consumptions for an average household a week simulated using estimated demand system 
as teff prices increase by 10 percent with CV as 7.82 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 4.06 3.14 1.26 6.09 3.32 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 3.85 4.07 1.21 5.93 3.19 1.50 
Food aid – barley 3.85 2.98 2.31 5.93 3.19 3.86 
Food aid – maize 3.85 2.98 1.21 7.81 3.19 1.57 
Food aid – sorghum 3.85 2.98 1.21 5.93 4.63 2.04 
Cereal consumptions for an average household a week simulated using estimated elasticities 
as teff prices increase by 10 percent with CV as 4.55 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 4.04 3.06 1.05 3.71 2.53 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 3.94 3.62 1.04 3.70 2.50 0.61 
Food aid – barley 3.94 2.98 1.68 3.70 2.50 1.93 
Food aid – maize 3.94 2.98 1.04 4.79 2.50 1.06 
Food aid – sorghum 3.94 2.98 1.04 3.70 3.34 1.10 
Note: The first part shows the weekly cereal consumptions for an average household at the expenditure 
of 203 Birrs from data. To examine changes in household cereal consumptions a week, the second part 
presents the simulation results from the estimated demand system while the third part presents the 
simulation results using Marshallian and Hicksian elasticities. According to Equation 14, the last column 
shows the value of dissimilarity measure (× 100) between food aid policy offering cash–voucher and 
that providing wheat only, barley only, maize only, and sorghum only. 
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Figure 2.1. Households, Area, Production, and Yield for Primary Cereals in Meher Season 
 
Note: Data come from the Central Statistical Agency annual reports on the Agricultural Sample Survey in Ethiopia from 2006 to 2016. The Meher 
season is the main crop season and produces 90 to 95 percent of total grain output (USDA 2008).
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Figure 2.2. Wholesale Prices for Primary Cereals in Ethiopia 
 
Note: Data come from the market statistics reported by the Ethiopian Grain Trade Enterprise. 
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Figure 2.3. Consumer Price Index in Ethiopia 
 
Note: Data are from the Central Statistical Agency in Ethiopia with the base period in December 2011. The dash lines indicate the 
levels of CPI for food and non–alcoholic beverages when household and community data were collected in the Ethiopia 
Socioeconomic Survey 2013–2014 and 2015–2016 respectively.
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Chapter 3. The Welfare Impacts of New Demand-Enhancing 
Agricultural Products 
3.1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, food and agricultural markets have become more consumer-oriented 
(Unnevehr et al. 2010). Large numbers of new products are developed to serve consumers’ 
heterogeneous tastes and increasing expectations of food quality. According to Mintel’s Global 
New Product Database, the agriculture sector in the United States (U.S.) has introduced to markets 
more than 3,500 new varieties of fruit and vegetables since 2011 (USDA 2017a). However, little 
is known about the magnitude of consumer benefits from the introduction of demand-enhancing 
agricultural products. 
Consumers are affected by the introduction of a new agricultural product in two ways. First, 
some consumers are better off with a growing number of varieties because the new variety with 
different attributes might better serve their preferences.13 This is interpreted as an impact mainly 
capturing the “consumer preference for diversity.” Second, consumers will directly receive an 
economic benefit if the new variety increases market competition and leads to lower prices of other 
varieties. These lower prices would then attract more consumers and hence increase the aggregate 
demand for all varieties.  
 In this chapter, we estimate the change in consumer welfare from the introduction of a 
new variety, the Honeycrisp, in the U.S. apple market. The apple market has several desirable 
features for the purposes of this study. First, apples are the second most valuable fruit in the United 
States (USDA 2016b) and the fruit is marketed by variety names or trademarked brand names. 
Second, the market is also very dynamic with a large number of newly patented varieties under 
development (Rickard et al. 2013). Third, the findings have important implications for public 
                                                     
13 The terms “attributes” and “characteristics” will be used interchangeably through this chapter. 
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investments as the growth of the apple industry is rooted in the success of the breeding programs 
at land-grant universities such as Cornell University, Washington State University, and the 
University of Minnesota.  
Public organizations and the U.S. government have a long history of funding agricultural 
research and development (R&D) programs through the university systems (Foltz, Barham, and 
Kim 2000). However, the growth rate of public investment in agricultural R&D began to decrease 
in the early 1950s. By 1974, more than half of the total investments were provided by the private 
sector, and this ratio increased to 58% in 2009 (Pardey et al. 2015). The development of patent 
protection laws mitigates the adverse effects of the decline of public support and encourages more 
private investments in agricultural R&D (Pray and Fuglie 2015). The Bayh-Dole Act of 1980 and 
the subsequent legislation gave universities the permission to attain the ownership of inventions 
made with federal funding and, thereby, enabled them to finance agriculture research by 
transferring a part of their patent rights to the private sector.14  
Particularly, we evaluate the welfare changes in the apple market from the introduction of 
Honeycrisp apples using structural models of consumer demand and retailer competition. On the 
demand side, we estimate a random utility model of demand that explicitly accounts for consumers’ 
heterogeneous tastes and preferences. On the supply side, we model the retailer competition in a 
Bertrand-Nash fashion and derive the pricing rules for apples. Using the estimated demand 
parameters together with the pricing rules, we consequently simulate equilibrium outcomes in a 
counterfactual scenario wherein Honeycrisp apples are removed from the market. Then we quantify 
the changes in consumer welfare, market size, and sales revenue. We obtain data from multiple 
sources. The primary data are the point-of-sale scanner data which include apple prices and sales 
revenues at the Universal Product Code (UPC) level from 61 cities across the United States in the 
                                                     
14 The provisions of the Bayh-Dole Act were further supported by the Federal Technology Transfer Act of 
1986 and the National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act of 1996. 
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period from March 2009 to February 2015. The rest of our data comprise the population statistics 
of demographics, such as age and household income, and the cost data for retailers, such as apple 
prices in the wholesale market and wage rates in the retailing industry. 
The results show that the introduction of Honeycrisp apples drives the prices of competing 
apple varieties downward, especially for the best-selling varieties such as Gala and Red Delicious. 
The extent of decline in prices is positively correlated with the market share of Honeycrisp apples. 
On average, the prices of Gala and Red Delicious apples decrease by 0.72 percent and 0.61 percent 
respectively, when the market share of Honeycrisp apples is greater than or equal to 1 percent. If 
the share rises up to 5 percent, the prices of Gala and Red Delicious apples decrease by 2.23 percent 
and 1.67 percent respectively. Compared to the results in the counterfactual scenario wherein 
Honeycrisp apples are removed from the markets, the estimates show that Honeycrisp has increased 
the total sales quantity by 8.03 percent and the total sales revenue by 21.25 percent over the study 
period. In addition, the results show that the consumer welfare increases from 3.03 million dollars 
in 2009 to 15.20 million dollars in 2014. The total changes in consumer welfare can be decomposed 
into the changes due to the increased number of total apple varieties and the changes due to the 
decline in prices of competing apple varieties. The simulated results imply that 91.60 percent of 
total consumer welfare changes are attributable to the increase in apple varieties. To be able to 
extrapolate our results to the entire U.S. apple market, we perform a back of the envelope analysis 
to extrapolate the estimates of welfare to the entire U.S. market and find that the introduction of 
Honeycrisp has increased total consumer welfare by about 940 million dollars during the study 
period. This corresponds to approximately 20 percent of the annual average domestic expenditures 
on public food and agricultural R&D. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 gives a brief review of the 
literature. Section 3.3 describes the background of the U.S. apple market, followed by the data 
introduction in Section 3.4. We then present the analytical model and its underlying assumptions 
40 
 
in Section 3.5. Section 3.6 discusses the identification strategy, as well as the estimation procedure. 
At last, we explain the results in Section 3.7 and conclude in Section 3.8. 
 
3.2. Literature Review 
Food and agricultural markets have become more consumer-oriented and consumer expectations 
of food quality are increasingly higher (McCluskey et al. 2007; Unnevehr et al. 2010). Higher 
awareness of healthy diets and changing consumer tastes, in turn, provides incentives for producers 
to improve the quality of their food and agricultural products. For example, Yue et al. (2013) 
surveyed grower preferences for fruit traits and find that growers prioritize quality traits, such as 
flavor, over horticultural traits, such as disease resistance. However, despite the increasing 
importance of demand-enhancing agricultural products, we do not have enough knowledge about 
their economic benefits. Unnevehr (1986) quantifies the changes in consumer welfare from 
improvements in the quality of rice and concludes that economic returns to agricultural research on 
grain quality are substantial. In another study, Brester et al. (1993) evaluate industry profits from 
the introduction of low-fat ground beef and find that the new product results in a small increase of 
less than 1 percent in equilibrium retail price and quantity of aggregate ground beef, as well as 
social welfare.  
Estimation of demand systems is central in the research on measuring the economic 
benefits from the introduction of a new product.15 Using the estimates from a demand model, some 
studies construct cost-of-living indices to summarize the total welfare changes resulting from a 
number new products. For example, Hausman (1999) investigates the bias of the Consumer Price 
Index (calculated by the Bureau of Labor Statistics) due to the omission of new products (i.e., 
                                                     
15 The literature on the demand estimation is large (e.g., Deaton and Muellbauer 1980; Hausman, Leonard, 
and Zona 1994; Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000a, 2001). A review of these studies 
is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevo (2011) and Bonnet and Richards (2016) briefly survey the 
development of demand estimation. 
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cellular telephones). The author estimates the welfare changes due to the adoption of cellular 
telephones using a derived expenditure function from an estimated Hicksian demand. Similarly, 
Nevo (2003) develops a price index to account for the introduction of new products and quality 
changes in existing products based on the estimation of a brand-level demand system.  
Other studies use estimated demand models to simulate market outcomes in certain 
counterfactual scenarios. For example, Hausman and Leonard (2002) estimate structural models of 
demand and supply to simulate the equilibrium prices in the absence of a new bath tissue product 
and then measure the difference in consumer welfare between the observed scenario and the 
counterfactual scenario. Similar approaches have been adopted to analyze the introduction of new 
products in a number of markets. Petrin (2002) evaluates welfare changes due to the introduction 
of minivans in the automobile market, Kim (2004) performs a similar analysis for the processed 
cheese market, and Pofahl and Richards (2009) quantify the consumer valuation of new products 
in the market for juice drinks. A notable distinction between these studies and our work is that we 
focus on a fresh produce item rather than a processed or highly industrial product. Although the 
private sector leads the breeding programs in many vegetable crops as well as some fruit crops, the 
development of new produce varieties is heavily influenced by leading research and germplasm 
innovation at the land-grant universities.16 Therefore, our results inform policymakers and research 
institutions about insights into future public and private initiatives on agricultural investments. 
This chapter is also related to the literature on consumer valuation of different apple 
varieties. Yue and Tong (2011) conduct a choice experiment in real markets with a follow-up 
survey to investigate the willingness to pay for new apple varieties versus existing ones. The 
authors find that there is a strong preference for new varieties and that new varieties with more 
                                                     
16  In addition to apples, there are a large number of successful breeding programs in the land-grant 
universities, for example, strawberries at the University of California, Davis and the University of Florida, 
blueberries at the University of Florida, Michigan State University, and North Carolina State University, 
tomatoes at the University of Florida, and wheat at Kansas State University.  
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desired characteristics (e.g., firmness, crispness, and tartness) would receive higher premiums. 
Similarly, Rickard et al. (2013) develop an experiment to examine the impacts of names on a new 
apple variety. The results show that there is a price premium for using a sensory name for a new 
variety; however, changing the name of an existing variety has little influence. Other studies 
attempt to identify the internal quality characteristics that affect the consumer valuation of apples 
using individual surveys with contingent valuation questions. McCluskey et al. (2007) find 
consumers are willing to pay more for an apple with attributes closer to their subjective perceptions 
for texture, flavor, firmness, and tartness. In another study, McCluskey et al. (2013) measure the 
consumer valuation of internal quality characteristics across varieties and find that the willingness 
to pay for the same attribute is different by variety and associated with consumer demographics. A 
limitation of these studies is that findings are based on a small sample and the sample 
representativeness is questionable. Carew, Florkowski, and Smith (2012) evaluate the impacts of 
product characteristics on apple prices using a hedonic pricing model with Canadian sales data. The 
authors find that there is a price premium for a new apple variety and price premiums are positively 
correlated with the size and the grade of apples. Using market-level data, this chapter contributes 
to this line of research not only by providing new evidence on consumer valuation of apple 
characteristics and substitution patterns between the most popular varieties but also by evaluating 
the impacts of the introduction of a new apple variety on market shares and prices. 
This chapter also contributes to the broad literature on returns to agricultural R&D. A 
review by Alston et al. (2009) indicates that a large number of studies have measured social returns 
to investments in agricultural R&D by identifying the lagged effect of research (the temporal 
attribution problem) and the spillover effect of new knowledge in certain areas (the spatial 
attribution problem). They find that returns to agricultural R&D primarily rely on the size of 
research-induced supply shifts and the scale of the affected industry. Therefore, prior studies 
typically estimate a supply function that enables them to measure the extent to which the supply 
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curve shifts due to the agricultural R&D. Then, under certain assumptions, the welfare change from 
a downward shift of the supply curve against a stationary demand can be evaluated. Although the 
existing literature provides an abundance of evidence on the benefits of agricultural R&D to 
producers, there is a dearth of evidence on the benefits to consumers. 
 
3.3. The Apple Market in the United States 
Apples are one of the most popular fruits worldwide and apple varieties have been improved by 
cultivation and selection over thousands of years. Originally from Central Asia and widely grown 
in Asia and Europe, apples were brought to North America by early colonists, dating back to the 
1630s. There are 7,500 varieties of apples grown around the world and 2,500 in the United States, 
of which more than 100 have been commercially sold at retail stores. According to Rickard (2013), 
an abundance of newly patented apples are under development and will be ready for introduction 
into the market. The records of the United States Patent and Trademark Office show that 156 
patents of new apple varieties were approved during the period of 2000 to 2014. 
As the second most valuable fruit on the market, the sales revenue of apples has exceeded 
two billion dollars since 2007 (USDA 2016b).17 Apples are grown in all contiguous states but 
commercially produced in 32 states, led by Washington, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania, 
California, and Virginia.18 Most apples are sold fresh in retail stores. The sales quantity of fresh 
apples ranged from 6,300 to 7,900 million pounds between 2009 and 2014, about 70 percent of 
total production (USDA 2016b). After the adjustment for loss, the annual average consumption of 
fresh apples was 16.6 pounds per capita in 2014, up from 14.3 pounds in 2009 (USDA 2016a).  
                                                     
17 By the Fruit and Tree Nut Yearbook (USDA 2016b), the four most-valuable fruits in the United States, are 
grapes, apples, oranges, and strawberries. The corresponding market sales in 2015 are, respectively, 5.56, 
3.39, 2.22, and 1.96 billion dollars, which are summed up to 65 percent of total sales of fruits. 
18 Source: Apple Industry Statistics. United States Apple Association. 
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In contrast to processed food products sold by brand, apples are one of the few produce 
items marketed by variety. The sustainable growth of the apple industry is attributable to the 
development and commercialization of new varieties (Gallardo et al. 2012). In 2014, the top ten 
most purchased varieties accounted for 80 percent of total production.19 Table 3.1 sketches the 
volume (pounds sold) market shares by variety in fall, the marketing/harvesting season of apples, 
from 2009 to 2014.20 Gala is the most popular variety and accounts for one-third of total sales, 
while Honeycrisp is the fastest growing variety among the top five varieties. Table 3.2 shows that 
the annual average price of Honeycrisp has ranged between $1.85 and $2.30 per pound, which is 
about three times higher than the annual average price of Gala. 
The Honeycrisp apple is a winter hardy variety developed by the apple breeding program 
at the University of Minnesota. After the 30-year breeding effort, it was introduced to the market 
in 1991 and rapidly became one of the most popular apples in the United States. In 2006, 
Honeycrisp was named the Minnesota State fruit. The patent protection of Honeycrisp in the United 
States expired in November 2008 and the University of Minnesota no longer earns royalties from 
the sales of Honeycrisp. But the sales in other countries where plant breeders’ rights (similar to 
patent) and trademarks associated with Honeycrisp remain in force still generate a cash inflow to 
support future agricultural R&D programs at the university. 
Honeycrisp apples are usually harvested in the early fall and sold until the early spring; 
they are not available in all seasons.21 Figure 3.1 shows the annual sales quantity of Honeycrisp by 
season in the United States. The annual sales quantity increased fourfold from 36.02 million pounds 
                                                     
19 The most-purchased apple varieties in 2014 were Gala, Red Delicious, Fuji, Granny Smith, Honeycrisp, 
Golden Delicious, McIntosh, Cripp’s Pink/Pink Lady, Braeburn, and Jazz. Source: Retail Dietitian Toolkit. 
United States Apple Association. 
20 Due to seasonality in production, apple sales are significantly different by season. 
21 The sales season of Honeycrisp apples is usually from September to April. There is large variation in the 
sales of Honeycrisp across seasons, especially between summer and fall. 
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in 2009 to 127.62 million pounds in 2014. Meanwhile, the marketing season of Honeycrisp apples 
has been extended. The sales in spring began to rapidly increase in 2011, and the sales in summer 
had a jump between 2012 and 2013 although it was relatively small. 
 
3.4. Data 
The data come from several sources. The information on market prices and sales quantities are 
obtained from the retail point-of-sale scanner data collected by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI), 
known as IRI InfoScan Data.22 The data contains weekly sales information of the representative 
retailers from 61 IRI cities across the United States in the period of 24 seasons from March 2009 
to February 2015, where each IRI city is a collection of counties defined by the United States 
Census Bureau. Because of the seasonality in the apple market, we define the market as the 
combination of city and season. These IRI cities are denoted in Figure 3.2 by shadowed areas. The 
details of the data construction are given in Section 1 of Appendix B. 
Given the information of product attributes based on the ingredient and nutrition labels, it 
is straightforward to define a characteristics space for most processed food products. However, it 
is not applicable for fresh apples, because the product quality and nutrient contents might vary with 
production factors, such as chemical usage, land quality, and weather condition. In fact, existing 
studies have shown that consumer valuations of apple varieties are dependent on texture and flavors, 
such as sweetness and tartness (e.g., McCluskey et al. 2007; Yue et al. 2013; McCluskey et al. 
2013). Therefore, we project apple varieties onto a space characterized by attributes relevant to 
flavor and texture. The data including such attributes are obtained from the variety information 
provided by the Washington Apple Commission. The attribute data are only available for eight out 
of the top ten most-purchased apple varieties in the United States, including a continuous measure 
                                                     
22 In particular, we use the primary IRI InfoScan Data, purchased by the United States Department of 
Agriculture and made available to academics for policy research. 
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of sweetness and a set of expert rankings for multiple uses of apples (e.g., pie stuffing, applesauce, 
baking, and freezing), which are used as proxy variables for texture.23 Section 2 of Appendix B 
provides further details on apple characteristics. 
A maintained assumption in the subsequent analysis is that apples are differentiated by 
variety and by retailer. In other words, the Gala apple sold by retailer A is considered as a different 
product from the Gala apple sold by retailer B. This assumption is plausible as it allows us to 
account for consumer heterogeneous preferences for retailer types. It, however, results in a 
dimensionality problem for parameters to be estimated due to a large number of differentiated 
apples in consumers’ choice set. To address this problem, we first group the retailers by channel: 
convenience store, defense commissary store, dollar store, drug store, grocery store, and mass 
merchandise store. However, the data show that more than 85 percent of total apple sales occur in 
grocery stores. The data further show that grocery retailers significantly vary by size defined as the 
number of IRI cities in which a retailer owns a store. Therefore, we examine the distribution of the 
size of retailers and divide the retailers into four groups: local retailers, small regional retailers, 
regional retailers, and nationwide retailers. The details are discussed in Section 3 of Appendix B.24  
To account for market expansion, the market share of an apple is defined by the division 
of its sales quantity over the total potential quantity in the market. Following previous literature 
(e.g., Nevo 2001; Kim 2004; Villas-Boas 2007), we assume the size of total potential quantity is 
proportional to the population in the IRI city with a cup of fruit per capita per day. 25, 26 Table 3.3 
                                                     
23 The attribute data are available on the web page, http://bestapples.com/varieties-information/varieties/. 
24 Due to the privacy requirements of the data agreement with the Economic Research Service, USDA, we 
are unable to disclose the names of retailers in each category. 
25 Two cups of apple is equivalent to a large apple, which is about 0.5 pound. The relevant population is 
defined as the population covered by the data used in this chapter. Over the study period, the total quantities 
of apples sold by stores in our sample is about 13 percent of the total quantity sold by all retailers in the 
United States (the total apple sales is obtained from the USDA Economic Research Service). As a result, the 
proportionality factor for the population in the IRI city is 13 percent. 
26 Nevo (2001) assumes the market size is the total potential number of servings in a market where the 
potential is one serving of Ready-To-Eat breakfast cereal per capita per day. Kim (2004) calculates the market 
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presents the summary statistics for apple sales by retailer and by variety. Panel A of the table 
displays sample statistics for prices and market shares of apples. All nominal values are deflated 
by regional price indices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base period in 1982-
84. Panel B shows that consumers are more likely to buy fresh apples from local and small regional 
retailers than from regional and nationwide retailers. The market share of local retailers ranks first 
with an average of 13.29%, followed by small regional retailers with 11.59%, regional retailers 
with 4.44%, and nationwide retailers with 2.51%. Panel C provides the sample statistics of market 
shares by variety and shows that on average, Gala is the most popular variety and Honeycrisp is 
one of the top-five.  
We obtain data on consumer demographics such as age and household income from the 
American Community Survey from 2009 to 2014 provided by the United States Census Bureau. 
To investigate if the younger generation is more likely to purchase new products than the older 
generation, we define a variable of young adult as a binary indicator for consumers aged between 
25 and 44. In addition, we use retailer cost data as instruments for the estimation of demand. The 
cost information consists of apple prices by variety at the terminal markets and wage rates in the 
retailing industry. The price data from terminal markets are provided by the USDA Agricultural 
Marketing Service (AMS), including monthly average prices of different apple varieties paid by 
retailers in selected markets across the United States. There are 15 selected terminal markets across 
the United States and these markets are circled in Figure 3.2. Retailers in a city without a terminal 
market are assumed to pay the prices at the closest terminal market. The details of the construction 
of terminal market prices for every city are discussed in Section 4 of Appendix B. It is worth noting 
that Honeycrisp apples have the highest minimum price and widest price range in terminal markets. 
                                                     
size of processed cheese as a proportion to the size of the population with the proportional factor equal to 
one serving per capita per day. Villas-Boas (2007) defines the potential market of yogurt as half of the 
resident population in the market areas under the assumption that every individual consumes one half of a 
serving per week. 
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Table 3.4 presents summary statistics of cost-related variables. Wage rates for retailers in different 
cities are obtained from the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics Survey from 2009 to 2014. 
The survey reports wage rates at the state level for cashiers, truck drivers, tractor operators, stock 
movers, and packagers. Wage rates at the city level are averaged over states weighted by the 
associated population.27 
 
3.5. Analytical Framework 
3.5.1. Consumer Utility and Demand 
We specify a discrete choice model of demand for apples (e.g., Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and 
Pakes 1995; Nevo 2001; Petrin 2002; Kim 2004). Let 𝑗𝑗 = 0, … , 𝐽𝐽 denote differentiated apples, 
defined as a variety-retailer combination, with 𝑗𝑗 = 0  indexing the outside option, 𝑡𝑡 = 1, … ,𝑇𝑇 
denote markets, defined as a city-season combination. The utility of consumer 𝑖𝑖 from buying apple 
𝑗𝑗 in market 𝑡𝑡 is 
(16) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,  
where 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the price, 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is a 𝐾𝐾 × 1 vector of observed characteristics of apple 𝑗𝑗 in market 𝑡𝑡, 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
is the baseline utility of unobserved characteristics (i.e., unobserved valuation for econometricians 
but not consumers), 𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖 is a vector of dummies representing the seasonality in market 𝑡𝑡, and 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is 
an error term that is assumed to be independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) across apples 
and be drawn from the Type I extreme value distribution. The conformable parameters (𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖,𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖) are 
the random coefficients to be estimated. These parameters represent consumer heterogeneous tastes 
for observed apple characteristics and prices, such that 
                                                     
27 For example, the IRI city, Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP), consists of counties in both Minnesota and 
Wisconsin. The wage rate of cashiers in MSP is hence averaged over the wage rates of cashiers in the two 









� + Π𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, 
where the parameters (𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽)  represent the homogenous tastes and the component Π𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 
capture the individual discrepancies. For consumer 𝑖𝑖, the individual tastes are jointly determined 
by a 𝐿𝐿 × 1 vector 𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 of demographic background variables (i.e., age and household income) and a 
(1 + 𝐾𝐾) × 1 vector 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 of the idiosyncratic tastes, where Π and Σ are the corresponding parameter 
matrices with the dimension of (1 + 𝐾𝐾) × 𝐿𝐿 and (1 + 𝐾𝐾) × (1 + 𝐾𝐾), respectively. To complete the 
demand model, the utility of consumer 𝑖𝑖 from the outside option is specified as 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖 = 𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖 + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖0𝑖𝑖. 
The outside option includes other apples and fresh fruits sold in the stores included in this study, 
and any apple and fresh fruits sold in other stores. Following Nevo (2001), we denote 𝜃𝜃1 as a vector 
of the linear parameters (𝛼𝛼,𝛽𝛽) and 𝜃𝜃2 as a vector of nonlinear parameters �𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(Π), 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(Σ)�. The 
utility of consumer 𝑖𝑖 can thus be written as 
(17) 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖;𝜃𝜃1� + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖;𝜃𝜃2� + 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 , 
where 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the mean utility shared by all consumers, i.e., 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝛽𝛽 − 𝛼𝛼𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝒅𝒅𝑖𝑖, and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 
is the consumer specific utility determined by the individual tastes, given as: 
 
𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  =  �−𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ,𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�(Π𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖 + Σ𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖)
= −𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝1𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖1 + ⋯+ 𝜋𝜋𝑝𝑝𝑝𝑝𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝 + 𝜎𝜎𝑝𝑝𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝�




The heterogeneity is captured by the consumer specific utility, 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, as well as the idiosyncratic 
taste parameter, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖.  
Let consumer 𝑖𝑖  be characterized by a tuple (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖⋅𝑖𝑖). The collection of consumers 
buying product 𝑗𝑗 in market 𝑡𝑡 is defined as a set 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 such that 
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = � (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ∣∣ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∀𝑙𝑙 = 0,1, … , 𝐽𝐽 �. 
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Under the assumption that the distributions of demographics, idiosyncratic tastes, and error terms 
are independent, the market share of product 𝑗𝑗 in market 𝑡𝑡 is obtained as 
(18) 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = � 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝜖𝜖)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝑣𝑣)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷),
𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
 
where 𝑃𝑃(⋅) is the population distribution function. Note that if consumers are homogeneous in 
market 𝑡𝑡 , i.e., (𝐷𝐷𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) = (𝐷𝐷�𝑖𝑖, ?̅?𝑣𝑖𝑖) and error terms are drawn from the Type I extreme value 
distribution, then (18) reduces to a classic (multinomial) logit model of demand.  
 
3.5.2. Supply Side Model 
To evaluate welfare changes due to the introduction of Honeycrisp apples, we must obtain 
equilibrium prices of other apples in a counterfactual scenario in which Honeycrisp apples would 
be absent in the market. To this end, we model the competition among retailers to derive 
equilibrium pricing rules. For estimation to be tractable we divide retailers into four groups based 
on their sizes.  
Let 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟 be a partition of apple varieties sold by a retailer group 𝑟𝑟. Given a vector 𝒑𝒑−𝑟𝑟 of 
prices from rival groups, the retailer group 𝑟𝑟 maximizes the group profit by jointly choosing a 
vector 𝒑𝒑𝑟𝑟 of prices, that is, 
max
𝒑𝒑𝑟𝑟
𝑀𝑀 × ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 −𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝒑𝒑𝑟𝑟,𝒑𝒑−𝑟𝑟)
𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟
, 
where 𝑚𝑚𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗 is the marginal cost of product 𝑗𝑗 and 𝑀𝑀 is the size of market. Suppose there exists a 
pure-strategy Bertrand-Nash equilibrium in prices. The optimal prices then satisfy the first order 
condition for apple 𝑗𝑗 ∈ {1, … , 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟}, 






which implies that the substitution patterns across apple varieties (i.e., own- and cross-price effects) 
are involved in the optimal pricing conditions. Let ∆∗(𝒑𝒑) be defined as a matrix of substitution 
patterns such that ∆∗(𝒑𝒑)𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = −𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗(𝒑𝒑)/ 𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑘𝑘, and Ω be defined as a matrix of ownership such that 
Ω𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = 1 if 𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟 and 0 otherwise. The first order conditions can be written in matrix notation, 
(19) 𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑) − ∆(𝒑𝒑)(𝒑𝒑−𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎) = 𝟎𝟎, 
where 𝒑𝒑 is a vector of prices, 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 is a vector of marginal costs, 𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑) is a vector of market shares, 
and ∆(𝒑𝒑) is an element-wise product of ownership and the substitution matrix, i.e., ∆(𝒑𝒑) = Ω ∗
∆∗(𝒑𝒑). Implied by (19), the vector of marginal costs is, 
(20) 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎 = 𝒑𝒑 − ∆(𝒑𝒑)−1𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑). 
where the component ∆(𝒑𝒑)−1𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑) captures the markup terms for the differentiated apples. Given 
the estimated demand model and observed prices, the marginal costs can be recovered by (20). 
Suppose that the marginal costs of apples are independent from the introduction of Honeycrisp. 
Then, the counterfactual prices can be obtained by using the first order conditions in (19) with the 
recovered marginal costs.28  
 Some non-trivial assumptions are made in the counterfactual analysis. First, the 
introduction of Honeycrisp apples would not affect the competition between retailer groups in the 
apple market. In other words, retailer groups are assumed to compete in Bertrand-Nash fashion 
regardless of the presence of Honeycrisp apples. Second, the demand model would not change in 
the counterfactual scenario. That is, we conduct the counterfactual analysis with the same demand 
estimates. It, however, does not imply that the substitution patterns are invariant. In fact, the 
substitution matrix ∆(𝒑𝒑) is a function of market prices and hence vary with the equilibrium. Third, 
                                                     
28 Retailers are allowed to adjust marginal costs systematically and proportionally to achieve economies of 
scale. That is, 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎1 = 𝑣𝑣 × 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎0 where 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎0 and 𝒎𝒎𝒎𝒎1 represent the marginal costs of other apples when the 
Honeycrisp was present and absent in the market respectively and 𝑣𝑣 is a constant ratio implying the marginal 
costs of other apples would decrease due to the introduction of the Honeycrisp. In this chapter, we do not 
consider the economies of scale and set 𝑣𝑣 = 1. 
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the value of the outside good is constant. It implies that the relative utility of an inside apple to the 
outside good would be the same if the attributes of the inside apple are fixed. 
 
3.5.3. Evaluation of Consumer Welfare 
Let 𝑤𝑤 > 0 be a fixed expenditure on fresh fruits, 𝒑𝒑with be a vector of prices when Honeycrisp 
apples are available in the market, and 𝒑𝒑without be a vector of prices when absent. A consumer is 
strictly better off with the introduction of Honeycrisp apples if and only if 
𝑢𝑢�𝒑𝒑with,𝑤𝑤� − 𝑢𝑢�𝒑𝒑without,𝑤𝑤� > 0. 
To measure the welfare changes in dollars, money metric indirect utility functions are employed. 
These functions are constructed using the means of consumer expenditures with fixed utility levels. 
A monetary measure of welfare changes for consumer 𝑖𝑖 is 
𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑�,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑with,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�� − 𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑�,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑without,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖��, 
where 𝒑𝒑� ≫ 0 is an arbitrary price vector. Two natural choices for 𝒑𝒑� are price vectors 𝒑𝒑with and 
𝒑𝒑without. These two choices are equivalent under the assumption of no income effect. Following 
the literature (e.g., Nevo 2000b; Kim 2004), compensating variation (CV) is used to measure the 
welfare changes for consumer 𝑖𝑖, 
𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 = 𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑with,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑with,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�� − 𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑with,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑without,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖��, 
that is, 𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑with,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑without,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�� = 𝑣𝑣 �𝒑𝒑with,𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑with,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖�� − 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖 , which implies 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑without,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖� = 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖�𝒑𝒑with,𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖 − 𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖�. 
Due to the linear specification of the indirect utility function, the compensating variation for 







where 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖  is the constant marginal utility of income. Hence, the compensating variation for an 
average consumer can be calculated by 




where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖with and 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖without are the indirect utility functions with and without Honeycrisp apples and 
𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = max𝑗𝑗 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 . With the assumption of the extreme value distribution for 𝜖𝜖, McFadden (1981) 
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where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� = 𝒙𝒙𝑗𝑗𝛽𝛽𝑖𝑖 − 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗 + 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗 is the utility level of consumer 𝑖𝑖 from apple 𝑗𝑗 evaluated at the 
price 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗.  
The introduction of Honeycrisp apples affects the consumer welfare by increasing the 
number of apple varieties and changing prices for competing apples. To be able to measure these 
two impacts separately, the compensating variation can be decomposed as: 
(23) 
𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖] = ��
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ln �∑ exp �𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗�𝒑𝒑with��
𝐽𝐽without







where the first term of the integrand represents the impact of the increase in apple varieties and the 
second term captures the impact of the change in prices of competing apples. 
There is a caveat for the welfare analysis using the discrete choice model of demand with 
market level data. The welfare estimates might heavily rely on the idiosyncratic logit error due to 
the limited information of data (Petrin 2002). This problem arises from the assumption of the 
additive i.i.d. error in the random utility framework. It is clear in (23) that the direct impact of the 
54 
 
introduction of Honeycrisp apples is always positive, since 𝐽𝐽with > 𝐽𝐽without and exp(𝑥𝑥) > 0 for any 
𝑥𝑥. In other words, consumers are always better off when Honeycrisp is in the apple market even if 
it is identical to a competing apple variety. As a result, the welfare impacts of the introduction of 
Honeycrisp apples could be overestimated. The random-coefficients model alleviates this problem, 
to a large extent, by separating consumers’ heterogeneous tastes into two parts, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, where 
𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is an individual error term and 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  is determined by the interactions between apple 
characteristics and consumer demographics. The compensating variation can be hence decomposed 
into the changes related to the error term 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗 and the changes related to observed characteristics, 
𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗.  
 
3.6. Estimation 
3.6.1. Endogenous Prices and Identification  
A product price represents the implicit value of its characteristics, but not all characteristics are 
included in the demand estimation. As a consequence, the product prices are correlated with the 
estimation error through the consumer valuation of unobserved characteristics (also see Figure 3.3). 
This correlation raises the problem of price endogeneity, which is well-documented in prior studies 
(e.g., Berry 1994; Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes 1995; Nevo 2000a, 2001). In this study, some taste 
characteristics of apples, such as crispness and juiciness, and appearance characteristics, such as 
size and color, are not included in the demand estimation, due to the limited variety information on 
apples. To see the impacts of unobserved variables on the demand estimation, consider a scenario 
wherein a consumer prefers only crispy apples. In other words, both apple prices and market 
demands are positively related to the crispness of apples. If crispiness is not controlled in the 
demand estimation, then it will be included in the error term. In turn, the positive correlation 
between the apple price and the error term biases downwards the estimate of price parameter 𝛼𝛼.  
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A regular remedy for the problem of endogenous prices is to use product-level instruments 
that are highly correlated with product prices but not correlated with unobserved characteristics. In 
order to find valid instruments, we need to understand the structure of product prices. Product prices 
are a function of marginal costs and a markup term, where the markup term represents the consumer 
valuation of all product characteristics. The variation in product prices can, thus, be divided into 
the exogenous variation in marginal costs and the endogenous variation in consumer valuation. 
Therefore, valid instruments are required to identify price variation through the changes in marginal 
costs. 
There are three sets of cost-related variables employed in the estimation. First, by 
exploiting the panel structure of the data, Hausman (1994) and Nevo (2000a, 2001) calculate the 
average product prices in all other cities to capture the changes in marginal costs. These average 
product prices are viable instruments under the assumption that cross-city demand shocks (i.e., the 
change in unobserved valuation) are independent across cities. This assumption, however, is 
tenuous if there are cross-city advertising and promotion activities. To accommodate the potential 
problem of related marketing strategies across cities within a Census-defined division, we replace 
the average product prices over all other cities with the average product prices over cities in all 
other divisions. 29  Although these instruments by construction are not affected by cross-city 
unobservables, their exogeneity would still be questionable if there exist systematic demand shocks. 
For example, a sudden awareness of some nutrients in apples would increase the unobserved 
valuation of apples and hence the market demand across the United States. However, these demand 
shocks are not much of a concern in our case because all the apple varieties included in our analysis 
                                                     
29 The United States Census Bureau defines four statistical regions with nine divisions for data collection and 




are well-established.30 In addition, we use period dummies in the demand model that capture any 
time-variant national shocks (Hausman and Leonard 2002). 
Second, we use terminal market prices of different apple varieties to represent the retailer 
costs for apples. Following Villas-Boas (2007), we interact these prices with retailer group 
dummies and hence obtain product-level instruments. These instruments capture the differences in 
costs of apples and account for the variation in prices due to the changes in marginal costs by the 
combination of variety and retailer.  
Third, we use wage rates in the retailing industry as another set of instruments. Retailers 
are assumed to be price takers in the labor market. These pre-determined costs of variable inputs 
would influence retailers’ marketing strategies (including pricing conditions) but not consumer 
valuation for unobserved characteristics of apples. Thus, cross-city wage rates of labor, such as 
cashier, truck drivers, tractor operators, stock movers, truck loaders, and packagers, are viable 
instruments to disentangle the cross-city variation in marginal costs from the variation in the 
consumer valuation.  
 
3.6.2. Demand Estimation 
The demand model is estimated using the generalized method of moments (GMM) and the 
estimates of parameters are determined to minimize the differences between the observed and the 
predicted market shares of apples. Calculating the integral in (3) raises a challenge for applying 
instruments to the endogenous apple prices, which are correlated with the consumer valuation of 
unobserved characteristics 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 . The key to this challenge is to recover the mean utility 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  and 
construct the moments (i.e., orthogonal conditions) for 𝜉𝜉𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖. Berry (1994) provides an inversion 
                                                     




method to obtain 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 in the (multinomial) logit model by matching the observed market share 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖obs 
with the predicted market share 𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖/�1 + ∑ 𝛿𝛿𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖
𝐽𝐽
𝑘𝑘=1 �. The solution to 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is of an analytical 
form such that 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = log�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖obs� − log�𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖obs�. However, this analytical inversion method is impeded 
by the integral in the random-coefficients logit model. As a result, a numerical inversion method 
developed by Berry et al. (1995) is employed and the value of 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  depends on the non-linear 
parameters, 𝜃𝜃2. Suppose 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is a matrix of variables contained in the mean utility. Then the linear 
parameters, 𝜃𝜃1  can be expressed as 𝜃𝜃1 = �𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖′ 𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�
−1𝑋𝑋𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖′ 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜃𝜃2) , which suggests that 𝜃𝜃1  is a 
function of 𝜃𝜃2. Let 𝑍𝑍 be a 𝑛𝑛 × 𝐿𝐿 matrix of instruments and 𝜉𝜉(𝜃𝜃2) be a 𝑛𝑛 × 1 vector of the consumer 
valuation of unobserved characteristics. The estimation is, therefore, to find optimal 𝜃𝜃2∗ such that 
𝜃𝜃2∗ = arg min𝜃𝜃2
{𝐺𝐺′𝑊𝑊−1𝐺𝐺}  
where 𝐺𝐺  is a sample moment 𝐺𝐺(𝜃𝜃2) = (1/𝑛𝑛)𝑍𝑍′𝜉𝜉(𝜃𝜃2)  and 𝑊𝑊  is a consistent estimate of the 
asymptotic variance of √𝑛𝑛𝐺𝐺(𝜃𝜃2). The estimation follows Nevo’s (2000a, 2001) procedure using a 
simulated GMM objective function with analytical gradients.  
 
3.7. Results 
3.7.1. Parameter Estimates and Elasticities 
We first estimate a logit model of demand for apples to explore viable specifications for the full 
model (i.e., random-coefficients logit model) and illustrate the problem of endogenous prices and 
the need for instruments. The estimates of the logit model are presented in Table 3.5, where the 
dependent variable is given by log�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� − log(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖). The OLS results in columns 1 and 2 show that 
there is a small difference between estimates of price coefficients. This suggests the city-specific 
variables of average consumer demographics are significant but provide little information on the 
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cross-product variation in mean utilities.31 Columns 3 to 8 show that the orthogonality conditions 
for product prices might be violated and the specifications with instruments are preferable to the 
simple regression. Compared to the OLS results, the IV estimates of the price parameter are 
substantially larger in absolute value. This implies that product prices are negatively associated 
with mean utility but positively (negatively) with the consumer valuation of favorable (unfavorable) 
unobserved characteristics. The inclusion of endogenous prices without instruments leads to a 
relatively inelastic demand for apples. Compared to the estimates in column 3 (or 6), the estimates 
of the price parameter in columns 4 and 5 (or 7 and 8) are smaller in absolute value when the 
average product prices outside the division are used as instruments. The retailer costs, measured by 
terminal market prices and wage rates in the retailing industry, are included to account for the cross-
variety variation in prices and the cross-city variation in prices. We also find that estimates of the 
price parameter are robust to adding city-average consumer demographics. In addition, the adjusted 
R-squared and the F-statistic for the exclusion of instruments in the first stage regression suggest 
the weak instruments are less of a concern. 
Table 3.6 displays estimates from the full model (i.e., the random-coefficients logit model 
of demand) based on (17) with different specifications. Consumer heterogeneity is characterized 
by consumer demographics and idiosyncratic shocks.32 The inclusion of demographic variables 
creates a scaling problem because of differences in units. To address this issue, we apply the 
logarithm transformation to age and household income and express all demographic variables as 
the deviations from the mean (e.g., Nevo 2000a; Kim 2004; Villas-Boas 2007). The full model is 
                                                     
31 The term “product” hereafter refers to the differentiated apple. 
32 In every market (i.e., the combination of city and season), we simulate 1,000 consumers characterized by 
age, household income, and idiosyncratic tastes. The demographic variables of age and household income 
are sampled from the associated empirical distributions in the American Community Surveys. In line with 
Petrin (2002), we draw consumers’ idiosyncratic tastes from the normal distribution truncated at 95 percent 
based on two reasons: these tastes are bounded above and below, and the distributions of consumers’ 
preferences on apple characteristics are balanced.  
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estimated with all sets of instruments, including average product prices outside the division, 
terminal market prices, and wage rates in the retailing industry. 
The linear parameters, 𝜃𝜃1, are the mean of random coefficients estimated by the minimum-
distance procedure (e.g., Nevo 2000a, 2001), wherein the product-fixed effects are regressed on 
apple characteristics. The estimates of linear parameters are statistically significant with expected 
signs and are robust to alternative demand specifications. These negative price coefficients are 
greater in absolute value than those estimates from the logit model with the same set of instruments, 
implying more elastic demand for apples. The coefficients of observed apple characteristics suggest 
that consumers prefer the varieties well-suited for making applesauce and baking over the varieties 
well-suited for freezing and having a high degree of sweetness. In addition, the coefficients of 
retailer group reveal that consumers are more likely to buy apples from a small regional retailer 
than a nationwide retailer. 
The nonlinear parameters, 𝜃𝜃2, capture the heterogeneity in consumer preferences and tastes. 
The deviations from the homogenous tastes for apple characteristics are allowed to vary with 
demographic variables and idiosyncratic shocks. The coefficients of idiosyncratic shocks, age, and 
young adult, however, are not statistically significant. This implies that the heterogeneity in 
consumer preferences and tastes might not arise from the idiosyncratic shocks and the apple 
consumption patterns are not remarkably different by age and generation.33 On the contrary, the 
coefficients of the interaction terms between apple characteristics and household income are 
statistically significant. This suggests that the variation in consumer preferences for apple 
characteristics is primarily determined by the variation in household income. In particular, the 
positive coefficient of the interaction term between household income and the small regional 
retailer group implies that the marginal utility of shopping from a small regional retailer increases 
                                                     
33 Additional specifications that are not presented in this chapter also show that the coefficient of age-related 
variables are not statistically significant in the demand model. 
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with household income. The suitability for freezing is not a favorable apple characteristic for 
consumers with above average household income. Besides, there is a quadratic impact of household 
income on consumer disutility of apple prices. The coefficient signs of the interaction terms 
between price and household income and household income-squared are opposite. This implies that 
consumer insensitivity for apple prices is increasing in household income at a diminishing rate. 
Next, we discuss elasticity estimates and substitution patterns between apple varieties. The 
own- and cross-price elasticities are associated with the empirical distribution of consumer 
demographics, product fixed effects, and seasonality. Because of the large dimension, we only 
present the summary statistics of the estimates of elasticities by variety and by retailer group in 
Table 3.7. The results show that the estimated demand curves for apple varieties are highly elastic 
with respect to own price. On average, the most-purchased variety, Gala apples, has the least elastic 
demand, which is about half of the own-price elasticity of Honeycrisp apples. Specifically, a one 
percent decrease in the own price will increase the sales quantity of Gala apples by 2.80 percent 
and Honeycrisp apples by 5.58 percent. Moreover, the own-price elasticities vary across retailer 
groups. On average, the group of nationwide retailers has lower own-price elasticities than other 
groups.  
Table 3.7 also shows that cross-price elasticities of apples from the same retailer group are 
generally greater than those from a different group. In line with Kim (2004) and Villas-Boas (2007), 
we find that cross-price elasticities are relatively smaller than own-price elasticities. For example, 
the sales quantity of Golden Delicious will increase by 0.09 percent if the average price over other 
apples from the same retailer group increase by one percent, while it will increase by 0.06 percent 
if the average price over other apples from different retailer groups increases by one percent. It 
implies that consumers are more likely to substitute one variety for another in the same retailer 
group than in a different one. The only exceptions are consumers who buy apples from nationwide 
retailers. In addition, the large standard deviations of cross-price elasticities imply that cross-price 
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elasticities would change within a wide range and the specification of the logit model is too 
restrictive (Villas-Boas 2007). 
 
3.7.2. Counterfactual Analysis 
Using the retailers’ pricing rules and the estimated demand elasticities, we simulate the market 
outcomes in a counterfactual scenario in which Honeycrisp apples are removed from the market. 
The analysis focuses on markets where market shares of Honeycrisp apples are greater than or 
equal to 1 percent. The price changes of competing apple varieties due to the introduction of 
Honeycrisp are presented in Table 3.8, where these prices are averaged across retailer groups, 
weighted by sales quantity. The upper half of Table 3.8 displays the average price changes by 
variety in 481 markets. The prices of apples in most markets decline in response to the introduction 
of Honeycrisp. For example, the average price of Gala decreases by 0.72 percent, or a drop of 0.27 
cents per pound. In contrast to Gala, Golden Delicious exhibits the least responsiveness to the 
introduction of Honeycrisp. The last column shows the number of markets where the introduction 
of Honeycrisp increases the competition and reduces the prices of competing apple varieties. 
Moreover, the impact of the introduction of Honeycrisp on the decline in prices of competing apple 
varieties is positively correlated with the market share of Honeycrisp. The lower panel of Table 3.8 
presents the equilibrium prices of competing apple varieties in 96 markets where market shares of 
Honeycrisp are greater than or equal to 5 percent. In this situation, the average price of Gala 
decreases by 2.23 percent, or a drop of 0.71 cents per pound. 
Next, we calculate changes in the market shares of competing apple varieties, the overall 
market size, and the total sales revenue. The estimates in Table 3.9 are based on the sample of 481 
markets. The results show that Honeycrisp has increased both the total sales quantity and the total 
sales revenue. In the study period, the number of markets with market shares of Honeycrisp greater 
than or equal to 1 percent increased from 42 in 2009 to 111 in 2014, and the total sales quantity of 
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Honeycrisp increased from 13.35 million pounds in 2009 to 47.66 in 2014. Compared to the 
counterfactual results, the introduction of Honeycrisp leads to a decrease in the total sales of other 
apples but an overall increase in the total sales of all apples. Table 3.9 shows that the total sales of 
other apples was 57.40 million pounds less than the total sales of other apples when Honeycrisp is 
removed from the markets (i.e., Counterfactual Total Quantity minus Other Apples’ Quantity), and 
that the introduction of Honeycrisp increased the total sales of all apples by 8.03 percent from 
1,574.90 to 1,701.45 million pounds. These results suggest that Honeycrisp attracted more 
consumers who would otherwise choose the outside option. Besides, the gain in sales revenue due 
to the introduction of Honeycrisp outweighed the loss in sales revenue due to the decline in the 
prices of others. As the total sales quantity rose in the study period, the total sales revenue increased 
by 21.25 percent from 621.65 to 753.76 million dollars.  
We evaluate the changes in consumer welfare using the measure of CV. The CV suggests 
the pecuniary change for consumers so that they are indifferent between the observed scenario (i.e., 
the data) and the counterfactual scenario. In other words, the CV measures the amount of money a 
Honeycrisp consumer needs to be compensated in the counterfactual scenario to maintain the same 
utility as before (i.e., the utility achieved when Honeycrisp apples are in the market). Before delving 
into the CV measure for consumer welfare, we examine the extent to which the assumption of 
additive i.i.d. error in the random utility framework affects the estimates of welfare change. Table 
3.10 shows the decomposition of welfare changes for an average consumer into a component from 
observed characteristics, 𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗, and a component from the logit error, 𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗. For the markets with 
market shares of Honeycrisp greater than or equal to 1 percent, the total average changes in 
consumer welfare due to the introduction of Honeycrisp are 3.14 cents per pound, of which 59.55 
percent (i.e., 1.87 cents per pound) are related to the changes from observed characteristics and 
40.45 percent (i.e., 1.27 cents per pound) to the changes from the logit error. In addition, the results 
show that the percentage change in consumer welfare stemming from the observed characteristics 
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is positively associated with the market share of Honeycrisp. For the markets with Honeycrisp share 
greater than or equal to 5 percent, 70.82 percent of the total average changes in consumer welfare 
can be explained by the changes from observed characteristics. Thereby, the problem due to the 
assumption of additive i.i.d. error is less of a concern in this study.34 The total welfare change due 
to the introduction of Honeycrisp is calculated by 
Total Change in Consumer Welfare = �𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖] × 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
 
where 𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 is the total sales quantity of apples in market 𝑡𝑡. Table 3.11 shows that the total benefits 
in consumer welfare increased from 3.03 million dollars in 2009 to 15.20 in 2014. The 
decomposition of total changes in consumer welfare suggests that the growth of consumer welfare 
is primarily attributable to the increase in apple varieties rather than price competition. The total 
consumer welfare gains from Honeycrisp increased from 2.76 million dollars in 2009 to 13.91 
million dollars in 2014, corroborating the recent growth of the Honeycrisp demand and popularity 
in the United States. 
 
3.8. Conclusion 
Agricultural research and development programs on new demand-enhancing products have become 
increasingly important over the past decade. Large numbers of new agricultural products have been 
developed and introduced in the United States to serve consumers’ increasing expectations of food 
quality. However, little is known about their economic benefits. In this paper, we analyze the 
welfare impacts of the introduction of Honeycrisp apples using structural models of consumer 
demand and retailer supply. 
                                                     
34 Petrin (2002) finds the welfare analysis can be improved by augmenting the full model with additional 
micro-level data of households. 
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 We estimate consumer demand for apples in a discrete choice approach with random 
coefficients, and model the retailer competition in the Bertrand-Nash setting. The model addresses 
the problem of endogenous product prices and explicitly incorporates consumer heterogeneous 
tastes. With both demand estimates and retailers’ pricing rules, we predict counterfactual prices of 
competing apple varieties in the absence of Honeycrisp and evaluate the changes in consumer 
welfare and total sales quantity and revenue. 
The main results show that consumers are better off in a market with more options of apple 
varieties. For the sample markets, we find that the introduction of Honeycrisp has increased 
consumer welfare by 3.14 cents per pound on average, corresponding to a total of 49.03 million 
dollars overall the study period. More than 90 percent of welfare gain is explained by the increased 
number of total apple varieties, while the remaining part is explained by the decline in prices of 
competing apple varieties. The extent of the decline is positively associated with the market share 
of Honeycrisp. We also find that the introduction of Honeycrisp has increased the total sales of all 
apples by 126.48 million pounds and the total sales revenue by 132.12 million dollars, which are 
equivalent to 8.03 percent and 21.25 percent of their corresponding counterfactual estimates, 
respectively. 
It is important to put the magnitude of the estimated welfare change into context. Suppose 
the estimated welfare change from our sample can be extrapolated to the entire U.S. apple market. 
In that case, a back of the envelope analysis suggests the introduction of Honeycrisp has increased 
total consumer welfare in the United States by about 940 million dollars between 2009 and 2014.35 
This gain corresponds to 21 percent of the annual average domestic expenditures on public food 
                                                     
35 The estimated change in total consumer welfare is a product of total apple sales quantity and the change in 
average consumer welfare of buying apples (i.e., 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖]). According to the USDA Food Availability (Per 
Capita) Data System, the number of total sales quantity in the U.S. apple market between 2009 and 2014 was 
29,933.09 million pounds. Given that 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖] is 3.14 cents per pound, the estimated increase in total consumer 
welfare was 939.90 million dollars. 
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and agricultural R&D between 2000 and 2011 in the United States (Pardey et al. 2016).36 Aligned 
with previous literature, our estimates also imply that there are substantially large returns to 
agricultural R&D.37 
Due to the lack of disaggregated data on apple production, we do not investigate the vertical 
relationship between retailers and growers on the supply side. As a result, the model only accounts 
for the welfare changes in the total sales revenue of retailers rather than growers. The price premium 
paid for Honeycrisp strongly motivates growers to produce more Honeycrisp apples. The estimated 
increase in apple sales revenue is consistent with recent growers’ planting reports. In addition, news 
articles in New York Times and on National Public Radio claim that many growers in Washington 
state have been looking to switch from Gala and Red Delicious to Cosmic Crisp, a new variety 
derived from Honeycrisp (Karp 2015; Charles 2017). This is in line with our finding that Gala and 
Red Delicious are the two varieties that suffer the largest decreases in prices from the introduction 
of Honeycrisp. Nevertheless, the incentives might quickly vanish as the growth of the Honeycrisp 
production will eventually reduce its price premium.
                                                     
36 Pardey et al. (2016) report that the average annual domestic expenditures on public food and agricultural 
R&D is about 4.47 billion dollars in United States between 2000 and 2011. 
37 As Bresnahan points out relating to Hausman’s (1996) study on the valuation of new goods, the large 
consumer surplus results from a steep demand for the new variety (i.e., Honeycrisp) and its small 
substitutability between other varieties. 
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Table 3.1. Apple Market Shares by Variety (Percent of Total Volume) 
Variety 2009-Fall 2010-Fall 2011-Fall 2012-Fall 2013-Fall 2014-Fall 
Gala 27.58 30.50 32.89 30.58 30.30 31.46 
Red Delicious 21.66 21.66 18.18 19.11 15.73 13.25 
Fuji 9.57 8.02 8.82 9.98 10.26 11.51 
Granny Smith 10.70 10.48 10.82 10.69 9.50 10.75 
Honeycrisp 3.81 5.83 6.63 6.34 6.79 8.56 
Golden Delicious 5.74 4.84 4.32 3.78 3.58 3.48 
Mcintosh 6.03 5.52 5.25 4.38 4.81 4.82 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.51 0.56 0.45 1.03 1.51 1.05 
Braeburn 1.19 1.22 0.61 0.80 0.71 0.67 
Jazz/Scifresh 0.35 0.61 0.36 0.88 0.98 1.10 
Top 5 73.31 76.50 77.33 76.70 72.59 75.53 
Top 10 87.14 89.24 88.31 87.58 84.17 86.65 




Table 3.2. Apple Market Prices by Variety (Dollars per Pound) 
Variety 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Gala 0.63 0.60 0.63 0.70 0.70 0.65 
Red Delicious 0.50 0.52 0.56 0.58 0.61 0.64 
Fuji 0.68 0.76 0.76 0.82 0.76 0.83 
Granny Smith 0.77 0.80 0.80 0.89 0.89 0.85 
Honeycrisp 2.11 1.85 1.97 2.30 2.24 2.07 
Golden Delicious 0.89 0.91 0.98 1.06 1.00 0.90 
Mcintosh 0.63 0.63 0.68 0.79 0.67 0.62 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 1.26 1.28 1.20 1.25 1.18 1.17 
Braeburn 1.16 1.23 1.29 1.46 1.51 1.55 
Jazz/Scifresh 1.75 1.46 1.17 1.10 1.24 1.21 
Source: IRI Infoscan Data. 
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Table 3.3. Summary Statistics of Apple Sales by Retailer Group and Variety  
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Panel A. Price (Dollars per Pound) and Market Share (Percent) 
Price  0.54 0.47 0.30 0.05 2.04 
Market Share a 1.07 0.31 2.24 0.00 48.23 
Panel B. Market Shares by Retailer (Percent)  
Local 13.29 9.18 13.59 0.00 86.48 
Small Regional 11.59 3.77 13.72 0.00 50.92 
Regional 4.44 2.82 5.65 0.00 35.07 
Nationwide 2.51 1.78 3.22 0.00 29.44 
Panel C. Market Shares by Variety (Percent)   
Gala 5.45 2.92 6.37 0.00 48.48 
Red Delicious 4.56 2.92 4.60 0.00 44.35 
Fuji 2.21 1.30 2.94 0.00 20.40 
Granny Smith 3.06 1.88 3.03 0.00 15.35 
Honeycrisp 1.45 0.46 2.73 0.00 24.10 
Golden Delicious 1.39 0.77 1.72 0.00 14.62 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.79 0.46 1.05 0.00 8.63 
Braeburn 0.69 0.28 1.52 0.00 20.37 
Note: Prices are deflated by regional price indices from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base period at 1982-84. 
a Market share is defined as the ratio of the apple sales quantity to the 
potential market size. The potential market size is defined in footnote 12.
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Table 3.4. Summary Statistics for Cost Information 
 Mean Median SD Min Max 
Apple Prices in the Terminal Markets (Dollars per Pound) 
Minimum Prices 
Braeburn 0.28 0.27 0.06 0.10 0.53 
Fuji 0.23 0.23 0.05 0.10 0.41 
Gala 0.25 0.24 0.05 0.12 0.40 
Golden Delicious 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.11 0.36 
Granny Smith 0.25 0.25 0.05 0.11 0.40 
Honeycrisp 0.43 0.39 0.19 0.12 1.60 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.32 0.31 0.08 0.11 0.58 
Red Delicious 0.21 0.20 0.05 0.08 0.34 
Range of Prices 
Braeburn 0.15 0.12 0.11 0.00 0.63 
Fuji 0.23 0.20 0.12 0.01 0.72 
Gala 0.22 0.20 0.11 0.00 0.74 
Golden Delicious 0.18 0.17 0.07 0.04 0.44 
Granny Smith 0.20 0.17 0.12 0.03 0.78 
Honeycrisp 0.25 0.21 0.24 0.00 1.23 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.18 0.16 0.13 0.00 0.70 
Red Delicious 0.16 0.14 0.08 0.04 0.62 
Relevant Labor Costs in the Retailing Industry (Dollars per Hour) 
Minimum Wage Rates      
Cashiers 3.48 3.49 0.20 3.07 4.07 
Heavy Truck Drivers 5.48 5.45 0.44 4.29 7.22 
Light Truck Drivers 3.85 3.84 0.22 3.36 4.48 
Tractor Operators 4.45 4.45 0.29 3.62 5.38 
Stock Movers 3.68 3.68 0.17 3.30 4.13 
Packagers 3.53 3.53 0.18 3.17 4.07 
Range of Wage Rates      
Cashiers 2.20 1.91 0.73 1.39 4.67 
Heavy Truck Drivers 7.07 7.06 0.73 4.57 9.30 
Light Truck Drivers 8.32 8.37 0.89 5.40 10.33 
Tractor Operators 5.41 5.21 0.96 3.64 8.80 
Stock Movers 4.71 4.68 0.54 3.35 6.45 
Packagers 3.46 3.54 0.56 2.01 4.94 
Note: Prices and wage rates are deflated by regional price indices from the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base period at 1982-84. Apple prices by variety in the 
terminal markets are provided by the USDA Agricultural Marketing Service. Minimum 
prices are defined as the 5th percentile price and the ranges are defined as the associated 
differences between the 5th and the 95th percentile price. Relevant labor costs in the 
retailing industry are obtained from the BLS Occupational Employment Statistics Survey. 
Minimum wage rates are defined as the 10th percentile wage rate and the ranges are 
defined as the associated differences between the 10th and the 90th percentile wage rate.
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Table 3.5. Results from the Logit Model 
 OLS  IV 
Variable (1) (2)  (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  –2.075*** –2.127***  –12.882*** –7.320*** –7.324*** –11.831*** –7.358*** –7.305*** 
 (0.105) (0.104)  (1.185) (0.255) (0.246) (1.055) (0.252) (0.241) 
Mean of Young Adult Ratio  –4.987***     –3.322* –3.488* –3.595** 
  (1.922)     (1.987) (1.952) (1.770) 
Mean of log(Age)   –4.434**     –9.316*** –4.964*** –6.819*** 
  (1.826)     (2.040) (1.867) (1.737) 
Mean of log(Income)  50.326***     48.853*** 55.185*** 54.397*** 
  (10.069)     (11.306) (10.534) (10.167) 
Mean of log(Income)2  –2.160***     –2.094*** –2.365*** –2.336*** 
  (0.459)     (0.515) (0.479) (0.463) 
Fit/Exogeneity Test for 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 0.250 0.274  89.777 271.325 216.306 98.636 270.079 225.499 
Frist Stage Regression 
Adjusted R2    0.596 0.643 0.648 0.599 0.645 0.651 
F-statistic for Instruments    14.782 94.057 63.003 15.722 94.572 63.608 
Average Prices Outside Division    No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
Terminal Market Prices    Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Wage Rates    Yes No Yes Yes No Yes 
Note: The sample size is 26,089. The dependent variable is given by log�𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖� − log(𝑠𝑠0𝑖𝑖). All specifications include the product fixed effects and 
the period dummies. The null hypothesis of exogeneity test is that 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is exogenous. Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks 
indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.   
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Table 3.6. Results from the Full Model 
 Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Mean Price –11.048(1.800)*** –11.309(2.169)*** –11.052(2.782)*** –11.045(3.112)*** 
 Constant –3.123(0.176)*** –2.480(0.275)*** –2.410(0.288)*** –2.011(0.281)*** 
 Sauce 0.525(0.065)*** 0.228(0.041)*** 0.477(0.105)*** 0.432(0.107)*** 
 Baking 2.446(0.173)*** 1.493(0.099)*** 3.296(0.434)*** 4.287(0.446)*** 
 Freezing –5.982(0.704)*** –4.324(0.720)*** –6.070(1.047)*** –7.441(1.045)*** 
 Sweetness –2.499(0.399)*** –2.393(0.366)*** –2.930(0.526)*** –4.642(0.525)*** 
 Local 3.204(0.099)*** 3.102(0.121)*** 3.011(0.164)*** 3.177(0.165)*** 
 Small 
 
4.298(0.348)*** 3.961(0.335)*** 3.942(0.550)*** 6.732(0.638)*** 
 Regional 2.319(0.095)*** 0.781(0.848) 2.863(0.711)*** 3.733(0.714)*** 
Interaction w. Price  0.072(9.045) 0.076(11.534) 0.075(13.081) 
Shocks Constant  –0.086(6.940) –0.091(5.962) –0.091(6.232) 
 Sauce   –0.032(6.183) –0.031(7.205) 
 Baking   –0.064(13.146) –0.065(15.965) 
 Freezing  –0.087(8.462) –0.048(9.956) –0.048(13.090) 
 Sweetness  –0.067(12.414) –0.041(7.732) –0.042(9.291) 
 Local  –0.020(20.600) 0.018(10.345) 0.019(12.567) 
 Small 
 
 –0.010(20.828) 0.041(41.967) 0.041(53.321) 
 Regional  0.138(17.905) 0.118(13.765) 0.119(14.518) 
Interaction w. Price 0.055(17.856) 0.071(23.635) 0.051(26.435) –0.091(44.344) 
Young Adult Constant    0.123(30.790) 
Interaction w. Price 0.001(15.654) 0.007(19.832) –0.0004(26.361) –0.209(54.739) 
Age Constant    0.178(35.595) 
Interaction w. Price 151.714(26.564)*** 148.008(40.987)*** 152.080(46.764)*** 152.128(37.146)*** 
Income Constant 4.067(5.478) 3.913(5.133) 4.071(8.582) 4.085(9.722) 
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 Sauce 1.287(4.534)  1.269(5.843) 1.263(6.314) 
 Baking 4.729(4.636)  4.765(5.202) 4.783(5.930) 
 Freezing –20.761(7.100)*** –14.928(6.699)** –20.843(10.353)** –20.879(11.841)* 
 Sweetness –12.587(6.819)* –9.316(7.001) –12.616(10.178) –12.658(11.037) 
 Local 2.306(2.991) 0.836(3.031) 2.327(4.439) 2.336(4.929) 
 Small 
 
10.929(3.801)*** 10.258(4.593)** 10.985(5.210)** 10.994(5.399)** 
 Regional 2.085(3.478) 1.994(5.596) 2.143(6.595) 2.161(6.914) 
Inter. w. Inc2 Price –7.333(1.296)*** –7.139(2.004)*** –7.350(2.245)*** –7.352(1.797)*** 
      
GMM 
 
 941.826 979.350 939.538 939.265 
R2 Min. 
 
 0.898 0.821 0.806 0.818 
Price Coef. > 0  0% 0% 0% 0% 
Note: The sample size is 26,089. All specifications include the period dummies and use the same set of instruments (i.e., the 
average prices outside the division overall seasons, the terminal market prices, and the relevant wage rates in the retailing 
industry). The parameters of apple characteristics are estimated by the minimum-distance procedure. Standard errors are 
presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of 
significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Table 3.7. Estimates of Own- and Cross-Price Elasticities 
 Own-Price  Cross-Price 
   Same Retailer 
Group (Yes) 
 Same Retailer 
Group (No) 
 Average 
Variety Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Braeburn –3.958 2.191  0.040 0.107  0.026 0.060  0.031 0.081 
Fuji –3.855 1.138  0.052 0.104  0.053 0.162  0.053 0.144 
Gala –2.802 1.004  0.050 0.112  0.043 0.135  0.045 0.128 
Golden Delicious –6.466 2.943  0.093 0.272  0.061 0.173  0.072 0.214 
Granny Smith –3.737 1.608  0.063 0.155  0.053 0.163  0.056 0.160 
Honeycrisp –5.584 2.712  0.030 0.086  0.021 0.052  0.024 0.067 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink –5.639 2.972  0.050 0.192  0.027 0.081  0.035 0.133 
Red Delicious –2.961 2.011  0.033 0.135  0.022 0.060  0.026 0.094 
Retailer Group 
Local –4.243 1.998  0.072 0.193  0.026 0.079  0.043 0.136 
Small regional –5.925 3.213  0.076 0.215  0.023 0.076  0.041 0.140 
Regional –4.560 2.134  0.036 0.102  0.030 0.086  0.032 0.092 
Nationwide –3.377 2.077  0.026 0.070  0.064 0.180  0.050 0.149 
Note: Means and standard deviation of estimated own- and cross-price elasticities are presented here. The third and 
the fourth column show the statistics for estimated elasticities only from the same retailer group by variety and by the 
type of retailer group. The fifth and the sixth column show the similar information but from different retailer groups. 




Table 3.8. Equilibrium Prices (Cent per Pound) with and without Honeycrisp 
 Price C. Price Price Change 
Number of Markets 
where Price ≤ C. Price 
(Percent in Total) 
Market Shares of the Honeycrisp ≥ 1 percent (481 Markets) 
Braeburn 67.86 67.98 0.12 (0.18%) 351 (73%) 
Fuji 54.05 54.17 0.13 (0.22%) 389 (81%) 
Gala 37.28 37.55 0.27 (0.72%) 473 (98%) 
Golden Delicious 54.16 54.18 0.02 (0.04%) 291 (61%) 
Granny Smith 41.90 41.96 0.06 (0.14%) 317 (66%) 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 63.84 64.01 0.17 (0.27%) 370 (77%) 
Red Delicious 34.58 34.79 0.21 (0.61%) 449 (93%) 
Market Shares of the Honeycrisp ≥ 5 percent (96 Markets) 
Braeburn 67.08 67.48 0.39 (0.60%) 73 (76%) 
Fuji 53.40 53.74 0.34 (0.64%) 81 (84%) 
Gala 31.37 32.07 0.71 (2.23%) 95 (99%) 
Golden Delicious 52.67 52.77 0.10 (0.19%) 70 (73%) 
Granny Smith 41.92 42.15 0.24 (0.55%) 69 (72%) 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 62.50 62.93 0.43 (0.69%) 74 (77%) 
Red Delicious 33.44 34.00 0.56 (1.67%) 95 (99%) 
Note: Price and C. Price represent the observed and the counterfactual price respectively. Both are 
averaged across retailer groups by sales quantity and deflated by regional price indices from the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base period at 1982-84. The price change is the difference 





Table 3.9. Sales Quantity (Million Pounds) and Sales Revenue (Million Dollars) 
   Sales Quantity  Sales Revenue 
 Num. of Num. of  Other      Other    
Year Markets IRI Cities Honeycrisp Apples Total C. Total Changes  Honeycrisp Apples Total C. Total Changes 
2009 42 29 13.35 127.10 140.45 131.00 9.41  12.58 48.62 61.20 50.43 10.77 
2010 61 38 21.06 194.80 215.86 201.20 14.63  17.77 78.09 95.86 81.03 14.84 
2011 78 39 29.99 227.50 257.49 235.90 21.54  22.71 89.26 111.97 93.11 18.86 
2012 82 38 29.67 267.10 296.77 277.10 19.73  28.17 112.19 140.36 117.53 22.83 
2013 107 43 42.22 353.50 395.72 367.60 28.11  36.13 137.41 173.54 144.13 29.41 
2014 111 43 47.66 347.50 395.16 362.10 33.06  42.46 128.37 170.83 135.42 35.41 
Total 183.95 1517.50 1701.45 1574.90 126.48  159.82 593.94 753.76 621.65 132.12 
Note: These results are based on the 481 markets where the market share of the Honeycrisp is greater than or equal to 1 percent. Other apples include 
all competing apple varieties. C. Total in sales quantity and sales revenue respectively represent the counterfactual quantity and revenue when the 
Honeycrisp is removed from the markets. The values of sales revenue are deflated by regional price indices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics 
(BLS) with the base period at 1982-84. 
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Table 3.10. Decomposition of Welfare Changes for An Average Consumer (Cent per Pound) 
Total Changes at Average in Changes from Observed  Changes from  
Consumer Welfare (𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖]) Characteristics (𝛿𝛿𝑗𝑗 + 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) Logit Error (𝜖𝜖𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗) 
Market Shares of the Honeycrisp ≥ 1 percent (481 Markets) 
3.14 (100.00%) 1.87 (59.55%) 1.27 (40.45%) 
Market Shares of the Honeycrisp ≥ 5 percent (96 Markets) 
4.49 (100.00%) 3.18 (70.82%) 1.32 (29.18%) 
Note: Average consumer welfare is estimated by the simulation form of 𝐸𝐸[𝐶𝐶𝑉𝑉𝑖𝑖] =
∫(𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖with − 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖without)/𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝜖𝜖)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝐷𝐷)𝑑𝑑𝑃𝑃(𝑣𝑣) where 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖 = max𝑗𝑗 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑗𝑗  and 𝜖𝜖  is draw from 
the general extreme value distribution with shape parameter 𝜅𝜅 = 0, scale parameter 




Table 3.11. Total Changes in Consumer Welfare (Million Dollars) 
Year Num. of Markets 
Num. of 
IRI Cities 
Change due to 
Increased Varieties 
Change due to 
Decline in Prices of 
Competing Apples 
Total Change in 
Consumer Welfare 
2009 42 29 2.76 (91.09%) 0.27 (8.91%) 3.03 (100%) 
2010 61 38 4.42 (92.28%) 0.38 (7.72%) 4.79 (100%) 
2011 78 39 6.73 (92.45%) 0.54 (7.55%) 7.28 (100%) 
2012 82 38 7.05 (91.56%) 0.66 (8.44%) 7.70 (100%) 
2013 107 43 10.04 (91.11%) 0.98 (8.89%) 11.02 (100%) 
2014 111 43 13.91 (91.51%) 1.29 (8.49%) 15.20 (100%) 
Total 44.91 (91.60%) 4.12 (8.40%) 49.03 (100%) 
Note: These results are based on the 481 markets where the market share of the Honeycrisp is 
greater than or equal to 1 percent. The values of consumer welfare are deflated by regional price 
indices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base period at 1982-84. The component 
ratios are presented in parentheses. 
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Figure 3.2. Map of the Cities in IRI data and Terminal Markets 
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Figure 3.3. Correlation between Product Prices and Estimation Error 
 
Note: Product prices represent the implicit value of all product characteristics, but not all product characteristics 
are included in the demand estimation. Therefore, the correlation between product prices and the estimation 
error, which contains the consumer valuation of unobserved characteristics, raises the problem of endogeneity. 
 








Chapter 4. Food Retail Competition in Local Markets 
4.1. Introduction 
The food retail industry in the United States (U.S.) is dominated by a few retail chains. In 2012, 
there were 42,420 retail chains operating 66,343 stores, while the largest 20 retail chains earned a 
total of 315 billion dollars, accounting for 59 percent of the entire sales revenue in the food retail 
industry (U.S. Census Bureau 2015). Retailer concentration in local markets can be even higher. 
Typically, in a market with more than five million people, the majority of sales are captured by 
three to six retail chains, and the rest is shared by a fringe of small retailers (Ellickson 2013). 
Previous studies provide strong evidence on a positive correlation between retail price levels and 
the local market concentration (e.g., Cotterill 1986, 1999). Multi-store retail chains are able to 
internalize cross-effects between stores within the same chain, and hence enhance market power 
and result in high markups (Smith 2004).  
 The knowledge of food retail competition in local markets could inform public and 
business policy. In 2010, the U.S. Departments of Agriculture (USDA), Treasury, and Health and 
Human Services (HHS) launched the Healthy Food Financing Initiatives (HFFI) to increase food 
access in underserved communities through efforts such as developing and equipping grocery 
stores, small retailers, corner stores and farmers markets selling healthy food (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services 2017). 38 Food access is determined by both the accessibility and 
affordability of food. Ideally, opening a new store will directly increase the accessibility of food 
and raise competition in the local market and in turn reduce food prices in the local market. 
Nevertheless, stores in the local market might cooperate with their nearby rivals and thereafter 
exercise market power and maintain considerable profit margins. Kyureghian et al. (2012) find 
                                                     
38 The HFFI received 125 million dollars from the USDA through the 2014 Farm Bill, 22 million dollars 
from the Treasury’s Community Development Financial Institutions Fund in 2015, and a total amount of 
funding over 51.8 million dollars from the HHS between 2011 and 2016 (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2017). 
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most households fail to meet the USDA dietary guidelines because they cannot afford healthy foods. 
As a result, it is of importance to understand household valuations of store proximity and the extent 
to which retailer concentration drives up food prices in local markets. 
The primary objective of this chapter is to examine store competition in local markets by 
addressing the heterogeneity in households’ store choice sets, travel distances, and shopping 
baskets. A secondary objective is to evaluate the association between the profit margin and the 
number and composition of nearby rivals in local markets. To achieve these objectives, we develop 
a structural model that accounts for households’ store choice and allows us to evaluate price 
elasticities and gross profit margins across stores and retail chains. The data used in this study are 
primarily from two sources—the Consumer Network household scanner data and the InfoScan 
retail scanner data—including rich and complementary information on household grocery shopping 
and weekly store sales. The joint use of these two data is novel to the research on the household 
choice of stores. 
 There is a sizable literature on food retail competition. Early studies using structure-
conduct-performance models generally find a strong positive relationship between the market 
concentration and retail prices, and conclude that retailers with large market shares earn high profits 
by raising prices (e.g., Cotterill 1986, 1999). Bonanno and Lopez (2009) estimate a simultaneous 
equation system of prices and store service using store-level data on fluid milk purchases. They 
find that supermarkets differentiate themselves from their rivals through store service. A strand of 
the literature looks into retail competition across store formats. Hausman and Leibtag (2007) 
investigate the change in prices due to the entry of supercenters by estimating consumer choices 
between supercenters and traditional food outlets using household panel data. Their results suggest 
that consumers, especially from low-income households, benefits from lower food prices offered 
by the supercenters, and that the expansion of supercenters leads to a significant increase in 
consumer welfare. Volpe (2011) examines the performance (i.e., profitability and cost efficiency) 
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of supermarkets and their competition with hypermarkets (e.g., Wal-Mart Supercenter). His results 
reveal that the competition with hypermarkets cannibalizes the profits of supermarkets. In fact, 
store competition exists not only across different formats and retail chains but also within the same 
retail chain. Cleeren et al. (2010) use an empirical entry model to examine the competition between 
discount stores and supermarkets in the German grocery industry. They find that the intra-format 
competition is more intensive than the inter-format competition. In another study, Smith (2004) 
estimates cross-elasticities between stores within the same retail chain. His results show that 
demerger for stores within the largest firms brings a price decrease of 2 to 3.8 percent in selected 
regions varying by market concentration, while a merger between the largest firms leads a price 
increase up to 7.4 percent. A market is defined in two dimensions—differentiated products and 
geographic areas. However, previous studies typically investigate the retail competition in the 
product space. A distinguishing feature of this study is that we look into this issue in both the 
product space and the geographic space by accounting for household-specific shopping baskets and 
travel distances, as well as their heterogeneous store choice sets. 
This chapter is also related to the literature on determinants of households’ store choice. 
The existing papers on food retail competition typically examine store substitution patterns by 
modeling the household choice of shopping stores. For example, Volle (2001) estimates a 
multinomial logit model to evaluate the impact of store promotions and loyalty on store choice 
using household behavioral data on grocery shopping in France and concludes that loyalty is a 
primary determinant. Including more variables of store characteristics, Solgaard and Hansen (2003) 
employ a random coefficient logit model to identify the determinants of household store choices. 
They find that price level, assortment, and distance determine the consumer choice, and that 
assortment is the most important factor driving the choice among different formats and the impact 
of distance varies with consumer demographics. In addition, their results show that there is no 
significant difference in quality and service across stores. Recent studies provide new empirical 
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evidence by including both store and household characteristics in their analyses. Dong and Stewart 
(2012) develop a specialized multinomial logit model and find the consumer choice of stores for 
purchasing fluid milk heavily depends on store prices, promotion deals, as well as household 
demographics and purchase history. Kyureghian and Nayga Jr (2013) take a further step by 
integrating county-level retail availability information into Dong and Stewart’s model to examine 
the impacts of local food retail environment on the household purchase of fruit and vegetables. 
They find that the availability of convenience stores drives up the household probability of 
purchasing fruit and vegetables. 
Most abovementioned studies account for variables of household demographics, store 
average prices, and store characteristics in their models under an implicit assumption that different 
households visiting the same store will buy an identical basket. However, this implicit assumption 
is tenuous if household shopping baskets are substantially different from one another. We address 
the heterogeneity in households’ store choice and shopping baskets by constructing prices for 
household-specific shopping baskets. Turolla (2016) is the only other economic study that 
accommodates this issue using the microdata on household grocery shopping in France. With 
limited information on the composition of household shopping baskets and their expenditures, 
Turolla develops a model to predict prices of household-specific shopping baskets that are, in turn, 
used in the estimation of the household store choice model. The author finds that retailers’ market 
power in some local markets is simply due to a high level of concentration rather than the firms’ 
anti-competitive practices, and concludes that the competition between large grocery stores is 
highly localized in France. A notable advantage of our study is that we are able to calculate prices 
of household-specific shopping baskets charged by different stores using both the household and 
retail scanner data. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 gives us an overview of data and provides 
some preliminary evidence on the tradeoff between household travel distance and shopping basket 
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price. Section 3 shows the analytical framework by introducing our structural models of demand 
and supply. Finally, we present and discuss the model results in Section 4, and conclude in Section 
5. 
 
4.2. Overview of Data 
4.2.1. Data and Local Markets 
Data in our analysis come from multiple sources. The primary data comprise the Consumer 
Network household scanner data and the InfoScan retail scanner data from January to December in 
2016, both of which are collected by Information Resources, Inc. (IRI). 39 The household scanner 
data are derived from a large sample of nationally representative households who report their 
demographics, when they shopped, where they visited, what food products they purchased, and 
how much they spent. Household demographic data include household income level, size, and 
residence area, as well as the gender and the education level of household head, where a household 
head in this study is a household member who makes household decisions on shopping. The amount 
of money a household spent on each food product is measured by dollars at the Universal Product 
Code (UPC) level. For the sake of household privacy, two restrictions are imposed on the data. 
First, households only report names of retail chains they visited rather than the specific store 
locations. This limitation creates a challenge in modeling households’ store choice that we discuss 
below. Second, a household’s residence area can only be tracked by a census block, which is the 
smallest geographic unit defined by the U.S. Census Bureau. This restriction is less of a concern 
for this study since census blocks are informative enough to infer household residence in our 
analysis. In particular, we focus on the Minneapolis and St. Paul (MSP) Metropolitan Statistical 
Area (MSA), the 16th largest metropolitan area in the United States with more than 3.6 million 
                                                     
39 The IRI data access is granted by the USDA Economic Research Service. 
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people. The household scanner data representatively sampled 3,329 households from 2,872 census 
blocks spreading out across 11 counties in the MSP MSA.40  
The retail scanner data contain weekly sales information (i.e., sales revenue and quantity) 
of stores from the participating retail chains at the UPC level. Every store can be identified and 
linked to a specific address represented by the latitude and longitude coordinates. In the MSP MSA, 
there are 5 retail chains included in the data.41 Retail chain 1, 2, and 3 report sales information at 
the store level, while retail chain 4 and 5 report at the Retail Market Area (RMA) level. An RMA 
is a geographic marketing area that is defined by the retail chain and might cross the boundaries of 
states and counties. In this study, the stores from retail chain 4 are all from the same self-defined 
RMA, so are the stores from retail chain 5. As a result, there is no variation in sales revenues and 
prices for stores from these two chains.  
Figure 4.1 presents the location information of households and stores in our sample. Stores 
from retail chains are marked by different shapes of points, while households are labeled by plain 
dots. The information of household density at the city (i.e., subdivision) level is also presented in 
the figure by the degree of grey. The figure suggests that the majority of stores and households in 
the MSP MSA are located in the area whose boundary is denoted by the interior dash line. This 
area represents the core market in the MSA MSP, covering 7 counties—Anoka, Carver, Dakota, 
Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, and Washington—in Minnesota. Aware of households who visit the 
stores on the boundary from outside but close to the core market, we extend the area of the core 
market outward by 5 kilometers (km). To that end, our sample includes all households and stores 
located in the area, the boundary of which is denoted by the outer dash line. 
                                                     
40 These 11 counties consist of 10 counties (i.e., Anoka, Carver, Chisago, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, Scott, 
Washington, and Wright) in Minnesota and 1 country (i.e., St. Croix) in Wisconsin. 




There are 1280 households in the sample. Table 4.1 displays the summary statistics of 
household demographics. It shows 21 percent of sampled households are headed by a male, 59 
percent are married, and 87 percent are white. More than half of sampled household heads hold a 
bachelor’s or above degree. Approximately 75 percent of the households are staying in their own 
houses. Half of the households are employed, and 16 percent of them are partially employed. About 
29 percent of households have at least one kid. Most sampled households consist of 2 individuals 
with an average size of 3. Compared to the median household income in the United States (55,322 
dollars in 2016), households residing in the MSP MSA are wealthier. Specifically, only 10 percent 
of sample households earn an income less than 25,000 dollars a year and 46 percent of sample 
households have an annual income of more than 70,000 dollars. 
The household scanner data include information on household shopping trips and products 
they purchased at the UPC level. A household might shop in multiple stores during one shopping 
trip and shop multiple times in the same store in a given month. For the subsequent analysis, we 
aggregate household shopping trip data at the monthly level by store and food category and focus 
on shopping trips made to households’ primary stores. A primary store for a household in a month 
is the store at which the household spends the largest portion of its monthly grocery expenditure. 
A household on average spends 67 percent of its monthly expenditure in its primary store. Overall, 
62 percent of household primary stores are from the five retail chains included in the retail scanner 
data. 
Table 4.2 shows the average household expenditure shares of 55 food categories in two 
groups: perishable product items and processed product items. The most consumed food category 
of perishable product items is Fruit, accounting for 5.42 percent of an average monthly household 
grocery expenditure, followed by Vegetables 3.59 percent, Beef 2.81 percent, Deli Prepared 1.57 
percent, and Pork 1.41 percent. As for the processed product items, the most consumed food 
category is Dairy with 12.86 percent, followed by Snacks 6.35 percent, Frozen Meals 5.19 percent, 
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Refrigerated Meats 5.16 percent, and Meals 5.03 percent. On average, 20 percent of monthly 
household expenditures are spent on perishable product items. These household expenditure 
patterns largely mirror the average shares of store revenues by food category, which are derived 
from the retail scanner data and presented in Table C1. 
Table C2 shows the average store prices by food category. In particular, the average store 
price 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 of food category 𝑣𝑣 in store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡 is calculated by  




where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖 are the revenue share and the unit price of product item 𝑘𝑘 in food category 
𝑣𝑣 in store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡. 
A distinct contribution of this study is that we examine retail competition in local markets, 
which are identified by households’ willingness to travel for shopping (WTTFS). A household’s 
WTTFS is a scalar, implying the size of a local market for a store. A local market is an area of a 
circle centered on a store with a radius equal to the assumed household WTTFS. Table 4.3 presents 
the summary statistics of the data on household travel distance to stores, the unit price of the 
household basket, and the size of household store choice sets under different assumptions of 
household WTTFS, ranging from 10 km to 20 km. Note that the size of a household store choice 
set is positively related to the household WTTFS. Panel A shows the distribution of household 
travel distances to stores in household choice sets. The household travel distance to a store is the 
Euclidian distance between the household home address and the store address. 42  Suppose 
households are equally likely to visit every store in their choice sets. The expected household travel 
distance to a store on average increases from 6.49 km to 12.63 km, as the household WTTFS raises 
from 10 km to 20 km. The 2009 National Household Travel Survey, conducted by the U.S. 
                                                     
42 For privacy protection, households are only able to be tracked at the census block level. Therefore, a 
household home address is regarded as the centroid of the census block in which the household resides. 
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Department of Transportation Federal Highway Administration, reports the annual average 
distance of a personal trip for shopping was 6.5 miles, equivalent to 10.4 km (Santos et al. 2011). 
This is close to 10.23 km, the average household travel distance to a shopping store when 
households are willing to travel as far as 16 km for shopping. Therefore, we use 16 km as the 
benchmark distance for household WTTFS. Robustness checks are conducted throughout the 
subsequent analyses. As the household WTTFS doubles from 10 km to 20 km, the sample size (i.e., 
the overall number of stores in households’ choice sets) increases by more than three times, from 
112,932 to 372,067 observations. Panel B of Table 4.3 presents the summary statistics of the unit 
price of the household basket. The unit price 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 of household ℎ’s shopping basket in store 𝑗𝑗 at 
period 𝑡𝑡 is given by 




where 𝜔𝜔ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the household ℎ’s expenditure share of food category 𝑣𝑣 at period 𝑡𝑡 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the 
average price of food category 𝑣𝑣 in store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡. The statistics suggest the distribution of the 
unit price of household shopping basket does not vary much with the household WTTFS. 
According to Equation (25), the unit price of a household shopping basket is the unit price of a 
composite good by construction. Panel C of Table 4.3 shows the change in the size of a household 
choice set. As the household WTTFS increases from 10 km to 20 km, the median number of stores 
that are included in a household choice set inflates from 11 to 39. 
Suppose households are willing to travel as far as 16 km. Then, the local market of a store 
is an area of a circle centered on the store with the radius of 16 km. The union of all households’ 
choice sets contains 119 stores in the study area. The union of local markets overlaps 141 cities 
from 10 counties in Minnesota (MN) and 1 county in Wisconsin (WI). Note that each city is a 
subdivision of a county and it is a small administrative area in the United States. Table 4.4 displays 
the summary statistics for these cities. As shown in Figure 4.1, Hennepin and Ramsey County are 
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the top two most populated counties in the study area. On average, a city in Hennepin and Ramsey 
County has 12,258 and 10,912 households with the density of 400 and 461 households per squared 
kilometer, respectively.  
Table 4.5 presents the summary statistics of total revenue, store price, and market shares 
by retail chain and by store. Retail chain 1 is the leading retailer operating 44 stores in the study 
area with the total revenue of 91.7 million dollars in 2016, followed by retail chain 2 operating 22 
stores with 56.3 million dollars, and retail chain 5 operating 20 stores with 41.1 million dollars. A 
store price is an average price across food categories weighted by its revenue; that is, 




where 𝜔𝜔𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 are the sales revenue and the price of food category 𝑣𝑣 in store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡. On 
average, stores from retail chain 5 have the lowest store prices. The market share of a retail chain 
is the quantity sold in the retail chain divided by the total number of potential quantity in the study 
area.43 The total number of quantity sold in a retail chain is defined as the total revenue of the retail 
chain divided by the average store price of the retail chain. Following the previous literature, the 
total number of potential quantity is a product of the total number of households and a constant, 
which in this study is the ratio of the monthly household average grocery spending over the average 
store price across retail chains. The use of potential quantity allows us to model a scenario in which 
the current market could be enlarged. According to the USDA moderate food plan, the monthly 
average cost of food at home is 605 dollars for a household of two adults, 874 dollars for a 
household of a couple with two children between 2 and 5 years old, 1043 dollars for a household 
of a couple with two children between 6 and 11 years old in December 2016 (USDA 2017b).44 
                                                     
43 The number of quantity in our context refers to the number of shopping baskets. 
44 The USDA Center for Nutrition Policy and Promotion releases a monthly online report for the cost of food 
on the page: https://www.cnpp.usda.gov/reports-publications. 
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Since the average size of households in the sample is about 3, we assume the monthly household 
average grocery spending is 650 dollars.45  
Table 4.5 shows the overall market share of the leading retailer, retail chain 1, is 13.02 
percent in the study area, which is 5.54 and 7.70 percent greater than the market share of the second 
and third largest retailer, respectively. Analog to the calculation of the market share of a retail chain, 
we also compute the market share of a store within the chain. Table 4.5 shows that the average 
market share of a store from retail chain 1 is 1.10 percent, which is much greater than the number, 
the overall market share of retail chain 1 over the total number of stores within retail chain 1. This 
suggests the market power of an individual store might be negligible in a large market but 
significant in a local market. It lends support to the argument of local markets.  
 
4.2.2. Preliminary Evidence on Tradeoff between Travel Distance and Shopping Basket 
Price  
The household scanner data only include household choices of retail chains instead of specific store 
locations. Before turning to the model, we examine the extent to which we can infer household 
choices of retail chains from observed data. Table 4.6 presents the summary statistics of household 
travel distance and shopping basket price based on alternative subsamples. In Scenario 1, the data 
is first restricted to a sample that contains the choice of the closest store(s) for each household and 
then restricted to a subsample that contains the choice of the closest store with the lowest price. 
Accordingly, the average household travel distance is 2.53 km, the average unit price of household 
shopping basket (i.e., the average unit price of a composite good) is 4.01 dollars, and in the selected 
subsample there is 39 percent of the choice options containing the stores from the retail chains that 
                                                     
45 The results from the subsequent analysis are robust as we change the grocery spending from 625 dollars to 
725 dollars by every 25 dollars. 
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households visit. In turn, the data in Scenario 2 is first restricted to a sample that includes the choice 
of the store(s) with the lowest price for each household and then restricted to a subsample that 
contains the choice of the closest store with the lowest price. Accordingly, the average household 
travel distance increases to 9.66 km, while the average unit price of household shopping basket 
goes down to 3.67 dollars and the percentage of the selected choices with the stores from the retail 
chains that household visit declines to 25 percent. These statistics imply that households could find 
a further store with a lower average price for their shopping but they are willing to visit a closer 
store and pay a higher price instead. The same implications are found in Scenario 3 and 4, where 
we only focus on the data including the household choices with the stores from the retail chains 
that they visit. In sum, the tradeoff between household travel distance and shopping basket price 
motivates our research on food retail competition in local markets. 
 
4.3. Analytical Framework 
4.3.1. The Demand Model 
Discrete choice models are widely used in the estimation of demand in the empirical IO studies and 
are capable of investigating the consumer choices of differentiated products where each product 
has a constant price over all households. In our context, shopping stores are the differentiated 
products in the household choice sets. Analog to the existing literature, the variable of store average 
price can be included to model the household choice of stores, implicitly assuming that households 
visiting the same store buy an identical shopping basket and hence pay the same price. In fact, 
households may decide to visit a store depending on the composition of their shopping baskets. 
Using the household and retail scanner data, we are able to relax this assumption by measuring the 
price charged by every store in a household’s choice set for its specific basket. Furthermore, another 
variable of household travel distance to a store is also included to capture the tradeoff between 
household travel distance and shopping basket price. 
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Let households be indexed by ℎ = 1, … ,𝐻𝐻 and stores in the household ℎ’s choice set 𝐽𝐽ℎ by 
𝑗𝑗 = 1, … , |𝐽𝐽ℎ| where |𝐽𝐽ℎ| is the size of household ℎ’s choice set. The indirect utility that a household 
ℎ achieves from shopping in store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡 is given by 
 𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝛼𝛼ℎ𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆ℎ𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿ℎ,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗� + 𝑿𝑿ℎ′ 𝜷𝜷 + 𝑿𝑿𝑗𝑗′𝜸𝜸 + 𝑫𝑫𝑖𝑖′𝝓𝝓, (27) 
where 𝑝𝑝ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is the household-store price at period 𝑡𝑡 defined in Equation (25), 𝑑𝑑𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑡𝑡�𝐿𝐿ℎ ,𝐿𝐿𝑗𝑗� is the 
household ℎ’s travel distance to store 𝑗𝑗, 𝑿𝑿ℎ is a vector of household demographics, 𝑿𝑿𝑗𝑗 is a vector 
of store characteristics, 𝑫𝑫𝑖𝑖 is a vector of month dummies, 𝛼𝛼ℎ and 𝜆𝜆ℎ are scalar parameters to be 
estimated, and 𝜷𝜷, 𝜸𝜸, and 𝝓𝝓 are the conformable vector of parameters to be estimated. The utility 
from choosing an outside option ( 𝑗𝑗 = 0) is normalized to be zero (i.e., 𝑉𝑉ℎ0𝑖𝑖 = 0 ∀ℎ, 𝑡𝑡). To account 
for household heterogeneous tastes of price and travel distance, we allow the parameters 𝛼𝛼ℎ and 𝜆𝜆ℎ 







� + 𝚷𝚷𝒁𝒁ℎ + 𝚺𝚺𝝂𝝂ℎ , (28) 
where the first component (𝛼𝛼, 𝜆𝜆)′ represents the average taste of price and travel distance over 
households, the second component 𝚷𝚷𝒁𝒁ℎ + 𝚺𝚺𝝂𝝂ℎ represents household-specific deviations from the 
average, and 𝚷𝚷 and 𝚺𝚺 the conformable matrices of parameters to be estimated. To complete the 
model, an independent and identically distributed error term 𝜖𝜖ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖  is included to capture the 
unobserved disturbance in the valuation of household ℎ’s choice of store 𝑗𝑗 for grocery shopping. 
The model hence can be written as 
 𝑈𝑈ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 = 𝑉𝑉ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜽𝜽ℎ) + 𝜖𝜖ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, (29) 
where 𝜽𝜽ℎ = [𝛼𝛼ℎ ,𝜆𝜆ℎ ,𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜷𝜷), 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝜸𝜸), 𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣𝑣(𝝓𝝓)]  is a vector of all parameters. Following the 
literature on discrete choice models, 𝜖𝜖𝑗𝑗 is assumed to be drawn from the Type I Extreme Value 








This corresponds to the choice probability of a mixed logit model. It will reduce to the choice 
probability of a multinomial logit model if the parameter matrices 𝚷𝚷 and 𝚺𝚺 are restricted to be zero. 
Recall that households only report the names of retail chains rather than the specific 
locations of shopping stores. To address this restriction, we have to match the information on the 
choice probabilities at the retail level. Let retail chains be indexed by 𝑟𝑟 = 1, … ,𝑅𝑅. The probability 
of household ℎ visiting retail chain 𝑟𝑟 at period 𝑡𝑡 is 
 𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖(𝜽𝜽ℎ) = � 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(𝑗𝑗)𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝜽𝜽ℎ)
𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽ℎ(𝑚𝑚)
, (31) 
where 𝐽𝐽ℎ(𝑚𝑚) is the household ℎ’s choice set of stores within 𝑚𝑚 kilometers of its home address, and 
𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(𝑗𝑗) is an indicator function such that 𝐼𝐼𝑟𝑟(𝑗𝑗) = 1 if store 𝑗𝑗  is operated by retail chain 𝑟𝑟  and 0 
otherwise. Let 𝑟𝑟(ℎ, 𝑡𝑡) denote the retail chain that household ℎ reports at period 𝑡𝑡. Conditional on 
𝜽𝜽ℎ, the probability of household ℎ’s observed sequence of choices in the data is given by 
 𝑠𝑠ℎ(𝜽𝜽ℎ) = �𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑟(ℎ,𝑖𝑖)𝑖𝑖(𝜽𝜽ℎ)
𝑖𝑖
. (32) 
The unconditional probability of household ℎ’s sequence of choices is 
 𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝜽𝜽) = �𝑠𝑠ℎ(𝜽𝜽ℎ)𝑓𝑓(𝜽𝜽ℎ ∣ 𝜽𝜽)𝑑𝑑𝜽𝜽ℎ , (33) 
where 𝜽𝜽 is a vector of parameters in the probability density function for 𝜽𝜽ℎ. Therefore, to evaluate 
the probability of household ℎ’s observed sequence of choices, we need to draw a vector 𝜽𝜽ℎ from 
the distribution with a given 𝜽𝜽. For repeated draws indexed by 𝑛𝑛 = 1, … ,𝑁𝑁,  the average of 𝑠𝑠ℎ(𝜽𝜽ℎ) 










where 𝜽𝜽ℎ𝑛𝑛  is the value of 𝜽𝜽ℎ  in the 𝑛𝑛 -th draw from 𝑓𝑓(𝜽𝜽ℎ ∣ 𝜽𝜽)  and 𝑆𝑆𝑃𝑃ℎ(𝜽𝜽)  is the simulated 
unconditional probability of household ℎ’s sequence of choices. Therefore, the simulated log-
likelihood function is given by 




Due to the highly nonlinear structure of the simulated log-likelihood function in Equation (35), we 
use the corresponding gradient function in the estimation to reduce the computational burden. We 
employ Halton draws for simulation instead of independent random draws to increase accuracy. A 
total of 100 Halton draws are generated for the model estimation (e.g., Petrin and Train 2010; 
Turolla 2016).46 
The substitution patterns across stores are characterized by the stores’ price elasticities, 
which measure the changes in stores’ market shares (sales quantities) in response to the changes in 

















�𝛼𝛼ℎ𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑘𝑘𝑖𝑖𝑓𝑓(𝜽𝜽ℎ ∣ 𝜽𝜽)𝑑𝑑𝜽𝜽ℎ otherwise
. (36) 
This equation implies that store 𝑗𝑗’s own-price elasticity depends on its own market share but its 
cross-price elasticities vary with rivals’ market shares. Compared to a standard multinomial logit 
model and a nested logit model, a mixed logit model relaxes the assumption of the independence 
of irrelevant alternatives to a large extent and provides more accurate estimates of store substitution 
patterns. 
 
                                                     
46 The performance of 100 Halton draws is better than that of 1000 independent random draws (Bhat 2001). 
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4.3.2. The Supply Model 
To examine the competition of stores in local markets and investigate the variation of gross profit 
margins across stores, we need to know their marginal costs, which are unobserved from the data. 
In the empirical IO studies, the marginal costs are typically inferred by the firm’s pricing conditions 
derived from an oligopolistic competition model. In the model, a firm is assumed to maximize its 
profit by setting prices in each period. The first order conditions are used to characterize the 
equilibrium solution to this profit maximization problem. Then, marginal costs can be recovered 
using the first order conditions together with the demand estimates. Consequently, profit margins 
can be attained. 
 We estimate stores’ gross profit margins in three alternative scenarios of retail competition 
in local markets. The first scenario is the most competitive case, in which stores are assumed to 
compete against each other and prices are set by individual stores. The second scenario is motivated 
by the observation from Figure 4.1 in which some stores are located on the same site. In this 
scenario, another store in a place within 1 km from a store is considered as its rivals on the same 
site and all stores are assumed to collude with their rivals in the same site only. In the last scenario, 
stores within the same retail chain are assumed to coordinate together and maximize their joint 
profits. For the purpose of illustration, we present the supply model in the last scenario. 
 Suppose a retail chain 𝑟𝑟 is operating a collection 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟 of stores in our sample. The expected 
profit function of retail chain 𝑟𝑟 at period 𝑡𝑡 is given by 
 Π𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖 = ��𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 − 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖�
𝑗𝑗∈𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟
𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖(𝒑𝒑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖,𝒑𝒑−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖) − 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖, (37) 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the store price defined by Equation (26), 𝑣𝑣𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 is the associated marginal cost, 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 and 
𝑠𝑠𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 are the local market size and market share for store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡, respectively. The price vector 
𝒑𝒑𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  and 𝒑𝒑−𝑟𝑟𝑖𝑖  represent a collection of store prices for stores from retail chain 𝑟𝑟  and others, 
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respectively. The fixed cost 𝐶𝐶𝑗𝑗𝑖𝑖 for store 𝑗𝑗 at period 𝑡𝑡 is a constant. As a result, stores’ first order 
conditions to this profit maximization problem for retail chain 𝑟𝑟 is  







= 0,∀𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟. (38) 
In contrast to the previous studies where every store competes against rivals in the entire market, 
Equation (38) contains a term 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘/𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 reflecting the size ratio of different local markets and this 
term will reduce if the sizes oftwo local markets are the same (i.e., 𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘 = 𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗 for 𝑘𝑘 ≠ 𝑗𝑗). Denote ∆ 
as the response matrix of store market share with respect to prices, where ∆𝑘𝑘𝑗𝑗= �𝜕𝜕𝑠𝑠𝑘𝑘/𝜕𝜕𝑝𝑝𝑗𝑗� ⋅
�𝑀𝑀𝑘𝑘/𝑀𝑀𝑗𝑗� for all 𝑘𝑘 and 𝑗𝑗. Then, the first order condition in vector notation is 
 𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑) + [𝑻𝑻⊗ ∆(𝒑𝒑)](𝒑𝒑 − 𝒎𝒎) = 0, (39) 
where 𝒑𝒑 is a vector of observed store prices, 𝒎𝒎 is a vector of marginal costs to be estimated, ⊗ 
represents the Kronecker product, and 𝑻𝑻 is an ownership matrix with 𝑻𝑻𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 = 1 if 𝑗𝑗,𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝐽𝐽𝑟𝑟 and 𝑻𝑻𝑗𝑗𝑘𝑘 =
0 otherwise. The differences between store prices and associated marginal costs are hence given 
by 
 (𝒑𝒑 − 𝒎𝒎) = −[𝑻𝑻⊗ ∆(𝒑𝒑)]−1 ⋅ 𝒔𝒔(𝒑𝒑). (40) 
Therefore, the stores’ gross profit margins can be calculated by (𝒑𝒑 − 𝒎𝒎)/𝒑𝒑. 
 
4.4. Results 
4.4.1. The Demand Model Estimates 
The household store choice model is essentially a revised mixed logit model of demand for stores 
that are characterized by differentiated shopping baskets. We estimate this model using the method 
of simulated maximum likelihood. Table 4.7 shows the estimated parameters in the demand model 
under different assumptions of household WTTFS. Overall, the magnitude and significance of 
estimates are robust for the mean (homogeneous) part of random coefficients rather than the 
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deviation (heterogeneous) part. This is probably because our model is estimated using aggregate 
information on households’ choice of retail chains and, as household’s WTTFS increases, the 
variation in household choice sets declines and subsequently reduces the model capability in 
identifying parameters in the deviation part of random coefficients. The last column presents a 
model specification that is often used in previous studies where household valuations of store 
proximity are not taken into account. For ease of interpretation, we focus on the benchmark model 
in which households are willing to travel as far as 16 km for shopping. Section 2.1 includes the 
detail discussion on household WTTFS in this study.  
The estimated coefficients for household shopping basket price and travel distance are 
negative and statistically significant, suggesting that households bear a disutility from higher prices 
and longer travel distances to stores. In particular, the price estimates show an inverse U-shape 
relation between the magnitude of the price coefficient and the level of household income. The 
price coefficient is allowed to differ by household income. Compared to households with income 
less than 25,000 dollars, households with income more than 50,000 dollars are less sensitive to 
price. The average price coefficient for households with income between 50,000 and 70,000 dollars 
is the mean part of –0.394, homogenous over households, plus the differential of 0.142, for an 
estimate of –0.252. The estimates of the average price coefficients for households with income 
between 70,000 and 100,000 dollars and with income more than 100,000 dollars are –0.197 and –
0.228, respectively. The average distance coefficient is an estimate of –0.369, which is less than 
the estimates of the average price coefficients for the majority of households. This implies that 
travel distance for shopping generates larger disutility than shopping basket price on the household 
valuation of store choice, which is in line with the preliminary evidence. Figure 4.2 presents the 
distributions of household willingness to pay (WTP) for travel distance by income level, measured 
by 𝜆𝜆ℎ/𝛼𝛼ℎ. In general, it shows a household’s WTP for travel distance is increasing in its income 
level. However, for households with income above 100,000 dollars, the distribution of their WTP 
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for travel distance is not in the rightmost place. Instead, it moves toward left and the average WTP 
for travel distance for households with income above 100,000 dollars is lower than the average 
level for households with income between 70,000 and 100,000 dollars. It is possible in the study 
area that households in the highest income group would spend more on food away from home and, 
thus, may not care about grocery shopping as much as households in other income levels. 
Moreover, households headed by a female are more likely to visit the sampled stores than 
households headed by a male, while married household heads are less likely to shop in the sampled 
stores than single household heads. Compared to household heads with less than high school 
degrees, household heads with high school degrees are more willing to shop in the sampled stores 
whereas household heads with graduate (or professional) degrees are less. It is worth noting that 
the sampled stores in this study are either grocery or mass merchandise stores. Probably, in the 
study area, households headed by married people and those with graduate degrees prefer a club 
store, such as Costco, which is not sampled in our data. The employment status of a household head 
does not play a significant role in grocery shopping, while the size of a household does. Compared 
to single households, households consisting of 2 to 4 people are more willing to shop in the sampled 
stores. 
In addition, the fixed effects of time and retail chains are captured by associated binary 
variables. Note that except for store prices, there are no more variables of store characteristics 
included in the model. Using store sales information, we are able to generate a continuous variable 
measuring the assortment strategy of a store (i.e., the total number of products sold in the store) 
and a binary variable indicating if a store has a salad bar or a deli department. However, these two 
variables and the retail chain dummies are highly collinear since stores from the same retail chain 
are usually designed in the same operational format. Therefore, the data do not enable us to capture 




4.4.2. Price Elasticities and Profit Margins 
Using the demand estimates, we can calculate stores’ price elasticities and their gross profit margins. 
Table 4.8 presents the summary statistics of stores’ price elasticities by retail chain and by county. 
Overall, the mean of own-price elasticities is elastic, while the mean of cross-price elasticities is 
relatively small and inelastic. This finding is similar to the result in Turolla (2016), suggesting a 
short-run change in prices might not affect the store market shares. Moreover, we find that, on 
average, stores in the counties with a larger population and more rivals have higher own- and cross-
price elasticities than their counterparts in the counties with a smaller population and fewer rivals. 
For example, the average own-price elasticities over stores in Hennepin and Ramsey achieve –
3.843 and –4.953, respectively, which are the largest two values in magnitude. 
 Next, we calculate stores’ gross profit margins for the selected 106 stores, all of which have 
elastic own-price elasticities over the study period. Table 4.9 displays the summary statistics of 
gross profit margins computed under three alternative pricing strategies. The first column shows 
the distribution of these selected stores by retail chain and by county, and the number of rivals 
within the same site. The table shows that 40 percent of the selected stores are located on a site 
where there exists at least one rival. The lower bound of the gross profit margins vary by retail 
chain and by county, ranging from 29 percent up to 48 percent. Under the second pricing strategy, 
stores from retail chain 3 and stores in Washington County, on average, have the largest increases 
in their gross profit margins. Under the third pricing strategy, larger retail chains attain higher gross 
profit margins. In particular, stores from retail chain 1 on average attain the largest gross profit 
margin of 59.89 percent, followed by stores from retail chain 2, 5, 3, and 4. This ranking is the 
same as the ranking of retail chains in terms of market shares. Overall, regardless of pricing 
strategies, stores in Hennepin and Ramsey County—the counties with the top two highest store 
density (i.e., the number of stores per km2)—have the lowest gross profit margins. This implies that 
the increase in local competition among stores will inevitably reduce their gross profit margins. 
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 Last but not least, we are interested in the robustness of the estimates of stores’ price 
elasticities and gross profit margins with respect to the assumption of household WTTFS. 
Particularly, we check the changes in these estimates in six different scenarios. In the first five 
scenarios, we assume households are willing to travel a certain distance for shopping, ranging from 
10 to 20 km. In the last scenario, we follow the previous studies and assume households are willing 
to shop in every store in the study area regardless of travel distance. Figure 4.3 displays the 
distributions of the estimated stores’ price elasticities in different scenarios. The boxplots in Figure 
4.3 reflect that the medians of estimated own-price elasticities for stores from retail chain 1, 4, and 
5 decrease in general as household WTTFS increases. The bottom right boxplot shows the overall 
distribution of the estimated elasticities for all stores, suggesting that compared to the first five 
scenarios, the median of estimated stores’ own-price elasticities in the last scenario will be 
overestimated by 17.7 to 31.4 percent. Similarly, Figure 4.4 includes the boxplots of stores’ gross 
profit margins. The bottom right boxplot specifically suggests that regardless of the assumed 
distance that households are willing to travel for shopping, the median of the estimated gross profit 
margins for all stores are underestimated by 9.5 to 17.4 percent if we fail to account for shopping 
in local markets. 
 
4.4.3. Regression Analysis of Store Competition in Local Markets 
Accordingly, we investigate how profit margins will vary with the competitive environment in local 
markets. In particular, we regress stores’ gross profit margins on the number of nearby rivals and 
the demographics of the local population, that is, the local population percentages of marriage and 
different education and household income levels. The nearby rivals of a store are defined as the 
rivals within a certain distance away from the store. 
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For purpose of illustration, we present the regression results of stores’ gross profit margins 
on the number of nearby rivals within 5 km in Table 4.10.47 With the control variables of population 
demographics in local markets, we compare the estimates of interest within and across models in 
different specifications. Column (i) to (iii) display the regression results of gross profit margins in 
the first scenario that stores compete against each other, column (iv) to (vi) in the second scenario 
that stores collude within the same site, column (vii) to (ix) in the third scenario that stores collude 
within the same retail chain. On average, an increase of one rival within 5 km of a store is associated 
with a 2.4, 1.8, and 1.6 percent decrease in its gross profit margin in three alternative scenarios, 
respectively. To differ the rival effects from different retail chains, we replace the variable of the 
number of nearby stores with the number of nearby stores from the same retail chain and other 
retail chain, as well as a collection of the numbers of nearby stores from retail chain 1 to 5. Overall, 
most of these coefficients are negative and statistically significant, suggesting the gross profit 
margin of an average store will be cannibalized by its nearby rivals.  
Moreover, we find that in the first two scenarios, the decrease in the gross profit margin 
for an average store is mainly from the competition between nearby rivals from the same retail 
chain in the local market. However, in the third scenario, the decrease is primarily from the 
competition between nearby rivals from other retail chains. The results reveal that an additional 
rival from other retail chain within 5 km of a store is related to a decrease of 1.8 percent in the 
store’s gross profit margin. In this scenario where stores collude within the retail chain, there is a 
positive association between a store’s gross profit margin and the presence of another store from 
the same retail chain. This association becomes statistically significant when the definition of 
nearby store distance is above 5 km. This implies that, in the third scenario, the distance between 
                                                     




each store from the same chain ought to be above, at least, 5 km to increase the joint profits of the 
retail chain. 
In addition, the results show that, as the definition of the distance of nearby store increases, 
the association between a store’s gross profit margin and the number of its nearby rivals becomes 
smaller but still significant. The results also show that the signs of the estimated coefficients for 
the number of nearby stores remain negative. For example, in Table C4, when nearby rivals are 
defined as other stores within 10 km, an increase in the number of nearby rivals will be related to 




We investigate food retail competition in local markets by modeling households’ store choice in a 
structural framework that allows us to account for the heterogeneity in household choice sets of 
stores, travel distances, and shopping baskets. The IRI household and retail scanner data are jointly 
used in this study. Accordingly, a revised mixed logit model has been developed to accommodate 
the restriction in the household scanner data where households only report the names of the retail 
chains they visited rather than the locations of shopping stores. Using the estimated model, we are 
able to calculate stores’ price elasticities and hence recover their gross profit margins under 
alternative retail pricing strategies that differ by the degree of coordination across stores. The results 
show stores’ own-price elasticities and gross profit margins will be over- and under-estimated, 
respectively, if we neglect household willingness to travel for shopping. This finding strongly 
suggests the importance of our research on retail competition in local markets. 
 In particular, we focus on the Minneapolis and St. Paul Metropolitan Statistical Area with 
the household and retail data aggregated by month from January to December in 2016. We find the 
price of the household shopping basket and the household travel distance are negatively related to 
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the household valuation of grocery shopping. Given a fixed level of household utility, there is an 
evident tradeoff between the price of household shopping basket charged by a store and the travel 
distance to it. The estimates of the household store choice model suggest that households prefer to 
visiting closer stores at expense of paying their shopping baskets at higher prices. The price 
coefficient implies that, as the level of household income increases, they will be less responsive to 
the change in the prices of their shopping baskets. The mean parts of random coefficients for store 
price and travel distance are robust when the maximal distance that households are willing to travel 
for shopping varies from 10 to 20 km. 
 Moreover, the average price elasticity over stores in an area reflects the local competitive 
environment. We find that, on average, stores in the counties with a larger population and more 
rivals have higher price elasticities than those in the counties with a smaller population and fewer 
rivals. Specifically, the results show that the average own-price elasticities over stores in Hennepin 
and Ramsey, the core counties made of the MSP MSA, achieve the top two largest values in the 
magnitude of –3.848 and –4.939, respectively. 
 Finally, regardless of alternative pricing strategies, the gross profit margin of a store is 
negatively associated with the intensity of local competition, characterized by the number of nearby 
rivals in the local market. Particularly, with the control of population demographics, a store in a 
local market with one more rival within its 5 km, on average, suffers a decrease of 1.6 to 2.4 percent 
in its gross profit margin depending on different pricing strategies. If stores compete against each 
other or collude with rivals in the same site, the decrease in the gross profit margin of a store is 
primarily attributed to the competition of nearby rivals from the same retail chain. If stores 
coordinate within the same retail chain, the gross profit margin of a store could, however, increase 
when another store from the same retail chain is opened in a place, at least, more than 5 km from 
the store. In other words, the joint profit of a retail chain is able to increase if the minimal distance 
between any two stores is, at least, more than 5 km. 
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Table 4.1. Summary Statistics of Household Demographics 
Variable Explanation Mean SD Min Max 
Male Household head is male 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Married Household head is married 0.59 0.49 0 1 
White Household head is white 0.87 0.34 0 1 
High School Household head has high school degree 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Some College Household head has some college or associate’s degree 0.30 0.46 0 1 
College Household head has bachelor’s degree (Reference) 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Graduate Household head has graduate or professional degree 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Kid Household has at least 1 kid aged less than 18 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Owned House Household owns the house 0.75 0.43 0 1 
Fully Employed Household head is fully employed 0.50 0.50 0 1 
Partially Employed Household head is partially employed 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Household Size = 1 Household is made up of 1 individual (Reference) 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Household Size = 2 Household is made up of 2 individuals 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Household Size = 3 Household is made up of 3 individuals 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Household Size = 4 Household is made up of 4 individuals 0.14 0.34 0 1 
Household Size ≥ 5 Household is made up of more than 5 individuals 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Household Income < $25k Household income is less than $25,000 (Reference) 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Household Income ≥ $25k and < $50k Household income is greater than or equal to $25,000 but less than $50,000 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Household Income ≥ $50k and < $70k Household income is greater than or equal to $50,000 but less than $70,000 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Household Income ≥ $70k and < $100k Household income is greater than or equal to $70,000 but less than $100,000 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Household Income ≥ $100k Household income is greater than or equal to $100,000 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Sample Size Number of Sampled Households 1280    
Note: There are 1280 households sampled in the study area. Household demographic variables in the household scanner data are categorical, none of 
which is continuous. 
105 
 
Table 4.2. Average Household Expenditure Share by Food Category  
Perishable Product Items  Processed Product Items 
Food Category Share (%)  Food Category Share (%) Food Category Share (%) 
 Baked Goods 0.95  Baby Food 0.45 Juices 1.31 
 Beef 2.81  Bakery 3.58 Liquor 2.75 
 Beef/Veal 0.05  Baking 3.38 Meals 5.03 
 Chicken 1.09  Breakfast 2.74 Non-Fruit Drinks 0.12 
 Deli Cheese 0.32  Candy 2.74 Other Frozen 0.00 
 Deli Meat 1.01  Carbonated Soft Drinks 2.81 Other Refrigerated 0.04 
 Deli Prepared 1.57  Coffee & Tea 2.29 Produce 1.22 
 Fish 0.28  Condiments & Sauces 3.14 Refrigerated Baked Goods 0.20 
 Fruit 5.42  Cookies & Crackers 2.69 Refrigerated Beverages 1.16 
 Other Meat 0.21  Dairy 12.86 Refrigerated Condiments 0.61 
 Other Produce 0.12  Drink Mixes 0.39 Refrigerated Desserts 0.10 
 Other Seafood 0.01  Ethnic 0.96 Refrigerated Dough 0.37 
 Pork 1.41  Frozen Baked Goods 0.34 Refrigerated Meals 0.98 
 Sausage 0.00  Frozen Beverages 0.20 Refrigerated Meats 5.16 
 Shellfish 0.15  Frozen Desserts 2.10 Snacks 6.35 
 Turkey 0.26  Frozen Fruits & Vegetables 1.41 Sports/Energy Drinks 0.46 
 Vegetables 3.59  Frozen Meals 5.19 SS Fruit 1.03 
   Frozen Meat/Poultry/Seafood 4.06 SS Vegetables 1.01 
   Frozen Snacks 0.43 Water 1.11 
Note: There are 55 food categories in total. The average household expenditure shares of food categories are rounded to a 
multiple of 0.01 percent and these shares are summed up to 100 percent.
106 
 
Table 4.3. Summary Statistics of Household Shopping Trip Data with Different Willingness to Travel 
 Household Willingness to Travel for Shopping 
 10 km 12 km 16 km 18 km 20 km 
Panel A. The Household Travel Distance to Shopping Stores 
Mean 6.49 7.73 10.23 11.44 12.63 
SD 2.47 2.94 3.90 4.39 4.88 
Minimum 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 0.31 
10 Percent Quantile 2.74 3.35 4.44 4.99 5.49 
25 Percent Quantile 4.68 5.62 7.50 8.22 9.03 
50 Percent Quantile 6.95 8.16 10.84 12.06 13.24 
75 Percent Quantile 8.59 10.19 13.52 15.12 16.79 
90 Percent Quantile 9.43 11.32 15.01 16.87 18.73 
Maximum 10.00 12.00 16.00 18.00 20.00 
Sample Size 112,932 155,192 257,691 313,320 372,067 
      
Panel B. The Unit Price of Household Shopping Basket  
Mean 4.11 4.12 4.12 4.13 4.13 
SD 1.31 1.32 1.32 1.34 1.34 
Minimum 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 0.61 
10 Percent Quantile 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 3.24 
25 Percent Quantile 3.52 3.53 3.53 3.53 3.53 
50 Percent Quantile 3.86 3.87 3.87 3.87 3.87 
75 Percent Quantile 4.28 4.29 4.29 4.30 4.30 
90 Percent Quantile 4.94 4.95 4.96 4.98 4.98 
Maximum 30.50 31.22 31.22 31.22 36.78 
Sample Size 112,932 155,192 257,691 313,320 372,067 
      
Panel C. The Size of Household Choice Set of Shopping Stores 
Mean 11.31 15.55 25.76 31.38 37.29 
SD 4.19 5.38 8.23 9.81 11.51 
Minimum 1 1 1 1 2 
10 Percent Quantile 6 8 14.9 18 22 
25 Percent Quantile 8 12 21 26 30 
50 Percent Quantile 11 16 26 33 39 
75 Percent Quantile 15 19 32 39 47 
90 Percent Quantile 17 22 36 43 51 
Maximum 23 28 42 51 58 




Table 4.4. Summary Statistics of Cities Overlapped with Local Markets 
County Number of County Households 
Number 
of Cities 
 Number of City 
Households 
 City Household Density  
(Households per km2) 
 Mean SD  Mean SD 
Anoka, MN 114,130 16  7,133 7,205  356 335 
Carver, MN 28,439 9  3,160 3,552  113 121 
Chisago, MN 2,755 1  2,755 –  52 – 
Dakota, MN 153,671 19  8,088 8,781  221 198 
Hennepin, MN 490,316 40  12,258 27,446  400 305 
Ramsey, MN 207,327 19  10,912 25,062  461 313 
Scott, MN 37,205 8  4,651 5,097  94 102 
Washington, MN 86,582 25  3,463 5,494  276 407 
Wright, MN 10,423 3  3,474 3,009  43 38 
St. Croix, WI 1,353 1  1,353 –  16 – 
Note: MN and WI are the abbreviations of Minnesota and Wisconsin, respectively. City, a subdivision of County, 
is a small administrative area in the United States. 
 
 





Retail Chain  Store Price (Dollars per Unit)  Store Market Share (%) 
Total Revenue (Dollars) Market Share (%)  Mean SD  Mean SD 
1 44          91,734,616 13.02  4.07 0.10  1.10 1.15 
2 22          56,298,165 7.48  4.35 0.18  1.14 0.63 
3 28          22,581,868 2.97  4.40 0.17  0.51 0.77 
4 5            3,790,683 0.54  4.04 –  0.36 0.17 
5 20          41,141,627 5.32  4.47 –  1.25 1.29 
Note: A store price is an average price across food categories weighted by its revenue.
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Table 4.6. Summary Statistics of Household Travel Distance and Shopping Basket Price 
Variable Mean SD Min Max 
Scenario 1. Restrict the sample to the household observations with the stores having the shortest travel distance, 
then to the household observations with the stores having the lowest store price. 
Travel Distance (km) 2.53 1.49 0.31 15.68 
Shopping Basket Price (Dollars per Unit) 4.01 0.89 1.24 16.91 
Choice (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.39 0.49 0.00 1.00 
     
Scenario 2. Restrict the sample to the household observations with the stores having the lowest store price, 
then to the household observations with the stores having the shortest travel distance. 
Travel Distance (km) 9.66 4.01 0.48 16.00 
Shopping Basket Price (Dollars per Unit) 3.67 0.62 1.11 10.27 
Choice (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.25 0.43 0.00 1.00 
     
Scenario 3. Subsample the household observations with the stores from the visited retail chains, and next 
restrict to the household observations with the stores having the shortest travel distance, 
then to the household observations with the stores having the lowest store price. 
Travel Distance (km) 3.96 2.58 0.31 15.86 
Shopping Basket Price (Dollars per Unit) 4.01 0.86 1.48 15.50 
Choice (Yes = 1; No = 0) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
     
Scenario 4. Subsample the household observations with the stores from the visited retail chains, and next  
restrict the sample to the household observations with the stores having the lowest store price, 
then to the household observations with the stores having the shortest travel distance. 
Travel Distance (km) 9.13 4.39 0.46 15.97 
Shopping Basket Price (Dollars per Unit) 3.90 0.78 1.34 15.50 
Choice (Yes = 1; No = 0) 1.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 
Note: This table is based on a subsample of the choices with the stores from retail chain 1 to 5 for each household. 
The choice is a binary variable indicating if a household visits the retail chain.
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Table 4.7. Estimation Results from the Mixed Logit Model 
Variables Household Willingness to Travel for Shopping  Shop in 
 10 km 12 km 16 km 18 km 20 km  Every Store 
Shopping Basket Price        
Mean –0.477*** –0.427*** –0.394*** –0.407*** –0.413***  –0.542*** 
  (0.079) (0.090) (0.069) (0.072) (0.071)  (0.076) 
SD 0.742*** 0.710*** 0.763*** 0.728*** 0.727***  0.668*** 
  (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.032)  (0.023) 
Interaction with Household Income   
≥ $25k and <$50k 0.247*** 0.162* 0.099 0.093 0.082  0.096 
 (0.082) (0.097) (0.078) (0.079) (0.078)  (0.080) 
≥ $50k and <$70k 0.304*** 0.237** 0.142* 0.123 0.141*  0.209** 
 (0.098) (0.100) (0.083) (0.086) (0.086)  (0.087) 
≥ $70k and <$100k 0.241** 0.262*** 0.197** 0.179* 0.161*  0.285*** 
 (0.105) (0.099) (0.093) (0.095) (0.091)  (0.086) 
≥ $100k 0.219** 0.169* 0.166** 0.144* 0.133  0.216** 
 (0.090) (0.098) (0.084) (0.083) (0.082)  (0.089) 
Travel Distance        
Mean –0.328*** –0.364*** –0.363*** –0.369*** –0.367***  – 
  (0.025) (0.022) (0.021) (0.02) (0.018)  – 
SD 0.614*** 0.524*** 0.465*** 0.426*** 0.405***  – 
  (0.026) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) (0.017)  – 
Male –1.032*** –0.846*** –0.924*** –1.026*** –1.061***  –0.838*** 
  (0.237) (0.218) (0.219) (0.218) (0.226)  (0.173) 
Married –0.706** –0.807*** –1.069*** –1.041*** –1.026***  –0.738*** 
  (0.313) (0.282) (0.301) (0.279) (0.269)  (0.230) 
White –0.483* –0.452 –0.182 –0.234 –0.223  –1.657*** 
  (0.254) (0.294) (0.224) (0.234) (0.239)  (0.194) 
High School 0.086 0.042 0.576** 0.459 0.608**  –0.081 
  (0.285) (0.252) (0.278) (0.288) (0.267)  (0.218) 
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Some College 0.328 0.332 0.280 0.416** 0.358*  –0.053 
  (0.237) (0.223) (0.214) (0.206) (0.208)  (0.178) 
Graduate –1.031*** –0.901*** –0.499* –0.304 –0.424  –0.876*** 
  (0.323) (0.284) (0.260) (0.269) (0.273)  (0.223) 
Kid 0.202 0.165 –0.390 –0.327 –0.358  –0.196 
  (0.396) (0.353) (0.330) (0.321) (0.316)  (0.300) 
Owned House –0.153 –0.033 –0.391* –0.202 –0.229  –0.765*** 
  (0.248) (0.230) (0.232) (0.210) (0.219)  (0.177) 
Fully Employed –0.090 –0.030 0.227 0.032 0.079  –0.465*** 
  (0.246) (0.214) (0.200) (0.208) (0.202)  (0.160) 
Partially Employed 0.113 0.106 –0.005 –0.073 –0.093  –1.013*** 
  (0.243) (0.243) (0.253) (0.255) (0.252)  (0.217) 
Household Size = 2 0.686** 0.933*** 0.891*** 0.959*** 0.987***  0.034 
  (0.324) (0.277) (0.288) (0.293) (0.287)  (0.247) 
Household Size = 3 0.663 0.703* 1.141*** 1.072*** 1.144***  –0.113 
  (0.479) (0.426) (0.411) (0.416) (0.403)  (0.370) 
Household Size = 4 0.943 0.633 1.469*** 1.441*** 1.574***  –0.064 
  (0.622) (0.564) (0.467) (0.437) (0.423)  (0.413) 
Household Size ≥ 5 –0.233 –0.121 0.246 0.504 0.503  –0.547 
  (0.604) (0.561) (0.540) (0.528) (0.522)  (0.484) 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Retail Chain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes 
Number of Households 1280 1280 1280 1280 1280  1280 
Sample Size 112,932 155,192 257,691 313,320 372,067  1,142,618 
Log–Likelihood –10866.05 –11229.76 –11424.02 –11527.95 –11554.85  –12385.90 
Note: The last column presents the estimates from the model in which households are willing to shop in every store 
in the entire market. To increase accuracy, we use 100 Halton draws in the estimation of these models. Standard errors 
are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent 




Table 4.8. Summary Statistics of Stores’ Price Elasticities 
 Number Own-Price Elasticity  Cross-Price Elasticity 
 of Stores Mean SD  Mean SD 
Retail Chain ID       
1 44 –4.832 2.631  0.065 0.029 
2 22 –2.123 0.892  0.026 0.009 
3 28 –2.952 1.615  0.040 0.026 
4 5 –3.778 1.724  0.048 0.014 
5 20 –2.709 1.203  0.035 0.012 
County       
Anoka 16 –3.121 1.748  0.042 0.024 
Carver 4 –1.832 1.120  0.024 0.018 
Dakota 27 –3.179 1.663  0.049 0.025 
Hennepin 35 –3.843 1.971  0.045 0.024 
Ramsey 18 –4.953 3.295  0.057 0.036 
Scott 4 –2.031 1.098  0.026 0.011 





Table 4.9. Summary Statistics of Stores’ Profit Margins (%) 
 Number  
Number of Rivals 
within the Same Site 
 Competition 
across Stores 
 Collusion within 
the Same Site 
 Collusion within 
the Retail Chain 
of Stores No One Two  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Retail Chain ID              
1 41 26 11 4  28.72 16.01  30.37 17.68  59.89 17.41 
2 18 13 3 2  46.77 14.12  48.16 14.67  52.20 13.45 
3 24 13 9 2  38.23 13.43  42.36 17.72  40.13 13.19 
4 5 3 1 1  30.33 9.72  32.59 6.39  30.69 9.55 
5 18 9 6 3  40.40 16.24  44.35 20.28  44.57 15.25 
County              
Anoka 14 7 4 3  35.86 14.39  38.24 15.27  49.66 12.60 
Carver 3 1 2 0  48.17 14.29  51.56 14.53  52.61 8.43 
Dakota 22 9 10 3  33.44 13.19  36.19 14.82  59.00 23.40 
Hennepin 33 27 6 0  33.05 15.76  33.37 15.75  44.12 14.57 
Ramsey 18 11 4 3  28.77 16.18  30.30 16.23  46.11 17.97 
Scott 3 3 0 0  45.18 14.92  45.18 14.92  52.05 21.50 
Washington 13 6 4 3  53.06 13.19  63.18 19.11  55.43 12.34 
Note: There are 106 stores with elastic own–price elasticities included in the subsequent analysis of stores’ gross profit margins. 
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Table 4.10. Regression Results of Stores’ Profit Margins on Number of Nearby Rivals within 5 km 
Variable Competition across Stores  Collusion within the Same Site  Collusion within the Retail Chain 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Constant –28.271*** –28.421*** –25.804***  –45.475*** –45.731*** –40.853***  –18.228*** –18.179*** –15.845*** 
 (2.445) (2.424) (2.544)  (2.541) (2.477) (2.598)  (3.192) (3.192) (3.303) 
Number of Nearby Stores –0.024***    –0.018***    –0.016***   
 (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)   
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.047***    –0.058***    –0.009  
from Same Retail Chain  (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007)  
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.018***    –0.008**    –0.018***  
from Other Retail Chains  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)  
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.019***    –0.008*    –0.011** 
from Retail Chain 1   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.037***    –0.043***    –0.024*** 
from Retail Chain 2   (0.007)    (0.007)    (0.009) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.038***    –0.045***    –0.036*** 
from Retail Chain 3   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.041***    –0.041***    0.055*** 
from Retail Chain 4   (0.011)    (0.011)    (0.014) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.002    0.024***    0.006 
from Retail Chain 5   (0.007)    (0.008)    (0.010) 
Pop. Percentage of Marriage –0.141*** –0.138*** –0.120***  –0.221*** –0.215*** –0.182***  –0.106*** –0.107*** –0.084*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.206*** 0.214*** 0.176***  0.376*** 0.391*** 0.322***  0.205*** 0.202*** 0.178*** 
Less than High Schl Degree (0.028) (0.028) (0.029)  (0.029) (0.028) (0.030)  (0.036) (0.037) (0.038) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.196*** 0.184*** 0.187***  0.223*** 0.201*** 0.205***  0.053 0.057 0.036 
High School Degree (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.037) (0.037) (0.037) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.104*** 0.092*** 0.098***  0.087*** 0.066** 0.075***  0.011 0.015 0.000 
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Bachelor's Degree (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.033) (0.033) (0.033) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.052*** 0.058*** 0.053***  0.120*** 0.132*** 0.124***  0.004 0.002 0.013 
Graduate Degree (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.016) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.478*** 0.484*** 0.433***  0.807*** 0.818*** 0.722***  0.425*** 0.422*** 0.377*** 
≥ 25k and < 50k (0.046) (0.046) (0.048)  (0.048) (0.047) (0.049)  (0.060) (0.060) (0.062) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.030 0.030 0.027  0.053** 0.054** 0.048**  –0.097*** –0.098*** –0.096*** 
≥ 50k and < 75k (0.023) (0.023) (0.024)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.024)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.031) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.369*** 0.378*** 0.325***  0.655*** 0.671*** 0.574***  0.337*** 0.334*** 0.302*** 
≥ 75k and < 100k (0.040) (0.039) (0.041)  (0.041) (0.040) (0.042)  (0.052) (0.052) (0.054) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.357*** 0.362*** 0.314***  0.605*** 0.612*** 0.524***  0.300*** 0.299*** 0.258*** 
≥ 100k (0.038) (0.037) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.038) (0.040)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.051) 
Retail Chain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.647 0.654 0.652  0.703 0.718 0.717  0.507 0.507 0.519 
F Statistic 76.227 75.928 69.123  98.140 102.09 93.220  43.157 41.869 40.205 
Note: The dependent variables are stores’ profit margins computed under the alternative pricing scenario. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Figure 4.3. Stores’ Own-Price Elasticities 
 
Note: There are 119 stores from five retail chains in the data. The horizontal axis presents the labels of six scenarios, where the numbers 
represent the five scenarios in which households are willing to travel a certain distance for shopping and “all_noDist” represents the scenario 




Figure 4.4. Stores’ Gross Profit Margins (%) 
 
Note: A collection of 81 out of 119 stores have elastic own-price elasticities in all six scenarios of household WTTFS. Stores’ gross profit 
margins are computed in the scenario in which stores compete against each other. The horizontal axis presents the labels of six scenarios, 
where the numbers represent the five scenarios in which households are willing to travel a certain distance for shopping and “all_noDist” 
represents the scenario in which households are willing to shop in every store in the study area regardless of travel distance. The numbers 
of stores are presented in the paratheses. 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
This dissertation comprises three essays on research questions in consumer demand for foods and 
consumer choices of stores. In each essay, we use a structural model of demand to elicit consumer 
preferences and identify product relationships via the estimates of price and income elasticities. In 
turn, these estimated elasticities are used to analyze the changes in welfare, policy outcomes, and 
firms’ competition. In particular, these essays provide insights into welfare changes in response to 
trade restrictions, economic benefits from demand-enhancing agricultural R&D programs, and food 
retail competition in local markets and discuss implications for public and business policies. 
 The first essay focuses on the increased demand for “The New Super Grain”—Ethiopian 
teff—in the cereal market. Over the past decade, consumer demand for Ethiopian teff has 
experienced a considerable increase in Europe and North America, resulting from a growing 
awareness of its value in nutrition. With concerns about domestic food security, the Ethiopia 
government imposed an export ban on teff in 2006. This restriction was eventually released in 2015. 
As a consequence, teff prices increased by 10 percent in 2016 and 2017. At the same time, the 
government had been implementing a wheat import program since 2008 and distributed the 
imported wheat at subsidized prices. This chapter first investigates how much Ethiopian households 
suffer from the increasing teff prices, then evaluates the extent to which food aid programs could 
mitigate the loss of consumer welfare.  
 To improve our understanding of the cereal market and welfare change in Ethiopia, we 
estimate a two-stage food demand system by using the aggregated consumption data from the two 
waves of Ethiopia Socioeconomic Survey 2013-2014 and 2015-2016. The results show that among 
all primary cereals, teff is the most inelastic one. It implies the essential role of teff in the cereal 
consumption in Ethiopia.  Specifically, an increase of 10 percent in teff prices needs a monetary 
compensation of 7.82 Birrs, which is about 3.85 percent of the weekly expenditure on foods for an 
average household. We also find that the policy offering wheat as food aid is a better alternative 
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compared to the food aid policies offering other less expensive cereals, such as barley, maize, and 
sorghum. This finding provides empirical support for the ongoing wheat import program in 
Ethiopia. 
 The second essay focuses on the introduction of new agricultural products. As the food and 
agricultural market become more consumer-oriented, large numbers of demand-enhancing 
products have been introduced in the United States to serve consumers’ heterogeneous tastes and 
their increasing expectations of food quality. But little is known about the economic benefits of 
these products. Therefore, this essay examines the social benefits from the introduction of 
Honeycrisp apples. 
 In particular, we estimate structural models of consumer demand and retailer competition 
using store scanner data covering 61 cities across the United States from 2009 to 2015. With the 
estimated demand and retailer competition model, we conduct a counterfactual analysis by 
simulating a scenario where Honeycrisp apples are removed from the market. We find that the 
introduction of Honeycrisp apples increases consumer welfare by 3.14 cents per pound, more than 
90 percent of which is from the increased number of total apple varieties and the rest from the 
decline in prices of competing apple varieties. The extent of the decline is positively associated 
with the market share of Honeycrisp apples. Moreover, the simulation results show that the 
introduction of Honeycrisp apples has increased the total sales quantity by 8.03 percent and the 
total sales revenue by 21.25 percent over the study period. In addition, the success of Honeycrisp 
is deeply rooted in the agricultural R&D initiatives in the public university system. To provide 
some implications for agricultural R&D programs in the near future, we extrapolate the results to 
the entire U.S. apple market. We find the introduction of Honeycrisp apples has increased total 
consumer welfare by about 940 million dollars between 2009 and 2015, which is approximately 20 
percent of the annual average spending on public food and agricultural R&D.  
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 The third essay focuses on the food retail competition in local markets. Markets are defined 
by two dimensions—differentiated products and geographic areas. Stores in the food retail industry 
compete against their nearby rivals by providing differentiated products in neighborhood areas.  
Using the 2016 IRI household and retail scanner data from a metropolitan area, we 
investigate the household choice of stores using a revised mixed logit model, in which we account 
for the heterogeneity in households’ choice sets of stores, shopping baskets, and travel distances. 
The results suggest the importance of the investigation of store competition in local markets. We 
find stores’ own-price elasticities and gross profit margins could be over- and under-estimated, 
respectively, if households are assumed to shop in every store in the market regardless of travel 
distance. We also find households are reluctant to travel a long distance for their grocery shopping. 
Instead, they would like to visit closer stores and pay for their shopping baskets at higher prices. 
The price coefficient implies that households would be less responsive to the change in the prices 
of their shopping baskets, as their incomes increase. Moreover, the average own-price elasticity 
(gross profit margin) over stores in a county with a larger population and higher store density is 
greater (lower) than the average in a county with a smaller population and lower store density. In 
addition, the gross profit margin of a store is negatively associated with the number of nearby rivals, 
regardless of alternative retail pricing strategies. Depending on different pricing strategies, one 
increase in the number of nearby rivals within 5 kilometers from a store is associated with a 
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Appendix A The Welfare Impacts of Increased Demand for 
The “New Super Grain” 
Table A 1. Definitions of Food Segments 
Segment Items 
Cereals Teff, Wheat, Barley, Maize, and Sorghum 
Pulses and Root Crops Horse Beans, Chick Pea, Field Pea, Lentils, Haricot Beans,  
 Potato, and Kocho 
Fruit and Vegetables Onion and Banana 
Animal Products Meat (Including Goat And Mutton Meat, Beef, Poultry, and 




Table A 2. First–Step Probit Estimates from the Lower-Level Demand System 
 Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum 
Constant 0.824*** 0.113 –0.195 0.230 0.347** 
 (0.241) (0.178) (0.161) (0.161) (0.170) 
Year 2015 0.068 0.037 0.017 0.321*** 0.096 
 (0.124) (0.109) (0.095) (0.115) (0.098) 
Region - Afar –0.669* 0.921** –0.703** 0.655 –1.540*** 
 (0.367) (0.364) (0.311) (0.418) (0.352) 
Region - Amhara –0.293 0.089 0.075 –0.164 –0.419** 
 (0.273) (0.203) (0.177) (0.176) (0.187) 
Region - Oromiya –0.416 0.419** 0.560*** 0.424** –0.268 
 (0.269) (0.208) (0.181) (0.195) (0.184) 
Region - Somali –3.090*** 0.620** –0.958*** 0.050 –0.772*** 
 (0.413) (0.270) (0.256) (0.291) (0.259) 
Region – Bens. Gumuz 0.153 –0.419 –0.617* 0.156 0.331 
 (0.416) (0.320) (0.336) (0.516) (0.498) 
Region - SNNP –0.399 0.086 0.416** 1.168*** –0.260 
 (0.258) (0.193) (0.176) (0.242) (0.181) 
Region - Gambella –0.700* –0.968*** –0.140 0.460 –1.389*** 
 (0.363) (0.324) (0.304) (0.566) (0.353) 
Region - Chartered Cities –1.278*** 0.927*** –0.340* –0.242 –0.108 
 (0.303) (0.266) (0.200) (0.200) (0.220) 
Town 2.059*** 0.644*** 0.425** 0.270 0.253 
 (0.458) (0.190) (0.165) (0.206) (0.164) 
Urban 2.563*** 1.101*** 0.979*** 0.044 –0.424*** 
 (0.353) (0.168) (0.129) (0.140) (0.126) 
Major crop – teff 1.054***     
 (0.166)     
Major crop – wheat  1.679***    
  (0.227)    
Major crop – barley   1.463***   
   (0.197)   
Major crop – maize    1.344***  
    (0.183)  
Major crop – sorghum     1.878*** 
     (0.188) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of 





Table A 3. Second–Step Estimates from the Lower-Level Demand System 
 Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum 
Constant 0.120** 0.250*** 0.331*** 0.575*** 0.599*** 
 (0.052) (0.044) (0.051) (0.049) (0.069) 
Year 2015 –0.009 0.034** 0.017 –0.025 –0.035* 
 (0.017) (0.014) (0.014) (0.016) (0.020) 
Region - Afar 0.032 0.135** 0.087** 0.174*** –0.088 
 (0.062) (0.060) (0.036) (0.057) (0.102) 
Region - Amhara 0.079*** –0.068*** 0.000 0.064** –0.031 
 (0.030) (0.023) (0.023) (0.025) (0.047) 
Region - Oromiya 0.049 –0.047** –0.026 0.104*** –0.206*** 
 (0.030) (0.022) (0.019) (0.023) (0.042) 
Region - Somali –0.083 0.240*** 0.253*** 0.155*** –0.143** 
 (0.123) (0.056) (0.066) (0.047) (0.058) 
Region – Bens. Gumuz 0.001 –0.068 0.114*** 0.024 –0.055 
 (0.068) (0.048) (0.039) (0.040) (0.072) 
Region - SNNP –0.007 –0.022 –0.003 0.133*** –0.229*** 
 (0.028) (0.025) (0.022) (0.026) (0.044) 
Region - Gambella 0.134* –0.010 0.002 0.270*** –0.184*** 
 (0.070) (0.091) (0.025) (0.066) (0.054) 
Region - Chartered Cities 0.146*** –0.026 0.056** 0.045* –0.015 
 (0.029) (0.025) (0.024) (0.023) (0.045) 
Town 0.228*** –0.103*** –0.126*** –0.184*** –0.138*** 
 (0.024) (0.021) (0.018) (0.020) (0.024) 
Urban 0.353*** –0.157*** –0.174*** –0.180*** –0.189*** 
 (0.023) (0.016) (0.019) (0.018) (0.033) 
ln(𝑋𝑋𝐺𝐺  /𝑃𝑃𝐺𝐺)  0.059*** 0.031*** –0.012 –0.105*** –0.030* 
 (0.015) (0.012) (0.017) (0.013) (0.017) 
ln(𝑃𝑃Teff)  0.098*** –0.022 0.017 –0.034* –0.024 
 (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) (0.018) (0.019) 
ln(𝑃𝑃Wheat)  –0.022 0.062** –0.066*** 0.010 0.039** 
 (0.020) (0.025) (0.013) (0.018) (0.016) 
ln�𝑃𝑃Barley�  0.017 –0.066*** 0.035 0.003 –0.004 
 (0.021) (0.013) (0.031) (0.017) (0.014) 
ln(𝑃𝑃Maize)  –0.034* 0.010 0.003 0.030 –0.084*** 
 (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.031) (0.018) 
ln�𝑃𝑃Sorghum�  –0.024 0.039** –0.004 –0.084*** 0.055* 
 (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.030) 
Inverse Mills Ratio –0.156*** –0.155*** –0.290*** –0.187*** –0.163*** 
 (0.048) (0.034) (0.039) (0.040) (0.033) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the level of 




Table A 4. Estimates from the Upper-Level Demand System 





Constant 0.713*** 0.172*** 0.145*** –0.030 
 (0.036) (0.028) (0.014) (0.029) 
Year 2015 0.013 0.006 0.002 –0.021** 
 (0.012) (0.010) (0.004) (0.010) 
Region - Afar –0.305*** –0.045 0.025* 0.325*** 
 (0.041) (0.029) (0.013) (0.036) 
Region - Amhara –0.084*** 0.070*** –0.003 0.017 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.006) (0.019) 
Region - Oromiya –0.058*** 0.040** 0.010* 0.007 
 (0.022) (0.016) (0.006) (0.019) 
Region - Somali –0.403*** 0.003 0.014 0.386*** 
 (0.035) (0.024) (0.011) (0.029) 
Region – Bens. Gumuz –0.204*** 0.066** 0.046*** 0.092** 
 (0.041) (0.030) (0.011) (0.036) 
Region - SNNP –0.192*** 0.178*** 0.013*** 0.001 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.005) (0.018) 
Region - Gambella –0.254*** –0.007 0.015 0.246*** 
 (0.039) (0.028) (0.010) (0.034) 
Region - Chartered Cities –0.177*** 0.039* 0.019** 0.119*** 
 (0.028) (0.020) (0.009) (0.024) 
Town 0.035* –0.033** 0.030*** –0.032* 
 (0.021) (0.015) (0.007) (0.018) 
Urban –0.067*** –0.012 0.042*** 0.037** 
 (0.017) (0.012) (0.005) (0.015) 
ln(𝑋𝑋 /𝑃𝑃)  –0.040*** –0.007 –0.033*** 0.080*** 
 (0.012) (0.009) (0.004) (0.011) 
ln(𝑃𝑃Cereals)  0.117*** –0.032*** –0.030*** –0.055*** 
 (0.013) (0.009) (0.008) (0.009) 
ln�𝑃𝑃Pul&RCrp�  –0.032*** 0.047*** –0.005 –0.011* 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.005) (0.006) 
ln�𝑃𝑃Fruit&Veg�  –0.030*** –0.005 0.031*** 0.004** 
 (0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) 
ln(𝑃𝑃AnimalProd)  –0.055*** –0.011* 0.004** 0.062*** 
 (0.009) (0.006) (0.002) (0.008) 
Note: Standard errors are presented in parentheses with asterisks indicating the 
level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 
5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Table A 5. Policy Outcomes of Weekly Cereal Consumption as Teff Prices Increase (Kilogram) 
      Dissimilarity from 
Policy Teff Wheat Barley Maize Sorghum Cash Voucher 
Weekly cereal consumption for an average household from the ESS 2015/2016 
 4.21 2.97 1.02 3.76 2.51  
Panel A. Teff prices increase by 5 percent 
Weekly cereal consumption for an average household simulated using the estimated demand system 
as teff prices increase by 5 percent with CV as 3.77 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 4.00 3.07 1.19 5.94 3.23 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 3.90 3.52 1.17 5.87 3.17 0.39 
Food aid – barley 3.90 2.99 1.70 5.87 3.17 1.12 
Food aid – maize 3.90 2.99 1.17 6.77 3.17 0.41 
Food aid – sorghum 3.90 2.99 1.17 5.87 3.87 0.55 
Weekly cereal consumption for an average household simulated using the estimated elasticities 
as teff prices increase by 5 percent with CV as 2.30 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 4.13 3.01 1.03 3.74 2.52 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 4.07 3.29 1.03 3.73 2.50 0.17 
Food aid – barley 4.07 2.97 1.35 3.73 2.50 0.56 
Food aid – maize 4.07 2.97 1.03 4.28 2.50 0.29 
Food aid – sorghum 4.07 2.97 1.03 3.73 2.93 0.31 
Panel B. Teff prices increase by 15 percent 
Weekly cereal consumption for an average household simulated using the estimated demand system 
as teff prices increase by 15 percent with CV as 12.16 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 4.12 3.22 1.33 6.25 3.40 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 3.81 4.67 1.25 6.00 3.20 3.24 
Food aid – barley 3.81 2.97 2.97 6.00 3.20 7.73 
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Food aid – maize 3.81 2.97 1.25 8.92 3.20 3.39 
Food aid – sorghum 3.81 2.97 1.25 6.00 5.44 4.34 
Weekly cereal consumption for an average household simulated using the estimated elasticities 
as teff prices increase by 15 percent with CV as 6.75 Birrs 
Food aid – cash voucher 3.96 3.10 1.07 3.69 2.55 0.00 
Food aid – wheat 3.80 3.93 1.05 3.68 2.49 1.27 
Food aid – barley 3.80 2.99 2.00 3.68 2.49 3.81 
Food aid – maize 3.80 2.99 1.05 5.29 2.49 2.21 
Food aid – sorghum 3.80 2.99 1.05 3.68 3.74 2.26 
Note: The first part shows the weekly cereal consumptions for an average household at the expenditure 
of 203 Birrs from data. Panel A and Panel B show changes in the weekly household cereal consumption 
as teff prices increase by 5 and 15 percent, respectively. In each panel, there are two parts, presenting the 
simulation results using the estimated demand system and elasticities. According to Equation 14, the last 
column shows the value of dissimilarity measure (× 100) between food aid policy offering cash–voucher 
and that providing wheat only, barley only, maize only, and sorghum only. 
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Appendix B The Welfare Impacts of New Demand-Enhancing 
Agricultural Products 
B.1. Data 
The data described in Section 4.3.4 are used for the estimation of demand. The main data are from 
the primary IRI InfoScan data, including weekly sales revenue and quantity from the “census” 
retailers at the Universal Product Codes (UPC) level. The “census” retailers are referred to those 
that have agreed to contribute their sales data to the IRI database. The data purchased by the USDA 
include only the sales data from these “census” retailers, which are an unprojected subset of the 
full IRI InfoScan data (Muth et al. 2016). According to agreements between the IRI and the data 
providing retailers, some of the InfoScan data are collected at the store level, while others are 
collected at the retailer market area (RMA) level. The geographic areas of the RMAs, covering 
several states, are self-defined and different by retailers. Therefore, the sales revenue and quantity 
of RMA retailers cannot be separated by (IRI) city. For a clear definition of the market, only non-
RMA retailers are included in this chapter. To provide insights into the degree to which these two 
types of retailers have systematic differences in the context of this study, we compare the 
distribution of apple sales quantity from RMA and non-RMA retailers over the study period in 
Table B1. The table shows that Honeycrisp is sold in both types of retailers and display similar 
increasing trends in market share. In 2014, Honeycrisp became the 5th most popular apple in both 
types of retailers with average market shares of 7.3 percent and 4.6 percent in non-RMA and RMA 
retailers, respectively. 
 
B.2. Apple Characteristics and Consumer Demographics 
Table B2 presents apple characteristics by variety. These data are obtained from the apple variety 
information provided by the Washington Apple Commission. The information includes a collection 
of expert assessments for usage (e.g., pie stuffing, applesauce, baking, and freezing) and a measure 
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of sweetness. In practice, we express expert assessments in binary variables, where 1 refers to 
“Excellent” and 0 otherwise. The variables of consumer demographics, such as age and household 
income, are sampled from the American Community Survey. The American Community Survey 
contains annual population statistics for age and household income by age at the county level. In 
line with the sales information, we aggregate these statistics at (IRI) city level to obtain empirical 
distributions of age and household income. Accordingly, we sample 1000 consumers for every 
market from their corresponding distributions. Table B3 describes the sample statistics for age and 
household income. 
 
B.3. Retailer Groups 
Apples are assumed to be differentiated by variety and by retailer. The retailers in our sample are 
divided into four groups based on their size: local retailers, small regional retailers, regional 
retailers, and nationwide retailers. Table B4 shows the distribution of retailers by size. Table B5 
presents average prices and market shares of apples by variety and by retailer. The descriptive 
statistics show that retail prices are notably different across groups. In particular, compared to other 
retailers, the nationwide retailers sell all varieties but Golden Delicious at the lowest prices, while 
the regional retailers sell all varieties at the highest prices. Table B5 also shows that the local and 
small regional retailers account for the majority of Honeycrisp sales. 
 
B.4. Terminal Market Prices 
The USDA Agricultural Marketing Service (AMS) provides data on monthly average prices for 
apples by variety from 15 selected terminal markets across the United States. We construct the 
terminal market prices for 61 cities in our sample as follows. If an IRI city has a terminal market, 
then retailers in that city pay the prices reported in that terminal market. If an IRI city does not have 
a terminal market, then retailers in that city are assumed to pay the average of prices reported in 
138 
 
terminal markets that are in the same division.48 For example, terminal market prices in New York 
are assigned as prices for retailers in Buffalo, Syracuse, and Albany. If an IRI city does not have a 
terminal market within its division, then retailers in that division are assumed to pay the average of 
prices reported in terminal markets in the adjacent division. For example, retailers in Phoenix are 
assumed to pay an average of prices reported in Los Angeles and San Francisco. Table B6 presents 
the full list of IRI cities and their corresponding terminal prices.
                                                     




Table B 1. Comparison of Sales Quantity from non-RMA and RMA Retailers (Percent) 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 
Sales Quantity  Non-RMA RMA Non-RMA RMA Non-RMA RMA Non-RMA RMA Non-RMA RMA Non-RMA RMA 
Gala 17.70 25.88 19.24 27.48 22.01 29.30 22.72 28.83 25.45 27.79 23.84 30.03 
Red Delicious 20.11 27.77 18.65 27.56 17.32 23.99 18.17 23.50 16.67 20.85 17.24 16.90 
Fuji 11.99 12.80 9.69 12.23 8.50 13.66 9.13 14.62 9.66 17.33 8.25 14.38 
Granny Smith 12.12 10.67 11.30 10.48 12.25 10.83 12.84 9.49 12.12 9.46 12.14 9.99 
Honeycrisp 2.48 1.39 3.64 2.24 5.27 2.44 5.33 2.84 6.82 3.37 7.34 4.58 
Golden Delicious 6.06 5.65 5.67 5.11 4.98 4.78 4.37 4.41 4.08 4.19 3.98 4.25 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 1.72 0.86 1.99 1.32 2.62 1.56 3.16 1.65 3.64 1.93 3.27 2.28 
Braeburn 2.97 1.84 3.02 1.58 2.41 1.32 2.06 0.96 1.97 0.84 1.54 0.65 
 
Table B 2. Apple Characteristics by Variety 
Variety Pie Sauce Baking Freezing Sweetness 
Gala Very Good Excellent Very Good Not Suggested 0.83 
Red Delicious Not Suggested Not Suggested Not Suggested Not Suggested 0.33 
Fuji Very Good Very Good Very Good Very Good 0.93 
Granny Smith Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent 0.08 
Honeycrisp Excellent Excellent Excellent Good 0.67 
Golden Delicious Excellent Excellent Excellent Excellent 0.56 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink Excellent Excellent Very Good Very Good 0.17 
Braeburn Very Good Very Good Very Good Very Good 0.39 
Note: The variety information is given by the Washington Apple Commission. The measure of sweetness is 
monotonically normalized from 0 to 1. As a result, a sweeter apple variety will have a larger measure.
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Table B 3. Sample Statistics for Consumer Demographics 
 Mean SD Min Max 
Age (Years) 49.62 17.04 18 85 
Household Income ($1000) 67.49 51.30 10 200 
Young Adult (25-44 Years Old) 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Note: Consumer demographic variables are sampled from the American Community 
Survey provided by the United States Census Bureau. Young adult is defined as a 
binary indicator for a consumer aged between 25 and 44. 
 
 
Table B 4. Distribution of Retailers by Size 
 Local  Small Regional  Regional  Nationwid
 
Numb. of covered IRI cities 1 2 3 4 5 6 7  10 13 15 18 19  22 28  60 61 
Numb. of non-RMA retailer(s) 14 11 6 2 4 2 1  1 1 1 1 1  1 2  1 1 
Composition by channel type 
Convenience - - - - 1 - -  - - - - -  - -  - - 
Defense commissary - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - 1  - - 
Dollar - - - - - - -  - 1 - - -  - -  - - 
Drug - - - - - - -  - - - - -  - 1  - 1 
Grocery 14 11 5 2 3 2 1  1 - 1 1 1  1 -  - - 




Table B 5. Sales Information by Variety and Outlet 
 Local  Small Regional  Regional  Nationwide 
Variety Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Prices (Dollars per Pound) 
Gala 0.40 0.17  0.33 0.11  0.52 0.16  0.28 0.09 
Red Delicious 0.33 0.14  0.34 0.12  0.45 0.16  0.32 0.12 
Fuji 0.59 0.18  0.60 0.21  0.61 0.20  0.37 0.13 
Granny Smith 0.45 0.16  0.38 0.11  0.53 0.17  0.27 0.08 
Honeycrisp 1.14 0.36  1.11 0.26  1.15 0.32  0.64 0.34 
Golden Delicious 0.53 0.18  0.51 0.18  0.67 0.15  0.59 0.29 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.78 0.22  0.77 0.20  0.83 0.22  0.39 0.13 
Braeburn 0.73 0.18  0.74 0.20  0.77 0.18  0.46 0.22 
Market Shares (Percent) 
Gala 3.75 5.09  4.18 4.90  1.03 1.35  0.69 0.76 
Red Delicious 3.58 3.75  3.11 3.55  1.01 1.37  0.33 0.33 
Fuji 1.63 2.87  0.99 1.27  1.00 2.02  0.31 0.38 
Granny Smith 1.95 2.04  2.27 2.50  0.81 0.97  0.43 0.44 
Honeycrisp 0.95 2.04  0.69 1.42  0.46 0.88  0.46 1.02 
Golden Delicious 1.10 1.54  0.90 1.12  0.24 0.28  0.15 0.33 
Pink Lady/Cripps Pink 0.45 0.64  0.45 0.70  0.23 0.31  0.27 0.43 
Braeburn 0.40 0.70  0.59 1.55  0.20 0.33  0.10 0.24 
Note: Prices are deflated by regional price indices from the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) with the base 




Table B 6. IRI Cities and Terminal Markets 
IRI Cities Terminal Markets 
BOS, HAS, PRO Boston 
NYC, BUF, SYR, ALB New York 
HAR Average over Philadelphia and Pittsburgh 
PHL Philadelphia 
PIT Pittsburgh 
DET, GRR Detroit 
TOL, CLE, COL Average over Detroit and Pittsburgh 
CIN, LOU Average over St. Louis, Chicago, and Detroit 
CHI, IND, MIL, GRB Chicago 
STL, KAN, WIC St. Louis 
PEO, MSP, DSM, OMA Average over St. Louis and Chicago 
BAL, RIC, ROA Baltimore 
CHL, RAL Columbia 
ATL, BIR Atlanta 
MIA, TAM, ORL, JAC Miami 
NAS, MEM, KNX Average over St. Louis and Atlanta 
DAL, NOL, HOU, SAT Dallas 
OKL, TUL, LIT Average over St. Louis and Dallas 
SLC, DEN Average over Seattle, Los Angeles, and San Francisco 
PHX, LAS Average over Los Angeles and San Francisco 
LAX, SDC Los Angeles 
SFC, SAC San Francisco 
SEA, PRT, SPK, BOI Seattle 
Note: In Figure 3.2, the IRI cities are denoted by shadowed areas with associated labels, while the 
terminal markets are marked by circles. The abbreviations are spelled out in the continued table.
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Table B 6. IRI Cities and Terminal Markets (Continued) 
Abbreviation IRI City Abbreviation IRI City Abbreviation IRI City 
ALB Albany, NY IND Indianapolis, IN PHX Phoenix/Tucson, AZ 
ATL Atlanta, GA JAC Jacksonville, FL PIT Pittsburgh, PA 
BAL Baltimore, MD/Washington, DC KAN Kansas City, KS PRO Providence, RI 
BIR Birmingham/Montgomery, AL KNX Knoxville, TN PRT Portland, OR 
BOI Boise, ID LAS Las Vegas, NV RAL Raleigh/Greensboro, NC 
BOS Boston, MA LAX Los Angeles, CA RIC Richmond/Norfolk, VA 
BUF Buffalo/Rochester, NY LIT Little Rock, AR ROA Roanoke, VA 
CHI Chicago, IL LOU Louisville, KY SAC Sacramento, CA 
CHL Charlotte, NC MEM Memphis, TN SAT San Antonio/Corpus Christi, TX 
CIN Cincinnati/Dayton, OH MIA Miami/Ft Lauderdale, FL SDC San Diego, CA 
CLE Cleveland, OH MIL Milwaukee, WI SEA Seattle/Tacoma, WA 
COL Columbus, OH MSP Minneapolis/St Paul, MN SFC San Francisco/Oakland, CA 
DAL Dallas/Ft Worth, TX NAS Nashville, TN SLC Salt Lake City, UT 
DEN Denver, CO NOL New Orleans, LA/Mobile, AL SPK Spokane, WA 
DET Detroit, MI NYC New York, NY STL St Louis, MO 
DSM Des Moines, IA OKL Oklahoma City, OK SYR Syracuse, NY 
GRB Green Bay, WI OMA Omaha, NE TAM Tampa/St Petersburg, FL 
GRR Grand Rapids, MI ORL Orlando, FL TOL Toledo, OH 
HAR Harrisburg/Scranton, PA PEO Peoria/Springfield, IL TUL Tulsa, OK 
HAS Hartford, CT/Springfield, MA PHL Philadelphia, PA WIC Wichita, KS 
HOU Houston, TX     
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Appendix C Food Retail Competition in Local Markets 
Table C 1. Average Shares of Store Sales Revenue of Food Categories (%) 
 Retail Chain 1  Retail Chain 2  Retail Chain 3  Retail Chain 4  Retail Chain 5 
Food Category Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Perishable Product Items               
Baked Goods 2.04 0.42  5.32 0.37  11.06 5.18  1.04 –  1.11 – 
Beef 6.66 0.37  8.93 0.22  9.69 0.87  6.32 –  6.40 – 
Beef/Veal 8.19 3.59           9.91 – 
Chicken 3.12 0.31  5.96 0.14  7.59 0.82  2.25 –  2.45 – 
Deli Cheese 6.80 0.53  5.83 0.11     8.08 –  7.67 – 
Deli Meat 7.14 0.18  7.53 0.13     7.16 –  6.56 – 
Deli Prepared 6.24 0.20  5.39 0.25  4.72 0.75  5.52 –  5.24 – 
Fish 8.41 0.54  11.40 0.82     6.72 –  6.42 – 
Fruit 2.72 0.13  3.25 0.09  2.89 0.28  2.26 –  2.24 – 
Other Meat 3.73 0.35  4.43 0.26  3.13 0.18  2.78 –  2.90 – 
Other Produce 20.63 3.40  21.92 1.79  49.54 7.06  8.49 –  9.66 – 
Other Seafood 7.47 0.83  3.13      5.92 –  29.09 – 
Pork 3.16 0.15  3.07 0.09  3.10 0.11  2.87 –  2.98 – 
Sausage 4.77 0.59        2.73 –  3.66 – 
Shellfish 11.50 0.91  10.28 0.62  16.00 2.18     5.68 – 
Turkey 2.55 0.24  2.00 0.28  1.23 0.09  2.19 –  1.99 – 
Vegetables 2.38 0.12  2.56 0.06  2.67 0.55  2.15 –  2.07 – 
Processed Product Items               
Baby Food 12.58 1.67  15.56 1.01  17.11 0.90  14.82 –  15.47 – 
Bakery 3.85 0.19  3.03 0.04  2.76 0.09  2.59 –  2.76 – 
Baking 3.57 0.13  3.96 0.19  3.85 0.28  3.55 –  3.84 – 
Breakfast 3.45 0.07  3.36 0.10  3.30 0.10  4.12 –  4.30 – 
Candy 3.55 0.16  3.56 0.07  3.56 0.09  3.85 –  3.98 – 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 3.66 0.10  2.97 0.04  2.88 0.11  3.74 –  4.13 – 
Coffee & Tea 6.35 0.23  7.90 0.22  7.77 0.50  7.40 –  7.53 – 
Condiments & Sauces 3.11 0.10  3.33 0.09  3.41 0.13  3.27 –  3.52 – 
Cookies & Crackers 3.48 0.09  3.12 0.08  3.12 0.09  3.13 –  3.18 – 
Dairy 3.34 0.09  3.32 0.07  3.13 0.09  3.45 –  3.77 – 
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Drink Mixes 3.57 0.27  4.26 0.14  4.32 0.24  3.62 –  4.02 – 
Ethnic 2.93 0.08  2.84 0.05  2.76 0.06  2.66 –  2.96 – 
Frozen Baked Goods 4.05 0.10  3.49 0.11  3.89 0.25  4.10 –  3.97 – 
Frozen Beverages 2.08 0.12  2.56 0.09  2.57 0.11  1.63 –  1.72 – 
Frozen Desserts 4.35 0.11  4.02 0.09  3.83 0.05  4.46 –  4.64 – 
Frozen Fruits & Vegetables 2.89 0.14  4.65 0.28  4.79 0.47  3.24 –  3.32 – 
Frozen Meals 4.29 0.13  4.13 0.07  4.04 0.09  4.34 –  4.63 – 
Frozen Meat/Poultry/Seafood 7.30 0.19  6.97 0.09  6.50 0.23  6.85 –  7.01 – 
Frozen Snacks 5.31 0.36  4.64 0.13  4.34 0.13  5.52 –  5.96 – 
Juices 2.98 0.14  3.09 0.08  3.12 0.15  2.92 –  3.08 – 
Liquor 8.66 0.27  9.42 2.28  2.90 1.89  9.38 –  15.38 – 
Meals 2.43 0.15  2.25 0.07  2.12 0.09  2.28 –  2.44 – 
Non–Fruit Drinks 3.74 0.35  3.97 0.25  3.86 0.54  7.40 –  5.31 – 
Other Frozen 3.06 0.53  3.32 0.20  3.19 0.25     3.35 – 
Other Refrigerated 2.97 0.10  2.35 0.03  2.34 0.05  2.63 –  2.77 – 
Produce 3.09 0.11  3.26 0.08  3.15 0.23  3.28 –  3.31 – 
Refrigerated Baked Goods 7.31 1.79  3.61 0.56  2.11 0.20  1.66 –  1.81 – 
Refrigerated Beverages 4.07 0.13  3.52 0.04  3.46 0.09  3.26 –  3.59 – 
Refrigerated Condiments 3.81 0.12  3.76 0.07  3.30 0.34  3.27 –  3.36 – 
Refrigerated Desserts 5.87 0.55  5.43 0.37  3.86 0.14  2.83 –  2.87 – 
Refrigerated Dough 3.11 0.24  2.67 0.11  2.56 0.08  2.60 –  2.68 – 
Refrigerated Meals 6.00 0.54  4.45 0.22  3.97 0.43  3.49 –  4.19 – 
Refrigerated Meats 5.75 0.18  5.66 0.07  4.96 0.40  4.55 –  5.29 – 
Snacks 3.84 0.18  4.51 0.12  4.64 0.24  4.13 –  4.15 – 
Sports/Energy Drinks 3.73 0.23  5.26 0.17  5.26 0.35  5.80 –  5.83 – 
SS Fruit 2.89 0.15  3.26 0.13  3.33 0.18  2.75 –  3.07 – 
SS Vegetables 1.58 0.12  1.64 0.11  1.47 0.17  1.57 –  1.66 – 
Water 2.79 0.16  3.04 0.10  3.03 0.12  3.44 –  3.52 – 
Note: Retail chain 1, 2, and 3 report sales information at the store level, while retail chain 4 and 5 report at the Retail Market Area (RMA) 
level. The RMA is defined by the retail chain. There is no variation in revenues and prices for stores from retail chain 4 and 5. 
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Table C 2. Average Store Prices of Food Categories (Dollars per Unit) 
 Retail Chain 1  Retail Chain 2  Retail Chain 3  Retail Chain 4  Retail Chain 5 
Item Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD  Mean SD 
Perishable Product               
Baked Goods 0.37 0.09  1.24 0.15  0.00 0.00  0.03 –  0.09 – 
Beef 3.56 0.36  0.69 0.09  0.16 0.06  1.09 –  1.81 – 
Beef/Veal 0.00 0.00           0.00 – 
Chicken 1.49 0.20  0.19 0.03  0.02 0.01  0.46 –  0.93 – 
Deli Cheese 0.22 0.05  0.22 0.04     0.06 –  0.14 – 
Deli Meat 1.30 0.30  1.11 0.18     0.20 –  0.54 – 
Deli Prepared 1.06 0.23  1.03 0.16  0.00 0.00  0.28 –  1.24 – 
Fish 0.44 0.12  0.00 0.00     0.05 –  0.08 – 
Fruit 7.39 0.71  7.22 0.61  3.85 1.20  3.65 –  5.89 – 
Other Meat 0.38 0.07  0.21 0.03  0.09 0.03  0.16 –  0.39 – 
Other Produce 0.31 0.05  0.21 0.02  0.05 0.03  0.11 –  0.19 – 
Other Seafood 0.01 0.00  0.00      0.00 –  0.00 – 
Pork 1.27 0.25  0.26 0.04  0.09 0.03  0.66 –  1.11 – 
Sausage 0.00 0.00        0.01 –  0.01 – 
Shellfish 0.17 0.06  0.07 0.05  0.00 0.00     0.00 – 
Turkey 0.30 0.07  0.18 0.04  0.17 0.07  0.09 –  0.21 – 
Vegetables 5.55 0.63  3.93 0.26  1.77 0.61  2.29 –  4.31 – 
Processed Product               
Baby Food 0.72 0.67  1.85 0.26  3.81 1.35  1.59 –  1.43  
Bakery 5.10 0.36  3.37 0.21  3.53 0.30  3.79 –  3.15 – 
Baking 2.98 0.24  2.86 0.08  2.95 0.22  3.47 –  3.49 – 
Breakfast 2.27 0.12  2.92 0.11  3.44 0.33  4.19 –  3.29 – 
Candy 1.94 0.23  4.75 0.59  9.09 1.78  8.95 –  5.49 – 
Carbonated Soft Drinks 2.97 0.42  3.28 0.47  5.25 1.29  5.83 –  4.65 – 
Coffee & Tea 2.11 0.20  3.34 0.19  5.01 0.66  3.67 –  3.01 – 
Condiments & Sauces 3.25 0.16  2.97 0.09  2.75 0.19  3.47 –  3.59 – 
Cookies & Crackers 2.57 0.24  3.18 0.26  4.00 0.51  3.80 –  2.89 – 
Dairy 12.64 0.78  11.37 0.55  9.64 1.19  6.85 –  8.67 – 
Drink Mixes 0.33 0.03  0.40 0.05  0.60 0.09  0.72 –  0.55 – 
Ethnic 1.13 0.11  1.12 0.04  0.98 0.09  1.05 –  1.20 – 
Frozen Baked Goods 0.37 0.05  0.17 0.03  0.16 0.04  0.30 –  0.33 – 
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Frozen Beverages 0.16 0.02  0.08 0.01  0.06 0.01  0.06 –  0.09 – 
Frozen Desserts 2.22 0.16  1.70 0.12  1.94 0.34  1.98 –  1.61 – 
Frozen Fruits & Vegetables 1.18 0.09  1.33 0.06  1.16 0.22  0.61 –  0.74 – 
Frozen Meals 4.19 0.28  4.54 0.34  4.91 0.57  6.25 –  5.31 – 
Frozen Meat/Poultry/Seafood 3.90 0.30  4.23 0.21  2.92 0.52  3.16 –  2.90 – 
Frozen Snacks 0.34 0.06  0.41 0.05  0.47 0.08  0.75 –  0.70 – 
Juices 1.06 0.20  1.18 0.06  1.55 0.18  2.32 –  1.57 – 
Liquor 0.12 0.07  0.76 1.67  0.00 0.00  0.16 –  2.98 – 
Meals 4.46 0.27  3.99 0.18  3.61 0.27  5.67 –  5.47 – 
Non–Fruit Drinks 0.07 0.02  0.15 0.02  0.13 0.03  0.09 –  0.12 – 
Other Frozen 0.00 0.00  0.01 0.00  0.02 0.01     0.00 – 
Other Refrigerated 0.06 0.01  0.00 0.00  0.00 0.00  0.02 –  0.04 – 
Produce 1.36 0.21  1.36 0.07  1.02 0.32  0.16 –  0.28 – 
Refrigerated Baked Goods 0.36 0.05  0.17 0.03  0.08 0.02  0.10 –  0.12 – 
Refrigerated Beverages 1.49 0.17  1.47 0.13  1.85 0.40  1.37 –  1.17 – 
Refrigerated Condiments 0.80 0.15  0.85 0.08  0.51 0.15  0.22 –  0.37 – 
Refrigerated Desserts 0.11 0.03  0.10 0.01  0.04 0.01  0.11 –  0.15 – 
Refrigerated Dough 0.37 0.05  0.31 0.04  0.24 0.05  0.29 –  0.37 – 
Refrigerated Meals 1.37 0.22  1.11 0.12  1.11 0.21  0.81 –  0.96 – 
Refrigerated Meats 5.23 0.51  5.11 0.36  3.75 0.82  3.94 –  4.99 – 
Snacks 5.11 0.37  8.59 0.47  11.70 1.41  9.58 –  7.27 – 
Sports/Energy Drinks 0.71 0.10  0.78 0.08  1.30 0.19  2.35 –  1.57 – 
SS Fruit 0.67 0.08  0.97 0.08  0.96 0.16  0.70 –  0.62 – 
SS Vegetables 1.00 0.08  0.69 0.03  0.41 0.06  0.59 –  0.69 – 
Water 1.45 0.19  2.00 0.15  2.99 0.41  1.93 –  1.20 – 
Note: Retail chain 1, 2, and 3 report sales information at the store level, while retail chain 4 and 5 report at the Retail Market Area (RMA) 
level. The RMA is defined by the retail chain. There is no variation in sales revenues and prices for stores from retail chain 4 and 5.
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Table C 3. Regression Results of Stores’ Profit Margins on Number of Nearby Rivals within 8 km 
Variable Competition across Stores  Collusion within the Same Site  Collusion within the Retail Chain 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Constant –28.014*** –28.381*** –26.425***  –44.360*** –45.042*** –40.597***  –17.796*** –16.813*** –20.882*** 
 (2.417) (2.416) (2.487)  (2.489) (2.473) (2.541)  (3.170) (3.143) (3.293) 
Number of Nearby Stores –0.013***    –0.013***    –0.010***   
 (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.002)   
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.020***    –0.025***    0.008**  
from Same Retail Chain  (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004)  
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.010***    –0.008***    –0.017***  
from Other Retail Chains  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.002)  
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.020***    –0.011***    –0.029*** 
from Retail Chain 1   (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.004) 
Number of Nearby Stores   0.009*    0.003    0.021*** 
from Retail Chain 2   (0.004)    (0.005)    (0.006) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.021***    –0.034***    0.008 
from Retail Chain 3   (0.005)    (0.005)    (0.006) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.013    –0.032***    –0.006 
from Retail Chain 4   (0.008)    (0.008)    (0.011) 
Number of Nearby Stores   0.011**    0.009*    0.008 
from Retail Chain 5   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.007) 
Pop. Percentage of Marriage –0.137*** –0.141*** –0.128***  –0.209*** –0.217*** –0.184***  –0.101*** –0.090*** –0.128*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.204*** 0.211*** 0.171***  0.369*** 0.382*** 0.303***  0.202*** 0.183*** 0.243*** 
Less than High Schl Degree (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)  (0.028) (0.028) (0.030)  (0.036) (0.036) (0.039) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.240*** 0.228*** 0.237***  0.274*** 0.251*** 0.255***  0.088** 0.121*** 0.109*** 
High School Degree (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.155*** 0.146*** 0.142***  0.146*** 0.128*** 0.115***  0.051 0.077** 0.064* 
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Bachelor's Degree (0.026) (0.026) (0.026)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.026)  (0.034) (0.034) (0.034) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.032*** 0.031*** 0.046***  0.098*** 0.097*** 0.121***  –0.012 –0.009 –0.017 
Graduate Degree (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.452*** 0.468*** 0.425***  0.757*** 0.787*** 0.697***  0.398*** 0.354*** 0.451*** 
≥ 25k and < 50k (0.046) (0.046) (0.047)  (0.047) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.060) (0.060) (0.063) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income –0.015 –0.009 –0.009  –0.004 0.007 0.012  –0.134*** –0.150*** –0.137*** 
≥ 50k and < 75k (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)  (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.032) (0.032) (0.032) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.350*** 0.362*** 0.320***  0.622*** 0.644*** 0.560***  0.319*** 0.287*** 0.360*** 
≥ 75k and < 100k (0.039) (0.040) (0.040)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.052) (0.051) (0.053) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.331*** 0.345*** 0.309***  0.558*** 0.583*** 0.501***  0.275*** 0.238*** 0.331*** 
≥ 100k (0.038) (0.038) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.049) (0.049) (0.052) 
Retail Chain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.654 0.655 0.673  0.714 0.718 0.734  0.511 0.521 0.529 
F Statistic 78.352 76.435 75.573  103.19 102.25 101.07  43.869 44.246 41.822 
Note: The dependent variables are stores’ profit margins computed under the alternative pricing scenario. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Table C 4. Regression Results of Stores’ Profit Margins on Number of Nearby Rivals within 10 km 
Variable Competition across Stores  Collusion within the Same Site  Collusion within the Retail Chain 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Constant –24.439*** –24.442*** –20.190***  –40.879*** –41.335*** –36.206***  –15.808*** –12.451*** –12.087*** 
 (2.477) (2.491) (2.467)  (2.554) (2.564) (2.471)  (3.273) (3.148) (3.322) 
Number of Nearby Stores –0.011***    –0.011***    –0.007***   
 (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.011***    –0.015***    0.021***  
from Same Retail Chain  (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003)  
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.011***    –0.009***    –0.020***  
from Other Retail Chains  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.002)  
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.007***    –0.007***    –0.007** 
from Retail Chain 1   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.001    –0.006    0.012** 
from Retail Chain 2   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.033***    –0.035***    –0.023*** 
from Retail Chain 3   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.045***    –0.065***    –0.037*** 
from Retail Chain 4   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.005    0.001    –0.002 
from Retail Chain 5   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.006) 
Pop. Percentage of Marriage –0.126*** –0.126*** –0.096***  –0.198*** –0.201*** –0.167***  –0.097*** –0.074*** –0.070*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.020) (0.020) (0.021) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.142*** 0.142*** 0.072**  0.308*** 0.318*** 0.222***  0.164*** 0.091** 0.116*** 
Less than High Schl Degree (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.029)  (0.038) (0.037) (0.039) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.207*** 0.207*** 0.195***  0.241*** 0.235*** 0.207***  0.059 0.106*** 0.064* 
High School Degree (0.028) (0.028) (0.028)  (0.029) (0.029) (0.028)  (0.037) (0.036) (0.038) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.124*** 0.124*** 0.095***  0.116*** 0.112*** 0.066***  0.023 0.052* 0.013 
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Bachelor's Degree (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)  (0.026) (0.026) (0.025)  (0.033) (0.032) (0.033) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.032*** 0.032*** 0.060***  0.099*** 0.098*** 0.131***  –0.009 –0.002 0.010 
Graduate Degree (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.016) (0.015) (0.017) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.417*** 0.417*** 0.340***  0.724*** 0.736*** 0.657***  0.387*** 0.300*** 0.303*** 
≥ 25k and < 50k (0.047) (0.047) (0.047)  (0.048) (0.048) (0.047)  (0.061) (0.059) (0.064) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.008 0.008 0.027  0.019 0.021 0.060***  –0.110*** –0.127*** –0.104*** 
≥ 50k and < 75k (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.023)  (0.031) (0.029) (0.031) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.303*** 0.303*** 0.229***  0.576*** 0.587*** 0.499***  0.295*** 0.215*** 0.223*** 
≥ 75k and < 100k (0.040) (0.041) (0.040)  (0.041) (0.042) (0.040)  (0.053) (0.051) (0.054) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.294*** 0.294*** 0.222***  0.522*** 0.533*** 0.450***  0.261*** 0.180*** 0.192*** 
≥ 100k (0.038) (0.039) (0.039)  (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)  (0.051) (0.049) (0.052) 
Retail Chain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.658 0.658 0.679  0.717 0.717 0.749  0.510 0.551 0.522 
F Statistic 79.813 77.256 77.770  104.71 101.72 109.29  43.712 49.806 40.731 
Note: The dependent variables are stores’ profit margins computed under the alternative pricing scenario. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent.
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Table C 5. Regression Results of Stores’ Profit Margins on Number of Nearby Rivals within 16 km 
Variable Competition across Stores  Collusion within the Same Site  Collusion within the Retail Chain 
 (i) (ii) (iii)  (iv) (v) (vi)  (vii) (viii) (ix) 
Constant –26.576*** –26.830*** –30.865***  –42.530*** –42.831*** –47.729***  –18.221*** –19.707*** –20.931*** 
 (2.534) (2.530) (2.535)  (2.598) (2.592) (2.578)  (3.303) (3.129) (3.278) 
Number of Nearby Stores –0.005***    –0.006***    –0.002**   
 (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)   
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.002    –0.002    0.015***  
from Same Retail Chain  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.002)  
Number of Nearby Stores  –0.007***    –0.007***    –0.010***  
from Other Retail Chains  (0.001)    (0.001)    (0.001)  
Number of Nearby Stores   0.011***    0.014***    0.012*** 
from Retail Chain 1   (0.002)    (0.002)    (0.003) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.019***    –0.025***    –0.001 
from Retail Chain 2   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.024***    –0.024***    –0.033*** 
from Retail Chain 3   (0.003)    (0.003)    (0.003) 
Number of Nearby Stores   0.001    0.006    –0.026*** 
from Retail Chain 4   (0.006)    (0.006)    (0.008) 
Number of Nearby Stores   –0.016***    –0.022***    –0.002 
from Retail Chain 5   (0.004)    (0.004)    (0.005) 
Pop. Percentage of Marriage –0.134*** –0.133*** –0.154***  –0.202*** –0.201*** –0.229***  –0.111*** –0.107*** –0.122*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.016)  (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)  (0.021) (0.020) (0.021) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.166*** 0.164*** 0.183***  0.327*** 0.324*** 0.361***  0.192*** 0.178*** 0.149*** 
Less than High Schl Degree (0.029) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.030) (0.030)  (0.038) (0.036) (0.038) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.196*** 0.204*** 0.172***  0.233*** 0.243*** 0.202***  0.045 0.095*** –0.002 
High School Degree (0.029) (0.029) (0.032)  (0.029) (0.030) (0.032)  (0.037) (0.036) (0.041) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.117*** 0.122*** 0.070**  0.113*** 0.118*** 0.060**  0.009 0.036 –0.072** 
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Bachelor's Degree (0.026) (0.026) (0.028)  (0.027) (0.027) (0.029)  (0.034) (0.032) (0.037) 
Pop. Percentage of Education 0.046*** 0.051*** 0.107***  0.111*** 0.117*** 0.175***  0.003 0.033** 0.084*** 
Graduate Degree (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.012) (0.012) (0.013)  (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.449*** 0.446*** 0.530***  0.744*** 0.740*** 0.844***  0.434*** 0.415*** 0.504*** 
≥ 25k and < 50k (0.048) (0.048) (0.048)  (0.050) (0.049) (0.049)  (0.063) (0.060) (0.062) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.039* 0.042* 0.112***  0.045* 0.049** 0.121***  –0.081*** –0.062** 0.052 
≥ 50k and < 75k (0.023) (0.023) (0.026)  (0.024) (0.024) (0.026)  (0.030) (0.029) (0.034) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.346*** 0.345*** 0.429***  0.611*** 0.610*** 0.718***  0.340*** 0.333*** 0.383*** 
≥ 75k and < 100k (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.042) (0.042) (0.042)  (0.053) (0.050) (0.053) 
Pop. Percentage of HH Income 0.319*** 0.315*** 0.380***  0.535*** 0.531*** 0.615***  0.302*** 0.283*** 0.341*** 
≥ 100k (0.040) (0.040) (0.041)  (0.041) (0.041) (0.041)  (0.053) (0.050) (0.052) 
Retail Chain Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
County Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Time Effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272  1,272 1,272 1,272 
Adjusted 𝑅𝑅2 0.643 0.645 0.670  0.708 0.709 0.734  0.503 0.555 0.548 
F Statistic 74.927 73.111 74.792  100.26 98.006 101.25  42.444 50.438 44.973 
Note: The dependent variables are stores’ profit margins computed under the alternative pricing scenario. Standard errors are presented in parentheses 
with asterisks indicating the level of significance, where *** represents the 1 percent level of significance, ** 5 percent, and * 10 percent. 
